2025 INSC 734
Case Name: Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal
Court: Supreme Court of India
Date of Judgment: 19 May 2025
Bench: Justice Abhay S. Oka & Justice Ujjal Bhuyan
Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 2688 of 2025 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 9493 of 2024), along with connected appeals.
1. FACTS
The case arose from matrimonial disputes between Vidhi Rawal and her husband, Prateek Tripathi. Prateek Tripathi married Vidhi Rawal on 12th December 2019 following the Hindu rites at Dewas, Madhya Pradesh. After 2 years of marriage ,the respondent alleged that she was subjected to mental and physical Harassment by her husband and in-laws for dowry. She claimed that demands for ₹20 lakh and a luxury SUV were made and that she was harassed both in India and while residing abroad.She claimed that Prateek Tripathi would beat her and throw her out of the house while they were abroad
On 8th December 2021,the respondent made a complaint to the Station House Officer at the Police Station Women Consultancy Centre, Dewas, against Prateek Tripathi, and Vivekanand Tiwari alleging that dowry was demanded by them.
On 7th January 2022, FIR No. 3/2022 was lodged at P.S. Mahila Thana, Dewas under Sections 498A, 504, 506 and 34 IPC against all appellants to the account of non-payment of dowry .Subsequently, she filed an application under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (PWDVA) ; Following to the incidents she seeks protection orders, residence rights, monetary relief, c ompensation, and other remedies which are Sections 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 of the DV Act.
On 2nd March 2022, the respondent filed MJCR No. 215/2022 under Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005 before the District and Sessions Judge, Dewas, seeking reliefs .The appellants The husband, the brother-in-law Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi , and parents-in-law approached the Madhya Pradesh High Court under Section 482 CrPC (now Section 528 BNSS[1]) seeking quashing of the Section 12 proceedings of DV act. The High Court dismissed the quashing petitions, holding that proceedings under Section 12 of the PWDVA[2] were civil in nature and therefore could not be quashed under Section 482 CrPC.
2. ISSUES RAISED
1.Whether proceedings initiated under Section 12 of the PWDVA can be quashed by the High Court through its inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC (now Section 528 BNSS)
2.Whether the predominantly civil nature of domestic violence proceedings excludes the applicability of Section 482 CrPC.
3.What should be the scope and limits of the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction while dealing with applications seeking quashing of domestic violence proceeding..
3. CONTENTION
Appellants’ Contentions
The Magistrate is defined under Section 2(i) of the DV Act as a Judicial Magistrate of First Class or Metropolitan Magistrate exercising jurisdiction under the CrPC ,hence the court entertaining Section 12 applications is regarded as a Criminal Court.
Section 28 of the PWDVA provides that proceedings under Sections 12, 18–23 shall be governed by the CrPC. Since the proceedings are before a Criminal Court, the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC is necessarily available.
Several High Courts had already recognised maintainability of quashing petitions in domestic violence cases.The nature of relief granted (civil or criminal) cannot be the sole determinant of whether Section 482 applies ,the CrPC itself contains provisions where criminal courts grant civil-like reliefs The High Court erred in holding that civil nature alone bars invocation of Section 482.
In Devendra Agarwal v. State of U.P.[3] (Allahabad HC) and Nandkishor Pralhad Vyawahare v. Mangala[4](Bombay HC), wherein High Courts held Section 482 petitions are maintainable against DV Act proceedings.
Respondent’s Contentions
Proceedings under the PWDVA are essentially civil and welfare-oriented.The purpose of the Act is to provide protective and remedial relief rather than punishment as affirmed in Kunapareddy v Kunapareddy Swarna Kumari (2016)[5], where the Supreme Court described domestic violence proceedings as chiefly civil .Since Section 12 applications are not criminal complaints under under Section 2(d) or Section 200 CrPC; hence the criminal procedure machinery for taking cognizance does not apply.The notice issued under Section 13(1) is not a summons under Section 61 CrPC but a distinct notice in Form VII of the DV Rules, 2006.Since the proceedings are civil in character, they fall outside the scope of Section 482 CrPC.
4. RATIONALE
The Supreme Court held that; High Courts possess the power under Section 482 CrPC/Section 528 BNSS to quash proceedings under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act. However, this power must be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional cases involving gross illegality, abuse of process, or manifest injustice.The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Abhay S. Oka, undertook a detailed examination of the act of the PWDVA.
The Court observed that applications under Section 12 are filed before Judicial Magistrates or Metropolitan Magistrates, who are undeniably criminal courts established under the CrPC. Section 27 of the DV Act vests jurisdiction in these very courts. While the remedies granted under the Act such as protection orders, residence rights, maintenance, custody, and compensation are civil in character, therefore the nature of the court is unambiguously a Criminal Court .
The Court clarified that a Section 12 application is distinct from a criminal complaint under Section 200 CrPC. Under Section 12(4), the Magistrate must fix a hearing date within three days of receiving the application and issue notice under Section 13(1). The scheme is entirely distinct from criminal cognizance.
The Court interpreted Two Limbs of Section 482 CrPC broadly :
- First limb: power to give effect to any order “under this Code” does not apply, as orders under Sections 18–23 DV Act are not orders under the CrPC.
- Second limb: power to prevent abuse of process of any Court or to secure the ends of justice does apply, as the Magistrate entertaining a Section 12 application is a Court within the meaning of Section 482.
and held that the second limb of the provision is wide enough to encompass domestic violence proceedings.
