Case name: PURNO AGITOK SANGMA VS PRANAB MUKHERJEE
Citation: (2013) 2 SCC 239
Petitioner: Purno Agitok Sangma
Responder: Pranab Mukherjee
Petitioner Counsel: Learned Senior Advocate Ram Jethmalani
Responder Counsel: Learned Senior Advocate Harish Salve
FACTS:
The case revolves around the 2012 presidential election between Purno Agitok Sangma and Pranab Mukherjee. Sangma challenged Mukherjee’s eligibility, claiming Mukherjee held an “office of profit” as the Chairman of the Counsel of the Indian Statistical Institute (ISI) in Kolkata when he submitted his nomination papers. “According to Article 58 of the Indian Constitution, a person is ineligible to run for president if they hold a paid position under the central or state government.”
On July 2, 2012, during the examination of nomination papers, Sangma’s agent objected to Mukherjee’s candidacy on these grounds. Mukherjee’s representative requested two days to respond to these objections, and on July 3, Mukherjee submitted a written reply, including a resignation letter dated June 20, 2012, claiming he had resigned from the ISI position.
Despite the objections, including doubts about the authenticity of the resignation letter, the Returning Officer accepted Mukherjee’s nomination. Sangma’s election petition challenged the election of Pranab Mukherjee based on the claim that he held “offices of profit” when the nominations were filed. The Supreme Court then brought the petition for a preliminary hearing to determine if it warranted a full hearing.
ISSUES RAISED:
- Whether a President be disqualified under Article 58 (2) on the ground of holding “office of profit” as specified.
- Whether the Chairman, ISI is also eligible to become President of India without resigning from his office as Chairman.
- Whether Article 58 of Indian Constitution is applicable in this case.
- Whether Articles 58 and 102 are also applicable to Presidential elections.
CONTENTIONS:
ARGUMENT FROM PETITIONERS COUNSEL:
- Argued that “Article 71 of the Constitution mandates that the Supreme Court, whose decision is binding, shall conduct an investigation into and settle all issues and controversies arising out of or in connection with the election of a President or Vice-President.” Mr. Jethmalani argued that the Respondent’s claim that he had resigned from his positions as the Leader of the House in the Lok Sabha and Chairman of the Indian Statistical Institute, Calcutta, as of the date of filing his nomination papers in 2012 was sufficiently disputed. Mr. Jethmalani argued that the raised doubt could only be answered by a thorough investigation that necessitated gathering evidence and cross-examining the witnesses. “Accordingly, Mr. Jethmalani submitted that the instant petition would have to be tried in the same manner as a suit, which attracted the provisions of Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which reads as follows:
Miscellaneous Proceedings. – The procedure provided in this Code concerning suit shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction”
- According to “Section 87 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, which lays out the process for hearing election petitions, every election petition must be heard by the High Court and must be handled as nearly as possible in accordance with the process used for suits under the Code of Civil Procedure.” Mr. Jethmalani argued that the Legislature intended for proceedings involving election disputes to be tried in the same manner as other lawsuits, using the steps outlined in Section 141 C.P.C.
- A person who occupies a profit-making position under the Government of India, the Government of any State, or under any local or other authority under the control of any of the aforementioned Governments is not eligible to be elected as President, according to Article 58(2) of the Constitution. “As in the Explanation to Article 102, Mr. Jethmalani argued that the Explanation to Clause (2) of Article 58 also states that a person shall not be deemed to hold any office of profit simply because he is the President or Vice-President of the Union, the Governor of any State, or a Minister either for the Union or for any State. Mr. Jethmalani argued that if a president-elect occupies a position of profit, Article 102 cannot shield him from disqualification.”
- Under the Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections Act of 1952 or any other pre-independence statute, the phrase “office of profit” has not yet been definitively defined, and this Court must now decide how to interpret it. “Mr. Jethmalani cited the decision of a three-judge bench of this court in the case of Shibu Soren vs. Dayanand Sahay & Ors., in which the aforementioned expression was taken into consideration and this court held that in interpreting Articles 102(1)(a) and 191(1)(a), such interpretation should be realistic having regard to the object of the said Articles.” The term “profit” was found to imply some type of monetary benefit other than “compensation.” When determining if an office is profitable, neither the amount paid nor the name given to the payment may always be relevant. This Court continued by noting that, if the receiver receives any financial benefit, the phrase “honorarium” alone cannot exempt the payment from the concept of profit. “In the aforementioned case, it was determined that payment of an honorarium, in addition to daily allowances in the form of compensating allowances, rent-free housing, and a chauffeured car at State expense, were in the type of remuneration and are a source of financial benefit and, therefore, the aforementioned case, it was determined that receiving an honorarium in addition to daily allowances in the form of compensatory allowances, rent-free housing, and a chauffeured car at the expense of the State was in the nature of remuneration, is a source of pecuniary gain, and therefore constitutes profit.” Mr. Jethmalani said that the Election Petition in the aforementioned case was permitted because of such an observation.
