Abstract:
SC’s landmark ruling in the case State of Tamil Nadu Vs. The Governor of Tamil Nadu opens a can of worms. The Apex Court unanimously held that the Tamil Nadu Governor’s withholding of 10 State Legislative Bills was ‘illegal’ and ‘erroneous’. In doing so, the Bench used its special discretionary power under Article 142[1] to hold that the bills which were pending assent and reserved for President’s approval were deemed assented. The judgement stands on the precipice of Judicial Activism or Judicial Overreach, yet protecting the core democratic principles of India, distinguishing power between the democratically elected Assembly and The Governor. In this Paper, I would elucidate the Hon’ble Court’s decision of using Article 142 to do Complete Justice and discuss the constitutional powers of the Governor in using absolute and pocket veto. Rooted in the ideals of democracy, SC’s decision interprets Article 200[2], its clauses and sub-clauses and lays a foundation for the system of checks and balances in our country.
Keywords:
Judicial Activism, Judicial Overreach, Gubernatorial Powers, pocket veto, absolute veto
Introduction:
Between 13-01-2020 and 28-04-2023, the Legislature of state of Tamil Nadu enacted and forwarded 12 Bills for the final assent of the Governor. Even though the current governor, R.N Ravi, took charge of the office from 18-11-2021, yet he did not take the necessary action on any of the said bills until October 2023. On 31st October, 2023, Government of Tamil Nadu, the petitioner, moved the Supreme Court challenging the hon’ble governor’s decision to keep various Bills and other proposals submitted by the state government pending indefinitely.
On 10-11-2023, the Court issued notice and the Governor took a decision 3 days later by withholding assent simpliciter to 10 Bill. The Governor, without the aid of the Council of Ministers, exercised his discretion and reserved the remaining 2 Bills for President’s consideration.
The Supreme Court interpreted Article 200 of the Constitution, which outlines Governor’s assent to Bills passed by the State Legislature, that while no explicit time limit is prescribed for the Governor’s decision, the phrase ‘as soon as possible’ implies that the decision must be taken expeditiously. The phrases ‘indefinitely sitting on Bills’ and ‘simply rejecting the Bills without returning them to the Legislature’, which can be implied as ‘pocket veto’ and ‘absolute veto’ respectively are not permissible under the Constitution scheme. Akin to Article 111[3], which states if and when, the Parliament passes a Bill again, with or without amendment, the President is obligated to give assent, similarly, the Governor must grant assent within a specified timeframe and cannot reserve them for the President’s consideration in the second round.
This paper provides an analytical examination of the Governor’s powers that is incorporated under Articles 200, 213(1)(b), 254(2) with reference to Article 111. It explores the risk to a democratically elected Government when the Governor, appointed by the Centre, can misuse his discretionary power, by delaying the legislative procedure of passing and giving assent to the Bills. The Article discusses the Supreme Court’s landmark judgement, where the apex court for the first time gave assent to the pending bills, dissecting the thin line difference between activism and overreach.
1. Understanding Article 200 of the Constitution
When a bill gets clearance from all its legislative processes in a state, then that bill must be presented to the Governor to make it an Act. Article 200 of the Constitution is used by the Governor when a bill has been passed by the Legislative Assembly of a State or, in the case of a State having a Legislative Council, has been passed by both houses of the Legislature of the state. It shall be presented to the Governor to give his assent to the bill or withhold the bill. He has some options, which are provided to him by Article 200, which are:
- Grant Assent: The Governor can approve the bill, making it an Act.
- Withhold Assent: The Governor can withhold assent to the bill and may choose not to sign, effectively vetoing the bill.
- Reserve for the President’s Consideration: If a bill potentially impinges on the powers of the High Court or touches upon central interests, the Governor can refer it to the President for further scrutiny.
- Return the Bill for Reconsideration: For bills that are not Money Bills, the Governor can send them back to the legislature (accompanied by recommended changes) for a second look. If the legislature passes the bill again—whether modified or unchanged—the Governor must then give assent.
Reiterating the fourth option, the Governor ‘may, as soon as possible’, return Bills other than money Bills, with a message requesting that the house reconsider it in parts or in whole. If the Legislative House after reconsidering the Bill sends it to the Governor once again, the Governor ‘shall not withhold assent there from’. While the Governor must return the Bill as soon as possible, no specific timeframe is provided. The Raj Bhawans have exploited this ambiguity to sit on Bills indefinitely without returning them to the Legislature.
