Facts
The Criminal Appeal at the Supreme Court originated from a decision made by the Jharkhand High Court on February 17, 2014. A election was conducted on March 30, 2012, to choose two Rajya Sabha members representing the State of Jharkhand. The appellant, who serves as a representative of the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha in the Legislative Assembly of Jharkhand, has been accused of accepting settlements from independent candidates in exchange for her vote. The records from the public ballot for the Rajya Sabha seat indicate that she cast her vote in favour of a candidate from her own political party, rather than the one accused of offering a bribe. Following the nullification of the first election round, new elections were conducted. In this subsequent round, she once again cast her vote in favour of the candidate from her own political party, rather than the ones for whom she had accepted a bribe.
The appellant approached the High Court with the aim of having the chargesheet and the criminal proceedings against her nullified. She used Article 194(2) of the Constitution to exercise her legal safeguard, citing the precedent set by the Constitution Bench in the case of PV Narasimha Rao v. State. The High Court provided its justification for refusing to nullify the criminal proceedings against the appellant. In addition, the High Court denied protection to the appellant under Article 194(2) since she did not vote in favour of the alleged bribe provider. The High Court’s finding was mostly based on the Supreme Court’s ruling in PV Narasimha Rao. The significance of the interpretation of Article 105(2) of the Constitution, which outlines the rights, privileges, and immunities of members of Parliament and parliamentary committees, as well as its equivalent, Article 194(2), which grants similar immunity to members of State Legislatures, is pivotal in both the PV Narasimha Rao case and the present case.
Issues Raised
- Whether the offence of bribery under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act considered complete once the bribe is accepted, even if the act for which the bribe was given is not carried out?
- Whether a legislature who accepts bribes to cast a vote in Parliament or an Assembly also have immunity from prosecution under Article 105(2) or Article 194(2) of the Indian Constitution?
Contentions
Senior Advocate Raju Ramachandran, who is representing Sita Soren from the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM), presented arguments in support of the petitioner. Sita Soren has been accused of engaging in criminal conspiracy as defined in Section 120B and accepting bribes as defined in Section 171E of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. Additionally, she is charged with committing criminal offences as a public official as defined in Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. She attempted to dismiss these accusations, using the legal protection granted by Article 194(2). Nevertheless, the Jharkhand High Court observed that she did not cast her vote in favour of the candidate for whom she was offered a bribe. As a result, because the intended action for which the bribe was paid did not occur, the legal protection from prosecution was not applicable.
In 2014, Sita Soren appealed this order in the Supreme Court, seeking special leave to appeal against the Jharkhand High Court’s decision. The petitioner emphasised that the Supreme Court’s ruling in P.V. Narasimha Rao v. State justified a broad interpretation of Article 105(2), which guarantees immunity to members of Parliament. According to the Court in the Narsimha Rao case, this expansive interpretation was required to guarantee that legislatures in State and Parliament voice their opinions without worrying about facing legal consequences. In order to enable the court to draw a link between the alleged bribe and the vote cast, the petitioner contended that a similarly broad interpretation needs to be used in this particular case. Therefore, contented that under Article 194(2) of the Constitution she should be given immunity. Furthermore, Ramachandran noted this case should go to a three-judge bench and referenced Kalpana Mehta v Union of India, where Narasimha Rao’s relevance was dismissed. Attorney General Venkataramani agreed, saying the case facts don’t require reconsidering Narasimha Rao, as the provisions apply to House business, not relevant here. He noted a review petition against Narasimha Rao had already been set aside, so a larger bench reference would be abstract.
However, Senior Advocate P.S. Patwalia, who was appointed by the court, and Senior Advocate Gopal Sankaranarayanan argued that it is important to review the Narasimha Rao ruling because Articles 105(2) and 194(2) were meant to protect the freedom of expression of Members of Parliament in Parliament, not to protect them from being prosecuted. He pointed out that subsequent dissents in United States v. Brewster had cast doubt on the Narasimha Rao ruling, which was based on the US case United States v. Johnson. In addition, Patwalia drew attention to Justice Bharucha’s disregard for the UK case R v. Currie, in which a member of parliament was found guilty of accepting a bribe. He underlined the need for clarity on a number of outstanding questions in Narasimha Rao, including whether or not MPs could be regarded as public officials and whether or not they were exempt from bribery allegations.
In agreement, Sankaranarayanan said that the Narasimha Rao ruling was absurd as it shielded legislators who accepted bribes and cast appropriate votes, but it did not shield those who accepted money and altered their votes. According to him, this sent the message that MPs should accept bribes provided they take appropriate action. He used A.G. Noorani’s critique to bolster his case and pointed out that other nations, such as the US and the UK, do not provide immunity for bribes, making India’s position seem archaic.