- He also referred to “the Jaya Bachchan Vs. Union of India & Ors., regarding the use of the term “honorarium” and its implications for the financial situation of the office holder or the interest of the holder in profiting from the office, the phrase “office of profit” was open to interpretation within the meaning of Article 102 and other provisions of the Constitution.” It was noted that what was important was not whether the person actually obtained financial gain or did not withdraw the emoluments to which he was entitled, but rather if the office was capable of producing a profit or pecuniary advantage, other than reimbursement of out-of-pocket/actual expenses. The three-judge panel that heard the case determined that “holding an office of profit” refers to any position under the Central or State Government that is associated with compensation, salary, emolument, payment, or non-compensatory allowance and that position can produce gains of pecuniary gain. The nature of the compensation must be taken into account as a matter of substance rather than form when determining whether a person holds a profit-making office. Additionally, Their Lordships pointed out that the ability of the office to generate a profit is what matters when determining whether or not someone is holding a profit-making position.
- “Mr. Jethmalani urged that having regard to the above, the Election Petition deserved a regular hearing, as contemplated in Rule 20 of Order XXXIX of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966.”
ARGUMENT OF RESPONDENT COUNSEL:
“The Presidential and Vice-Presidential Act of 1952, commonly known as the ‘1952 Act’, governs the election of the President of India, particularly addressing election-related issues in Part III.” Mr. Salve highlighted that “Sections 14 and 14A of the Act” explicitly grant the Supreme Court the authority to hear Election Petitions under the 1952 Act, following the procedures specified in these sections. Consequently, any challenge to a presidential election must adhere to the rules in Order XXXIX of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966, which deal with Election Petitions under Part III of the 1952 Act.
“According to Rule 13 of Order XXXIX, once an Election Petition is presented, it must be placed before a Bench of five Judges for a preliminary hearing. This preliminary hearing determines whether the petition warrants a full hearing as provided for in Rule 20.” Sections 14 and 14A of the 1952 Act outline the following:
“1. No election may be challenged without first submitting an Election Petition to the appropriate authority.
2. The Supreme Court is the authority with jurisdiction to try an Election Petition.
3. Every Election Petition must be presented to such authority in accordance with the provisions of this Part and the rules made by the Supreme Court under Article 145. An Election Petition challenging an election can be presented based on one or more grounds specified in Sections 18(1) and 19. For a Presidential election, such a petition can be filed by any candidate or by at least twenty electors joined together as petitioners. The petition must be presented within thirty days of the publication of the election results under Section 12.”
Mr. Salve argued that the election of the President and Vice-President has been accorded a higher level of consideration compared to elections for members of Parliament and State Legislatures. Article 58 of the Indian Constitution, which pertains to presidential elections, must be strictly followed. “Mr. Salve cited the case of Charan Lal Sahu vs. Neelam Sanjeeva Reddy, where the Supreme Court ruled that Article 58 pertains only to a candidate’s eligibility to run for President and does not conflict with other constitutional provisions.”
“Mr. Salve further referenced the case of Mithilesh Kumar vs. R. Venkataraman, where a five-judge bench of the Supreme Court reiterated its earlier opinions in similar challenges to presidential elections.” He argued that the position of Chairman of the Indian Statistical Institute (ISI) in Kolkata was honorary and did not constitute an office of profit because it offered no salary or compensation. Even if indirect benefits were considered, the position still would not qualify as an office of profit.
In the context of the 2012 presidential election between Purno Agitok Sangma and Pranab Mukherjee, Sangma challenged Mukherjee’s eligibility on the grounds that he held an “office of profit” as the Chairman of the ISI when he submitted his nomination papers. According to Article 58(2) of the Constitution, a person is ineligible to run for President if they hold a paid position under the central or state government or any authority under their control.
On July 2, 2012, during the examination of nomination papers, Sangma’s agent objected to Mukherjee’s candidacy based on these grounds. Mukherjee’s representative requested two days to respond to these objections, and on July 3, Mukherjee submitted a written reply, including a resignation letter dated June 20, 2012, claiming he had resigned from the ISI position. Despite the objections, including doubts about the authenticity of the resignation letter, the Returning Officer accepted Mukherjee’s nomination.
Sangma’s election petition was subsequently brought before the Supreme Court for a preliminary hearing to determine if it warranted a full hearing. The primary basis for the challenge was the claim that Mukherjee held “offices of profit” on the date nominations were filed.
Mr. Salve supported his argument by citing various Supreme Court decisions:
1. “Mange Ram vs. Brij Mohan: This case dealt with the applicability of the Civil Procedure Code to Election Petitions, concluding that where necessary, the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code could be applied, but only when the High Court Rules were not followed.” Mr. Salve used this decision to support his contention that Section 141 of the Civil Procedure Code would not apply in this context.
2. Ravanna Subanna vs. G.S. Kaggeerappa: “Involving the election of a counsel for under the Mysore Town Municipal Act, this case helped clarify the application of rules regarding election disputes.”