The ruling in ‘State of Punjab Vs. Principal Secretary to the Governor[4]’ exemplifies that the Governor is a symbolic head and cannot withhold action on Bills passed by the Legislature. The court said that, in a Parliamentary form of democracy, real power rests in the elected representatives of the people. The fundamental principle of constitutional law which has been consistently followed since the Constitution was adopted is that the Governor acts on the ‘aid and advise’ of the Council of Ministers, save and except in those areas where the Constitution has entrusted the exercise of discretionary power to the Governor.
The office of Governor is a Constitutional position, distinct from the political sphere of the state; he must exercise his power in bona fide and to uphold the constitution. Follow Punchhi commission[5] advice i.e. Article 163 does not give the governor a general discretionary power to act against or without the advice of his council of ministers. The Governor must act in a way to balance autonomy, scrutiny and accountability at every step of law making.
2. Critical Analysis of SC’s Decision:
The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the core issue in the present matter lies in the interpretation of substantive part of Article 200 of the Constitution. After thorough analysis of various aspects of the aforementioned Article, the Court pointed out that in discharge of his functions, the Governor has three options to choose from when a bill passed by the State legislature is presented to him- to assent; to withhold assent; and to reserve the bill for consideration of President. The Court made it clear that the first proviso to Article 200 cannot be treated as a standalone power in the Governor’s hands. Instead, it is meant to work in conjunction with the option of withholding assent mentioned in the substantive part of Article 200. This means that the Governor cannot simply say “withheld” and stop there; once he chooses that course, he is bound to follow the procedure laid down in the proviso.
In State of Punjab v. Principal Secretary to the Governor of Punjab 2023, the Supreme Court confirmed this position. It also clarified the earlier interpretation in Union of India v. Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary[6] (1979) when a Governor withholds assent and sends the Bill back to the legislature with his recommendations, the Bill “falls through” unless the legislature reconsiders it, addresses his concerns, and re-passes it. Importantly, the Court stressed that this phrase does not mean the Governor has discretion on whether to trigger the proviso; once he opts to withhold assent, he must act “as soon as possible” to set that process in motion.
The Court also drew attention to the words ‘shall declare’ in Article 200. This phrase leaves no room for inaction: when a Bill is presented, the Governor has a constitutional duty to act, and must pick one of the three choices available under Article 200. He cannot sit on the Bill indefinitely, exercising a pocket veto. Similarly, since the first proviso is tied directly to the withholding of assent, the Governor cannot exercise an absolute veto either. In simple terms, the Governor’s role is to facilitate the Bill’s journey from legislature to law, not block it. The Court put this powerfully: without Article 200’s procedure, Bills would remain “mere pieces of paper—skeletons without flesh or lifeblood.”
Another key point the Court clarified was about what happens after a Bill is re-passed and sent back to the Governor. The proviso’s language ‘shall not withhold assent therefrom’ puts a clear bar on the Governor. He must assent, unless the new Bill is materially different from the one earlier presented. Only in that exceptional case can the Governor reconsider his options under Article 200.
As for discretion, the Court explained that the Governor has no general freedom to act independently. Only where the Constitution specifically allows it like under Article 163(1) or the second proviso to Article 200 can the Governor override ministerial advice. Even then, such actions are subject to judicial review. This directly overruled B.K. Pavitra v. Union of India (2019)[7] , which had wrongly suggested two things: (i) that the Governor has discretion in reserving Bills for the President, and (ii) that such discretion is immune from judicial scrutiny. Both were declared incorrect.
Moving to Article 201, the Court pointed out that the Governor can reserve a Bill for the President’s consideration only in specific situations—for example, where the Constitution itself requires presidential assent (like Articles 31-A, 31-C, 254(2), 288(2), 360(4)(a)(ii)), or where a Bill may be unconstitutional. Even then, the President is expected to act cautiously: since questions of constitutionality belong to the courts, the President should ideally use his powers under Article 143 to seek the Supreme Court’s opinion before deciding.
Importantly, the Court stressed that it was not undermining the Governor’s office. Instead, it reminded that the Governor must act as a friend, philosopher, and guide, not a political actor. His role is to promote consensus, keep the system running smoothly, and uphold the dignity of his constitutional office. In times of political tension, he should act with wisdom and restraint—never as a roadblock.
The Court appealed to all constitutional authorities: the values of the Constitution are rooted in the struggles and sacrifices of India’s forefathers. Those who hold high office must ask themselves whether their actions reflect their constitutional oath and advance these values, or whether they are letting short-term politics weaken them. To deliberately bypass constitutional duties, the Court warned, is to tamper with the very ideals on which India was built.
