Facts
The case of Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala is one of disagreement between freedom of the press and the shielding offered under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereafter “SC/ST Act”). Appellant Shajan Skaria is a journalist as well as the editor of an online news channel, “Marunadan Malayali.” On 24 May 2023, Skaria uploaded a video on YouTube criticizing P.V. Sreenijan, a winning Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) from Kunnathunad, Scheduled Caste constituency. The video indicted Sreenijan of diverse abuses, including corruption, abuse of power, and involvement in deterring investors from Kerala. Among others, Skaria called Sreenijan a “mafia don,” accused him of participating in a murder, and charged judicial manipulation through kinship, stating that his father-in-law is a retired Chief Justice of India.
The video caused Sreenijan to file a complaint with the police that the content of the video was not just defamatory but also intended to humiliate him as a Pulaya, a Scheduled Caste community member. He asserted that the video was a deliberate attempt at targeting and insulting him based on his caste identity. Accordingly, to his complaint, FIR No. 899 of 2023 was filed on 9 June 2023 before the Elamakkara Police Station under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(u) of the SC/ST Act, and Section 120(o) of the Kerala Police Act, 2011.
Fearing arrest, Skaria moved for anticipatory bail before the Special Judge for SC/ST cases at Ernakulam, which was refused on the reason that a prima facie case had been established under the SC/ST Act and therefore anticipatory bail was excluded under Section 18 of the Act. The appeal he made to the Kerala High Court also went in vain, with the court upholding the order of the trial court.
Later, the case went to the Supreme Court. The central issue was whether Skaria’s words constituted an offence under the SC/ST Act and whether the anticipatory bail bar in Section 18 applied here. The Court had to balance the rights of a citizen to free speech and individual freedom with the statutory safeguards meant to protect the dignity of historically oppressed castes.
Issues Raised
- The Supreme Court set out the following important legal questions for consideration:
- Whether Section 18 of the SC/ST Act creates an absolute bar on the grant of anticipatory bail in cases filed under the Act?
- When is it possible to hold that a prima facie case is made out in a complaint filed under the SC/ST Act?
- Whether the FIR charges disclosed commission of any offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the SC/ST Act, which pertains to intentional insult with the intent to humiliate a member of SC/ST community?
- Whether an offence under Section 3(1)(u), that prohibits promoting enmity or ill-will against members of SC/ST communities, was made out prima facie?
- Whether mere awareness of the caste identity of the complainant is enough to attract the penal provisions of the SC/ST Act?
Contentions
Appellant’s Arguments:
Appearing on behalf of senior counsel Mr. Siddharth Luthra and Mr. Gaurav Agrawal, the appellant argued:
The video was a valid exercise of journalistic freedom and did not refer to the caste of the complainant. There was no mention of the Scheduled Caste identity, direct or indirect, and the said offences under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(u) could not therefore be invoked. The SC/ST Act only aims at insults or humiliations committed based on a person’s caste. Personal criticism, though crude or slanderous, is not within the sweep of the Act unless it is established that caste was the moving factor.
The High Court did not realize cases like Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhandand Prathvi Raj Chauhan v. Union of India , which established that all insults are not offences under the SC/ST Act. Intent and context are important.
The appellant was apprehensive of arrest on politically inspired and general allegations, and thus, ought to be eligible for anticipatory bail as no prima facie case was established under the stringent provisions of the SC/ST Act.
Contentions of Respondents:
The State of Kerala and the complainant were opposing grant of anticipatory bail. Their submissions were:
The appellant knew that the complainant was a member of the SC community because he had been elected from a reserved constituency, and his social identity was publicly known. The video had insulting comments in order to tarnish the reputation of the complainant, fully aware of his social identity, and therefore with the intent to ridicule him as a Scheduled Caste person.
The public labelling of him as a “murderer” and a “mafia don” in conjunction with baseless charges of corruption constituted a deliberate humiliation of a public figure from a vulnerable group. The accused had a history of issuing similar defamatory statements against others and had also disregarded earlier court orders, thus demonstrating a propensity to abuse bail orders if released.
Section 18 of the SC/ST Act itself excludes anticipatory bail in a case where the accused is charged with offenses under the SC/ST Act, and a prima facie reading of the FIR satisfied this requirement.