3. Madhukar G.E. Pankakar vs. Jaswant Chobbildas Rajani: This case considered the term “office of profit” and concluded that mere incumbency in an office, even with some compensation, does not disqualify a candidate unless there is a significant risk of misuse of the position. “It was ultimately decided that the ban on candidature or electoral disqualification must have a substantial link with the end, may be the potential misuse of the position as Insurance Medical Practitioner in performing his duties as Municipal President.” This is because mere incumbency in office is not disqualification, even if some sitting fee or insignificant honorarium is paid.
Mr. Salve argued that the law stated in the rulings cited by Mr. Ram Jethmalani in the cases of Shibu Soren and Jaya Bachchan was sound and that Mukherjee’s position as Chairman of the ISI did not qualify as an office of profit. This disqualified the claim that he was ineligible to run for President of India. He emphasized that the Chairman of the ISI was an honorary position and did not involve any salary or compensatory benefits. Even if one accepted the interpretation that the office might provide indirect benefits, the position still did not qualify as an office of profit.
In conclusion, Mr. Salve’s arguments were based on established legal precedents and interpretations of the term “office of profit,” asserting that Pranab Mukherjee’s position as Chairman of the ISI did not disqualify him from running for President. The Supreme Court’s rulings in various related cases supported the contention that Mukherjee was eligible to run for the presidency, and the objections raised by Purno Agitok Sangma did not hold sufficient merit to challenge Mukherjee’s election.
ANALYSIS OF THE JUDGEMENT:
On December 5, the Supreme Court’s five-judge bench dismissed a lawsuit filed by Purno Agitok Sangma, which challenged Pranab Mukherjee’s election as president at the preliminary hearing stage. Mukherjee had defeated Sangma in the presidential election held on July 19, 2012. Sangma argued that Mukherjee was ineligible to run for president because he held two profitable offices on June 20, 2012, the deadline for filing candidature papers.
According to Article 58 (2) of the Indian Constitution, a person cannot be elected president if they hold a paid position with the central or state government, or any authority under them. Sangma claimed that Mukherjee was the Chairman of the Indian Statistical Institute (ISI) in Kolkata and the Leader of the House in the Lok Sabha. Mukherjee said he had resigned from these positions before filing his candidacy papers and argued that these roles were not “profitable” offices. He admitted to using two different signatures for official documents but said the difference in his signature on the resignation letter to the ISI was not suspicious.
Chief Justice Altamas Kabir and Justices P. Sathasivam and Surinder Singh Nijjar ruled that the Chairman of the ISI role was not a profitable office because it did not offer financial or material benefits. They also decided that being the party leader in the House did not count as a government-paid position. They explained that for an office to be considered “profitable,” it must offer significant financial perks, like a house or a chauffeur-driven car.
However, Justice Ranjan Gogoi, in his dissenting opinion, said the court should assume that Mukherjee was still the Chairman of the ISI on the nomination date and that the position might be profitable. He believed the case deserved a full hearing because Sangma needed to prove these points. Justice J. Chelameswar, another dissenting judge, added that only the ISI and Mukherjee knew the details of any payments Mukherjee received as chairman, and whether these payments were compensatory or profitable. He also stressed the need to confirm whether Mukherjee had resigned before June 20. Chelameswar argued that Sangma should be allowed to examine ISI documents to challenge Mukherjee’s claims, stating that it was crucial for justice to be not only done but also seen to be done. He emphasized that the issue at stake was not just the presidency of India, but the equality clause in the constitution and the credibility of the judicial system.
CONCLUSION
In this case, we saw the dissenting judge’s pointed observations bring up important points that the other judges have not yet addressed. Both the majority ruling and the dissents bring up additional points. One, since the Constitution’s inception, the CJI has always been in the majority in Benches of five or more cases, with the exception of ten instances, according to research by scholar Nick Robinson. It is challenging to think of a case resolved by a two- or three-judge bench in which the Chief Justice of India dissented. In a case involving a five-judge bench, the CJI last found himself disagreeing with other judges in 1993. Strangely, despite the consensus among many observers that this phenomenon cannot just be a coincidence, there has yet to be a convincing explanation for it. Despite the Chief Justice of India’s discretion in selecting judges to be on the bench, commentators argue that it is unfair to assume that the Chief Justice of India always fills the bench in order to secure a majority or consensus result that he favours. They note that the CJI takes into consideration factors like the seniority of the judges and their areas of expertise, which are both equally important.
The second question this case presents is whether the President is permitted to make choices that cannot be undone during the interim between the Supreme Court’s decision on the petition that challenges his election and its acceptance. According to “Article 71(2) of the Constitution, the President’s actions taken in the course of carrying out his duties as President would not be invalidated as a result of the Supreme Court’s ruling that the President’s election was unlawful.” Despite this clause, analysts claim that propriety dictated that President Pranab Mukherjee refrain from making final judgements, such as rejecting Ajmal Kasab’s request for clemency on November 5, until the Supreme Court’s ruling on Sangmas’ case.
Submitted by
KIRTI SINGH
4th year MNLU Nagpur