However, recognising the social welfare objective of the PWDVA, the Court cautioned that such powers must be exercised sparingly. Quashing should be permitted only where there is gross illegality, manifest injustice, or clear abuse of judicial process.The existence of a statutory appeal to the Court of Session under Section 29 of the DV Act further counsels restraint ; unlike criminal cognizance orders, there is an adequate alternative remedy against Magistrate’s orders under the DV Act.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s decision and restored the quashing petitions for fresh consideration on merits.
5. DEFECTS OF LAW
While protecting respondents from frivolous litigation is important, excessive judicial intervention at preliminary stages could undermine the protective purpose of the PWDVA. Although the judgment settles an important procedural controversy, certain concerns remain unbothered :
1.Procedural dual Ambiguity : Civil vs. Criminal Nature:
The DV Act is a legislative hybrid , its proceedings are “predominantly civil” (Kunapareddy; Prabha Tyagi v. Kamlesh Devi[6]) yet conducted before Criminal Courts under the CrPC. This dual character creates interpretive uncertainty regarding which procedural safeguards apply and to what extent.Therefore clear procedure should be introduced to avoid uncertainty.
2. Absence of Clear Standards:
While the Court prescribes a “hands-off approach” and restricts interference to “gross illegality” and “gross abuse of process” but does not formulate objective criteria for the same .This may result in inconsistent application by different High Courts and may result in unsatisfied and disproportionate judgements.
3. Section 28(2) — Unguided Procedural Discretion:
Section 28(2) allows the Magistrate to “lay down its own procedure” for disposal of Section 12 applications. There is no clear guidance from the law. This could lead to Magistrates doing things differently which might not be fair and could cause problems with how justice is served. The Magistrates own the procedure , for Section 12 applications could vary a lot.
4. Section 26 — Risk of Forum:
Section 26 enables a plaintiff to seek reliefs under Sections 18–22 in any pending civil, family, or criminal proceedings. This creates a risk of multiplicity of proceedings alongside a risk of conflicting orders from different courts, which the DV Act does not adequately address beyond the bare mentioned obligation in Section 26(3) to inform the Magistrate of reliefs obtained elsewhere.
5. No Codified Limitation Period:
The DV Act does not prescribe any limitation period for filing an application under Section 12. Combined with the wide definition of “domestic relationship” (persons who have any point of time they lived together), this creates a potential for stale claims without adequate legislative checks.
6. Conflict Between Section 29 Appeal and Section 482 Jurisdiction:
The existence of a statutory appeal under Section 29 to the Court of Session has been used as a reason for the High Court to show restraint. However, the relationship between this remedy and Section 482 jurisdiction is not statutorily articulated, leaving it to judicial discretion to navigate the overlap.
6. INFERENCE
The judgment in Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal (2025) is doctrinally significant, but its true value lies less in what it settles and more in what it reveals about the structural incompleteness of the PWDVA..
The decision in case Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal (2025) is considered as a significant development in domestic violence jurisprudence. The Supreme Court reconciled the civil nature of remedies under the PWDVA within the criminal forum through which such remedies are enforced. It held that the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC is available to quash proceedings under Section 12 of the Act. While the DV Act is a protective statute, the Court recognizes that proceedings under it can also be misused. The Section 482 jurisdiction acts as a safety valve against frivolous, vexatious, or malicious applications ; provided the threshold of “gross illegality or abuse” is met.By restricting interference to “gross illegality” and endorsing a “hands-off approach,” the Court ensures that the availability of Section 482 does not become an instrument to dilute or frustrate the DV Act’s protective purpose. This calibration depends entirely on judicial temperament, which is an unstable foundation for a statute designed to protect a vulnerable class.
At the same time, the Court emphasised judicial restraint and reaffirmed the welfare-oriented character of the legislation provided. The acknowledgment by Justice Oka of his earlier contrary view and the Court’s willingness to overrule it sets a valuable precedent on judicial accountability and intellectual honesty, reinforcing that no judge is bound by his previous errors. The judgment strikes a balance between safeguarding women from domestic violence and protecting individuals from abusive or frivolous litigation.
The ruling effectively overrules all High Court decisions that had taken the view that Section 482 CrPC was unavailable in DV Act proceedings. All pending petitions which were dismissed on this ground alone may now be revived and reheard on merits.The ruling is likely to become a leading precedent on the procedural framework of domestic violence proceedings and the extent of High Court intervention under the PWDVA. Contradictory to that judgments like this one will continue to perform important but inevitably incomplete work settling conflicts at the surface while the deeper tension between the Act’s protective ambition and its procedural design remains unresolved. The Court has added clarity; the legislature owes the statute coherence.
SIYA MAHAJAN
THE LAW SCHOOL , UNIVERSITY OF JAMMU
[1] Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023 is the successor to Section 482 CrPC and preserves the inherent powers of the High Court
[2] Section 12 is the procedural provision that enables an aggrieved woman to approach a Magistrate and seek relief under the Act
[3] Devendra Agarwal and 3 Others v State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, Application under Section 482 No 18994 of 2024
[4] andkishor Pralhad Vyawahare v Mangala w/o Pratap Bansar @ Sau Mangala Nandkishor Vyawahare 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 923 (FB).
[5] Kunapareddy @ Nookala Shanka Balaji v Kunapareddy Swarna Kumari (2016) 11 SCC 774 (SC).
[6] Laid down the principle that relief under the PWDVA is available even if the parties are no longer living together, provided they had a domestic relationship when the alleged acts of domestic violence occurred.