Rationale
The Supreme Court, in its elaborate analysis, considered both the doctrinal and practical dimensions of anticipatory bail under the SC/ST Act.
On the bar under Section 18 of the SC/ST Act:
The Court reasserted that although Section 18 prohibits anticipatory bail in offences under the SC/ST Act, there is no automatic prohibition. Drawing support from the judgment in Prathvi Raj Chauhan, it said that unless allegations in the FIR fail to make out a prima facie case under the Act, the bar under Section 18 cannot be invoked. The Court made it clear that anticipatory bail could still be contemplated in extraordinary situations to avoid abuse of law or miscarriage of justice.
On prima facie scrutiny of allegations:
Much of the Court’s judgment was spent upon interpreting what qualifies as a “prima facie” offence under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(u) of the Act. Section 3(1)(r) addresses wilfully insulting someone to humiliate them in public, just because they are a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. Section 3(1)(u) addresses inciting hatred or ill-will against SC/ST community members.
The Court ruled that not every personal criticism or attack, however defamatory, brings this Act to apply. It stressed that the offence would have to be committed “on account of” the individual’s caste, not coincidentally against someone who happens to be a member of a Scheduled Caste.
In such an instance, the Court held that the appellant never mentioned the caste of the complainant once. The video statements were political and aimed at the public behaviour of the complainant as an MLA and his abuse of power. The allegations, though defamatory and severe, were not caste-inspired. The Court made it clear that it is not enough for a person to have knowledge about someone’s caste to incur Section 3(1)(r). There must be a direct connection between the humiliation and the caste identification. The intention must be to humiliate the individual due to their caste status — a burden the complainant failed to place in this instance.
Insofar as Section 3(1)(u) is concerned, the Court held that such a provision targets activities which tend to foster group hatred or ill-will towards members of the SC/ST community as a class. Criticism of a person — even one who is a member of the Scheduled Caste — does not necessarily equate to hatred against the group. No words in the video could reasonably be interpreted as arousing hatred or ill-will against the SC/STs as a community.
On the balance between press freedom and anti-discrimination legislation:
The judgment is notable for its focus on the balance between freedom of expression and the requirement to preserve vulnerable groups from hate speech and humiliation. The Court reaffirmed that while the SC/ST Act promotes a vital constitutional purpose, its abuse or excessive use can muzzle legitimate dissent, journalistic investigation, or criticism of public functionaries.
Defects of Law
This case revealed ambiguities and challenges in the practical implementation of SC/ST laws.
1. Vague Thresholds for Offences:
The terms “intent to humiliate” and “promoting hatred or ill-will” are vaguely defined; this gives a very wide scope for subjective interpretation and accordingly, forced invocation of the criminal law based on personal feelings, political motives, or social considerations rather than based on clear legal standards.
2. Risk of Misuse:
As the Court has held, the rigid ban in Section 18 against anticipatory bail can be misused to harass persons against whom motivated complaints are lodged. In the absence of any screening mechanism that can filter out grievances which are false or which are not caste based, the law could be used profusely, thus losing its value.
3. Overlap with Defamation Laws:
The SC/ST Act complains of many cases including this-provoking cases are de facto defamation complaints against public personalities. The Act intended to deal with systemic and identity-based discrimination loses its force as an instrument against mere reputational disputes without any caste nexus.
4. Inadequate Procedural Safeguards:
Although Section 18 is rightly considered to deter the genuine perpetrators of atrocities against castes, this section’s overbroad application-exercised without even the prima facie satisfaction of the courts-makes far too much discretion available to police officers.
Inference
In some manner, the Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala decision has perhaps once and for all reaffirmed the paradigm, stressing that protective statutes such as the SC/ST Act need to be interpreted with empathy and caution. While the Act is an absolute necessity to curb deeply entrenched caste discrimination, it should never be misused to suppress dissent or curb free speech.
The judgment blends the right to personal liberty with the collective right to dignity, sharply distinguishing political criticism from caste-based insult. It reiterates that the intent and context of a statement must be subject to grave and cautionary scrutiny before resorting to the penal provisions contained in the SC/ST Act. The Court held that the bar on anticipatory bail under Section 18 is not absolute and must be invoked on the basis of a prima facie analysis of the complaint.
Anika Surana
Institute of Law, Nirma University