Rationale
Regarding bribery, the Court has determined that it is irrelevant whether the act for which the bribe is given is actually carried out. The Court further stated that under Section 7 of the PCA, simply “obtaining,” “accepting,” or “attempting” to obtain an undue advantage with the intent to act or refrain from acting in a particular manner is sufficient to complete the offense. The Supreme Court supported this interpretation by referring to the first explanation to Section 7, which clearly states that “obtaining,” “accepting,” or “attempting” to obtain an undue advantage constitutes an offense even if the performance of a public duty by a public servant has not been improper. Therefore, the crime of bribery of a public servant is established by the receipt or agreement to receive an undue advantage, rather than the actual performance of the act for which the undue advantage is obtained.
The Court has resolved the legal inconsistency created in the Narasimha Rao Case concerning parliamentary privileges by ruling that no Member of Parliament or State legislature may claim immunity from bribery accusations pertaining to votes or remarks in the legislature. A seven-judge Constitution Bench unanimously reversed the majority decision in the case of P.V. Narasimha Rao vs. State (CBI/SPE) (1998), highlighting the paramount importance of integrity in the operation of parliament. The Court explained that the parliamentary privilege included in Article 105 (for Members of Parliament) and Article 194 (for State legislators) is specifically intended to safeguard the liberty of expression and autonomy of legislators in their capacities within the legislative body. This privilege does not include bribery, since bribery is not indispensable for exercising the right to vote or determining one’s voting choice. The seven-member Bench has concluded that acknowledging the court’s authority to punish individuals for bribery does not alter the likelihood of any possible abuse. The court further determined that casting a vote in a Rajya Sabha election, as a responsibility of a lawmaker, is safeguarded by Article 194 of the Constitution. This safeguard guarantees that members have the freedom to vote without any fear of legal prosecution, while also excluding any criminal responsibilities.
Defects of Law
The decision by the Jharkhand High Court if scrutinised can be challenged otherwise as well. The Jharkhand High Court dismissed Sita Soren’s case as she voted for her own party and not the party she allegedly got the bribe from. The court adopted a restrictive interpretation of Article 194(2), limiting its safeguard to explicit remarks and votes that occur inside the legislative body. Such reasoning and judgments raise queries about the extent and purpose of the protection granted under Article 194(2) and whether or not it should include activities that are indirectly connected to legislative tasks.
In light of the decision in P.V. Narasimha Rao, SG Mehta contended that the SC at the time failed to consider the ramifications of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PCA). He highlighted that the ruling inadvertently shields those who receive bribes after carrying out an activity that was motivated by the payment, such as delivering a speech or casting a vote. This directly contradicts Section 7 of the PCA, which explicitly punishes public officials who take bribes as a motivation or in return for carrying out their official responsibilities in an inappropriate or dishonest manner. Mehta argues that the primary objective of the PCA is to prevent public officials from evading accountability by just carrying out corrupt actions, since the act of accepting a bribe alone is considered to be a violation.
Inference
The Supreme Court has appropriately acknowledged that corruption encompasses not only the result, but also the deliberate need to engage in fraudulent conduct. The primary purpose of Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act is to discourage public officials from accepting bribes and acting in a way that goes against the public interest, as emphasised by the Court. In order to achieve this goal, the legislative body has created a strict system that deals with different aspects of bribery, starting from the acceptance or attempted acceptance of a bribe to the actual act for which the bribe was given, ensuring that the offence is thoroughly addressed. It has been ascertained that a violation under the PCA arises regardless of whether a public official actually accepts the bribe or just tries to do so. This approach is in line with the law’s preventive purpose, which seeks to tackle a substantial public concern that could hinder the country’s progress and democratic structure. The Court correctly aims to deter corruption from its inception by making it illegal to acquire or receive a bribe, so holding individuals accountable from the very beginning of the offence.
Furthermore, the Court has taken a more comprehensive and contextual approach to addressing the inaccurate reading of Article 105(2) of the Constitution with regard to the interpretation of Section 7 of the PCA. The Court construed Article 105(2) too broadly in P.V. Narasimha Rao, implying that it offered complete protection for anything—offense or not—as long as it had anything to do with speaking or voting in Parliament. The legislative purpose of Articles 105(2) and 194 of the Constitution was not adequately taken into account in this interpretation. The present ruling properly states that members of Parliament should not be immune from the general laws of the land because of the privileges and immunities they have been awarded. The main goals of Articles 105(2) and 194 of the Constitution are to safeguard members’ freedom of expression in order to facilitate productive democratic debates and more thoughtful legislation. By destroying a member’s free will and conscience, accepting a bribe to act (or not act) in a certain manner inside Parliament challenges the democratic structure. Overall, the verdict aligns with public expectations that elected members should not be influenced by monetary inducements.
– Ananya Gupta
Jindal Global Law School