3. Was the use of Article 142 appropriate?
The Supreme Court’s use of its extraordinary power under Article 142 in State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu has sparked constitutional debate. Article 142 empowers the Court to pass any decree or order “necessary for doing complete justice” in any matter before it. In this case, the Governor had delayed action on several bills passed by the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, effectively creating a constitutional stalemate. Since Article 200 provides only three courses of action—assent, withholding with recommendations, or reservation for the President—the Governor’s prolonged inaction amounted to an unconstitutional pocket veto.
From this perspective, the Court’s invocation of Article 142 was appropriate and necessary. It ensured that the functioning of representative democracy was not paralyzed by executive inaction. By mandating that the Governor act “as soon as possible,” the Court reinforced constitutional accountability and safeguarded the will of the legislature, which represents the people. In this sense, Article 142 served as a safety valve against misuse of constitutional office.
However, concerns remain. Critics argue that liberal use of Article 142 risks judicial overreach, as it allows the Court to bypass express constitutional text and conventions. Ideally, disputes of this nature should be resolved strictly within the framework of Articles 200 and 201[8]. Overreliance on extraordinary powers could blur the lines between judicial review and judicial legislation.
In view of the unique and prolonged chain of events, the Bench concluded that it was “absolutely necessary and appropriate” to invoke its extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to deem the 10 pending bills as having received assent on the date of which it was sent to the Governor in the second round. The provision allows the Court to pass any decree or order to ensure “complete justice”. The Court emphasised that this exercise of Article 142 was not undertaken lightly or routinely, but only after the “deepest of deliberations.” It also declared that any actions by the President on these bills were void ab initio. The President had rejected assent on seven of these bills.
The Bench justified its decision by highlighting three key factors: the inordinate delay in processing the bills, the Governor’s failure to communicate his reasons for withholding assent, and the improper act of reserving the bills for the President in the second round—a clear breach of the procedure established under Article 200. Under these circumstances, the Court held that it was its “constitutionally bounden duty” to declare the ten bills as having received assent.
Yet, given the urgency and the Governor’s persistent disregard of his constitutional duty, the Court’s intervention was justified. In this instance, Article 142 was rightly used as a corrective mechanism to uphold constitutional governance and prevent erosion of democratic values.
4. Judicial Activism or Judicial Overreach?
On one construction, the judgment exemplifies judicial activism. The Court, by directing that the Governor act “as soon as possible,” read the constitutional text purposively and infused it with a sense of mandatory expedition. This interpretation reinforced the parliamentary scheme that the Governor, as a constitutional head, cannot obstruct the will of the legislature. Reliance on Union of India v. Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary and the reaffirmation of State of Punjab v. Principal Secretary to the Governor of Punjab further cemented the principle that gubernatorial powers under Article 200 are structured and circumscribed, not discretionary. In this sense, the judgment may be seen as judicial activism designed to secure constitutional accountability and prevent executive arbitrariness.
Conversely, it may also be contended that the decision verges on judicial overreach. By laying down a strict obligation upon the Governor regarding timelines and sequencing, the Court arguably travelled beyond the express language of Articles 200 and 201. Critics maintain that such matters are best left to constitutional conventions and the political process rather than judicial fiat. The apprehension is that the judiciary may, by repeated interventions, dilute the functional separation of powers.
A neutral appraisal suggests that the decision lies in a zone between activism and restraint. While the Court expanded its oversight over gubernatorial conduct, it did so in order to resolve an extraordinary constitutional impasse and to preserve the efficacy of representative democracy. Hence, the ruling reflects calibrated judicial activism rather than unrestrained overreach.
5. Beyond Assent: Relevance in Parliamentary Democracy
The case of State of Tamil Nadu vs. Governor of Tamil Nadu stands as a defining moment in India’s constitutional jurisprudence, as it decisively addressed the limits of gubernatorial discretion in granting assent to bills. Traditionally, Article 200 of the Constitution vests the Governor with powers to either grant assent, withhold assent, reserve the bill for the President, or return it for reconsideration. However, the prolonged inaction of Governors in several states, particularly in Tamil Nadu, created a constitutional deadlock that undermined legislative functioning.
In its ruling, the Supreme Court clarified that the Governor cannot exercise an indefinite “pocket veto.” The Court emphasized that the Governor, as a constitutional head, is bound to act within a reasonable time and in accordance with the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. This interpretation expands new doors beyond the simplistic binary of assent or non-assent, embedding the principle of constitutional accountability. By holding that indefinite delay defeats the very purpose of legislative intent, the judgment strengthens the doctrine of responsible government.
