Shivansh Sharma
Damodaram Sanjivayya National Law University, Visakhapatnam
A Case Comment Submitted for the Virtual Internship Program
The Amikus Qriae
September 2025
Date of Submission: 2nd October 2025
FACTS
The central legal question in this case concerned the State of Punjab’s power to create sub-classifications within the Scheduled Castes (SCs) for the purpose of reservation in public services.
The dispute originated from Section 4(5) of the Punjab Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes (Reservation in Services) Act, 2006 (the 2006 Act).[1] Specifically, this provision stipulated a first preference for Balmikis and Mazhabi Sikhs in 50% of the vacancies reserved for the Scheduled Castes. The State’s objective was to ensure that the most marginalized communities within the broader SC category received adequate benefits, a policy rationalized by empirical evidence of their persistent under-representation despite the existing quota.
Consequently, this provision was subjected to challenge before the Punjab and Haryana High Court. Citing the Supreme Court’s 2004 judgment in E.V. Chinnaiah v. State of A.P.[2], which established that the Presidential list of SCs under Article 341 constituted a singular, homogenous group that state legislatures were precluded from sub-dividing, the High Court invalidated Section 4(5) of the 2006 Act as unconstitutional.
The State of Punjab appealed this decision to the Supreme Court. A five-judge bench initially adjudicating the matter referred the issue to a larger bench, opining that the Chinnaiah ruling required reconsideration in light of the principles established in Indra Sawhney and the imperative of substantive equality. Pursuant to this reference, the matter was heard by a seven-judge Constitution Bench in State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh[3] in order to definitively determine the legal validity of sub-classification within the SC/ST categories.
ISSUES RAISED
- Whether sub-classification within the Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) for the purpose of reservation is constitutionally permissible under Articles 14, 15, and 16 of the Constitution of India.
- Whether the earlier five-judge bench decision in E.V. Chinnaiah v. State of A.P., which held that SCs constitute a homogenous class and cannot be sub-divided by State action, was correctly decided and requires revisiting.
- Whether State Legislatures are competent to enact laws providing for sub-classification within the SC list, or if such power is exclusively vested with the President and Parliament under Article 341.
CONTENTION
Contentions of the Appellant (State of Punjab)
The State of Punjab, supported by intervening parties, contended that the High Court erred in invalidating the Act, asserting that the legislative action was constitutionally permissible and sociologically necessary. The essence of the State’s submission rested on four primary contentions:
- Substantive Equality and Legislative Competence: The State argued that reservation policy is constitutionally mandated to achieve substantive equality. Given that certain castes within the Scheduled Castes (SC) list (specifically Balmikis and Mazhabi Sikhs) remain profoundly under-represented due to the benefits being disproportionately appropriated by the more advanced “creamy layer” within the SC category, sub-classification constitutes a necessary measure to ensure the equitable distribution of entitlements. The power to enact such special provisions for the advancement of backward classes under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) is an independent source of legislative authority that inherently includes the prerogative to prioritize the most backward segments for whom the reservation was originally conceived.
- Article 341 Poses No Statutory Impediment: The Appellant unequivocally submitted that the President’s power under Article 341[4] is solely limited to the identification and notification of the SC list. This power does not preclude the State from apportioning reservation benefits among those listed groups. Sub-classification, in this context, is not an exclusion from the Presidential list but rather a proportional distribution mechanism.
- The Chinnaiah Ruling is Factually Inconsistent: The Appellant contested the foundational premise of the E.V. Chinnaiah judgment, which established the SCs as a homogeneous class. This theory is contrary to socio-economic reality, as the SC category is demonstrably heterogeneous and necessitates a judicial reconsideration.
Contentions of the Respondents
Conversely, the Respondents, defending the High Court’s ruling and the Chinnaiah precedent, raised the following counter-arguments:
- Constitutional Uniformity and Exclusive Power: The Respondents posited that Article 341 vests the exclusive power to prepare and alter the SC list with the President and Parliament, thereby guaranteeing a uniform status of all SCs across the State. Sub-classification by a State Legislature amounts to an unwarranted encroachment upon the Presidential list.
- Violation of Equality: The establishment of quotas within a quota contravenes the fundamental guarantee of equality (Article 14). It results in treating groups within the same list—recognized as equally backward for constitutional purposes—differently, thereby creating unequal benefits.
- Lack of Legislative Competence: State Legislatures lack the authority to create an internal sub-group within the Presidential list. Should a caste be over-represented, the only legitimate recourse is to recommend its exclusion from the SC list, a power only Parliament holds.
RATIONALE
The seven-judge Constitution Bench, by a decisive 6:1 majority, affirmed the constitutional validity of sub-classification within the Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs). The Court’s rationale primarily rested on a holistic interpretation of the Constitutional guarantee of equality and the principle of substantive equality, and consequentially overruled the 2004 judgment in E.V. Chinnaiah v. State of A.P.
- Acknowledgment of Intra-Group Heterogeneity
The fundamental premise of the Court’s reasoning was the recognition that the castes and tribes listed under Articles 341 and 342[5] do not constitute a homogenous class. The bench acknowledged that within the broad SC category, there are groups who are significantly “more backward” and continue to suffer from deeper social disabilities, resulting in the reservation benefits being disproportionately accessed by the more advanced groups (the “creamy layer”). The bench held that treating unequals equally would violate Article 14[6] of the Constitution. Consequently, sub-classification constitutes a valid measure based on intelligible differentia to correct this internal disparity.
- Articles 15(4) and 16(4) as Independent Enabling Provisions
The Court clarified that Articles 15(4)[7] and 16(4)[8] serve as standalone, enabling provisions that empower the State to make special provisions for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes. This power is not limited by Parliament’s identification role. The majority reasoned that the power to provide reservation benefits necessarily encompasses the power to apportion those benefits, thereby ensuring they reach the intended beneficiaries. As the State has the competence to quantify the quantum of reservation under these Articles, it logically follows that it also has the power to manage the intra-group distribution.
- Distinction between Identification and Apportionment
A key distinction was drawn between the exclusive power of identification and the State’s power of apportionment. The Court held that Article 341 (which lists SCs) is the mechanism for identifying who belongs to the SC category, and this power remains exclusively with the President and Parliament. However, a State Legislature’s law providing for sub-classification does not exclude any caste from the SC list, nor does it effect an alteration of the list. Instead, it merely regulates the distribution of benefits among the listed groups based on their relative backwardness and representation. Thus, sub-classification is an exercise of the State’s power under Articles 15(4) and 16(4), and does not violate Article 341.
- The Mandate for Empirical Data and Objective Criteria
The ruling established that any sub-classification enacted by the State must be based on rational and objective criteria, supported by empirical data. The State must demonstrate, through quantifiable facts, that a sub-group is not adequately represented and is comparatively more backward than other groups within the SC category. This condition acts as a crucial check to prevent arbitrary or politically motivated sub-classification.
- Extension of the Creamy Layer Principle
The bench implicitly extended the philosophy behind the “creamy layer” principle (previously applied to Other Backward Classes) to the SC/ST categories. By affirming the validity of sub-classification, the Court provided a mechanism to ensure that the more privileged members of the SC/ST groups do not perpetually exhaust the reservation quota, thereby enabling the truly disadvantaged groups to access the benefits.
In conclusion, the Court determined that the policy of sub-classification is a permissible and necessary mechanism for achieving equitable distribution of reservation benefits and ensuring that the benefits of affirmative action are realized by the most vulnerable.
DEFECTS OF LAW
While the majority decision is commended for promoting substantive equality, the judgment introduces potential legal and practical challenges that merit critical analysis, particularly concerning federalism and judicial oversight.
- The Federalism Conflict: Erosion of Uniformity under Article 341
The primary legal concern stems from the potential conflict generated between Article 341 and the State’s power under Articles 15(4) and 16(4). Justice Bela Trivedi, in her lone dissent, forcefully argued that permitting states to sub-classify constitutes a direct encroachment on the exclusive domain of the President and Parliament. By regulating benefits based on intra-group backwardness, the State Legislature is, in effect, carving out a new, differentiated class, thereby modifying the uniformity of the list mandated by Article 341.