Its relevance to parliamentary democracy lies in the reaffirmation that the real authority rests with the elected representatives, not with a nominated constitutional head. The decision thus preserves the federal balance by ensuring that Governors do not become parallel power centers or political veto players. Instead, they remain facilitators of the legislative process.
By curbing the misuse of gubernatorial powers, the judgment provides a clear precedent for other states facing similar executive-legislature tensions. It safeguards legislative supremacy[9], upholds democratic will, and curtails arbitrariness in constitutional offices. In essence, this case not only resolves a procedural ambiguity but also reinforces the foundational principle that parliamentary democracy thrives only when constitutional actors remain within their prescribed limits.
6. Suggestions[10]
By holding that Governors are bound to act within a reasonable time and in accordance with the advice of the elected government, the Court reinforced the principles of legislative supremacy and constitutional accountability. However, for the judgment to have lasting impact, systemic reforms must follow.
One crucial step is the introduction of a statutory time frame within which the Governor must act on a Bill, thereby eliminating the scope of indefinite delays. A period of three to six months could balance both constitutional deliberation and legislative efficiency. Alongside this, clear procedural guidelines should be laid down to standardize gubernatorial conduct across states and prevent arbitrary interpretations of Article 200.
Further, to uphold the spirit of federalism, whenever a Bill is reserved for the President, mandatory consultation with the concerned state government should be institutionalized. This would prevent unilateral actions and strengthen cooperative federalism. Similarly, a mechanism for judicial recourse could be created, allowing states to directly approach the Supreme Court in cases of unreasonable delay, ensuring swift resolution of constitutional deadlocks.
Equally important is the cultivation of constitutional conventions and training for Governors, reinforcing their role as neutral constitutional heads rather than political actors. In addition, legislative committees at the state level can monitor pending assent bills and promote accountability, while public disclosure of reasons for withholding or returning a Bill can bring transparency to the process.
Together, these measures would ensure that the Governor’s office operates as a facilitator of democracy rather than an impediment. By curbing arbitrariness and reinforcing legislative primacy, India can move closer to realizing the constitutional vision of a robust and responsible parliamentary democracy.
Conclusion
The State of Tamil Nadu vs. Governor of Tamil Nadu case reveals how constitutional silences can create egregious situations that threaten the smooth functioning of parliamentary democracy. As the Supreme Court itself noted, its intervention was necessitated not to create a binding precedent, but to resolve a deadlock where the Governor had withheld action on Bills since 2020. This episode underlines the fragility of democratic institutions when constitutional offices exceed or delay their mandated roles. While the Court carefully avoided overruling or expanding the law beyond its context, the judgment nonetheless affirms a vital democratic principle—that the Governor’s office must function within the spirit of the Constitution and respect the mandate of the elected government. Moving forward, systemic reforms such as time-bound guidelines, greater transparency, and stronger federal conventions are essential to prevent such deadlocks. Ultimately, the case reinforces that parliamentary democracy can only thrive when constitutional actors uphold accountability, restraint, and fidelity to the people’s will.
References
- Article 200 Overview – https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1580975/
- Article 201 Overview – https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1776802/
- https://www.scobserver.in/reports/pendency-of-bills-before-tamil-nadu-governor-judgement-summary/
- https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2025/04/14/explained-sc-decsion-tamil-nadu-governor-powers-article-200-pocket-veto-sc-legal-news/
- https://indiankanoon.org/doc/82729634
- https://www.constitutionofindia.net/parts/part-vi/
- https://indiankanoon.org/doc/138338220/
- State of Punjab v. Principal Secretary to the Governor of Punjab (2023) – Supreme Court of India.
- Union of India v. Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary (1979) 3 SCC 324.
- Punchhi Commission Report on Centre-State Relations (2010)
Submitted By:
Mukti Sharma
BA LLB
University School of Law and Legal Studies, GGSIPU
[1] INDIA CONST. art. 142
[2] INDIA CONST. art. 200.
[3] INDIA CONST. art 111
[4] State of Punjab v. Principal Sec’y to the Governor of Punjab, (2023) 11 SCC 1.
[5] Punchhi Commission on Centre–State Relations, Report of the Commission on Centre–State Relations, Vol. I (2010), https://interstatecouncil.nic.in/punchhi-commission
[6] Union of India v. Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary, (1979) 3 SCC 324.
[7] B.K. Pavitra v. Union of India, (2019) 16 SCC 129.
[8] INDIA CONST. art 201
[9] Mahendra Prasad Singh, Discretionary Powers of the President and Governors in India in Constitution and Practice, 63 Indian J. Pol. Sci. 287 (2002).
[10] John A. Fairlie, The Veto Power of the State Governor, 9 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 860 (1915).