The majority’s distinction between “identification” (Article 341) and “apportionment” (Articles 15/16) is logically sound in theory, but it creates an administrative ambiguity. This may lead to a scenario where multiple states adopt varied criteria for sub-classification, potentially undermining the constitutional objective of having a uniform, centrally-determined list of Scheduled Castes across the country.
- Vulnerability to Political Discretion and Abuse
The judgment, while mandating empirical data for justification, nonetheless introduces a vulnerability to potential political abuse. State governments may be motivated to enact sub-classifications based not on genuine backwardness but on political expediency for the purpose of electoral consolidation among specific sub-castes. While the data requirement offers a safeguard, the compilation and acceptance of such data are often politically charged and susceptible to challenge, leading to increased litigation and judicial burden. This risks reducing a constitutional mechanism for social justice into a vehicle for political instrumentalization.
- Practicality of Creamy Layer Application
The ruling implicitly supported applying the “creamy layer” principle to the Scheduled Castes/Tribes to ensure benefits reach the most deserving. However, the Supreme Court has previously faced difficulties and delays in definitively applying the creamy layer concept to SC/ST promotions, often citing the need for robust, current data. By allowing sub-classification, the Court essentially sanctions a “mini creamy layer” principle (prioritizing the “more backward”), but the practical implementation will face the same, if not greater, administrative hurdles in gathering and maintaining reliable, granular data across numerous sub-castes.
- Ambiguity in Constitutional Standard for Implementation
The judgment provides the power to sub-classify but does not lay down a sufficiently detailed, uniform constitutional standard for how this sub-classification must be done beyond the generic “empirical data” requirement. This lack of a clear standard leaves the interpretation and implementation largely up to State discretion, which is likely to result in legislative divergence. For instance, different states might use criteria such as income, education, representation in public service, or even location, leading to a patchwork of laws that might, ironically, violate the original constitutional principle of equality.
In essence, the Davinder Singh ruling effectively addressed the issue of intra-group inequality but arguably created the concomitant issue of inter-state and intra-constitutional friction, thereby shifting the burden of defining substantive equality from the judiciary to data-dependent State legislatures.
INFERENCE
The Supreme Court’s 6:1 decision in State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh represents a significant evolution in Indian reservation jurisprudence. By departing from the doctrine of strict homogeneity established in E.V. Chinnaiah, the Court facilitated the transition of the legal framework from a formal interpretation of equality to one rooted in substantive equality and equity. The core inference drawn from this judgment is that the Constitution permits and, in some cases, necessitates differential treatment among groups that are disadvantaged in their social and educational advancement, even when they belong to the same reserved category. This decision constitutes a critical measure aimed at ensuring that the target beneficiaries—specifically the most marginalized subgroups—are not systematically excluded from the benefits of reservation by the relatively advanced groups, or the ‘creamy layer,’ within the Scheduled Castes (SCs).
The ruling empowers State Legislatures to be more responsive to empirical social realities. By construing Article 15(4) and Article 16(4) as independent sources of legislative power, the Court has provided the State with the necessary constitutional authority to tailor reservation policies based on objective criteria concerning intra-category disparities.
However, the long-term efficacy of this judgment is contingent upon its judicious implementation. The attendant risk of political expediency and the potential for fragmented policy application across states constitute substantial legal challenges that will necessitate sustained judicial scrutiny. The conclusion, therefore, is that while Davinder Singh establishes a robust, equitable foundation, the State now bears the onus, along with subsequent judicial review, to ensure that the newly granted power of sub-classification is exercised with constitutional fidelity, strictly adhering to the dual requirements of empirical data and rational nexus to ensure the fulfilment of the constitutional promise of social justice.
Shivansh Sharma Student of Damodaram Sanjivayya National Law University, Visakhapatnam
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Virtual Internship Program, The Amikus Qriae, September 2025.
[1] The Punjab Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes (Reservation in Services) Act, 2006, No. 5 of 2006, § 4(5) (India).
[2] E.V. Chinnaiah v. State of A.P., (2005) 1 SCC 394.
[3] State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh, (2025) 1 SCC 1.
[4] INDIA CONST. art. 341.
[5] INDIA CONST. art. 342.
[6] INDIA CONST. art. 14.
[7] INDIA CONST. art. 15, cl. 4.
[8] INDIA CONST. art. 16, cl. 4.