Facts
- The case did not begin overnight — it was the culmination of the LGBTQ+ struggle for equality in India.
- It all started with the 2018 Navtej Singh Johar case in which same-sex relationships were decriminalized.
- That verdict accorded dignity and privacy, but not legal recognition to queer couples.
- Over a period of years, same-sex couples began claiming equal rights under legislations such as the Special Marriage Act, 1954.
- Petitions were submitted in all High Courts seeking gender-neutral interpretation of marriage laws.
- The Supreme Court consolidated 18 petitions and constituted a five-judge Constitution Bench in January 2023.
- The petitioners claimed their rights under Articles 14, 15, 19 and 21 were being infringed upon.
- The Union government resisted the plea on the ground that marriage is statutory, not a fundamental right.
- Heard in April–May 2023, the judgment was pronounced on October 17, 2023.
- The Court held that there is no right to marry as a fundamental right, but recognized the dignity of queer individuals.
- It suggested establishing a committee to consider civil rights such as
inheritance, joint accounts, access to hospitals. - The Court held that there is no right to marry as a fundamental right, but recognized the dignity of queer individuals.
Issues Raised
- Does it enjoy constitutional protection to marry one of the same sex?
The case was about this. The Court was invited by the petitioners to decide if basic rights like equality (Article 14), non-discrimination (Article 15), freedom of expression (Article 19) and dignity (Article 21) cover the right to marry, including same-sex couples. Can the love and union of two consenting adults be withheld constitutional protection simply because they are of the same gender? That was the real question. - Is there a gender-neutral interpretation of the Special Marriage Act of 1954?
There was no new legislation demanded by the petitioners. The Court would rather interpret existing terms such as “husband” and “wife” in a gender-neutral sense, they suggested. They contended that legislation must change with evolving times and values of the constitution so that homosexual couples can marry under the existing system without waiting for Parliament to pass legislation.
Contentions
Petitioner’s Arguments
1. Articles 14, 19 and 21 grant the fundamental right of marriage.
The freedom of choice and marriage of the person one loves falls under personal freedom and dignity, the petitioners argued. Marriage is a social institution and not a personal matter, as the Supreme Court had already ruled in earlier cases of Shafin Jahan and Navtej Johar, the petitioners argued. Depriving same-sex couples of this privilege infringes on their constitutional rights of equality, autonomy and expression.
2. A breach of Equality Be. fore the Law, Article 14
The contention that laws like the Special Marriage Act, which limit marriage to heterosexuality, are forms of unwarranted discrimination was perhaps the most straightforward to advance. The petitioners argued that all citizens are entitled to equal protection under the law irrespective of sexual orientation.
3. The Special Marriage Act: A Gender-Neutral Interpretation
Petitioners requested that the Court interpret the law as it existed in a non-discriminatory fashion instead of requiring a new law to be passed. In an attempt to make the law conform to the ideals of the constitution without intruding as much into the legislative sphere, they requested a general interpretation that could permit the words “husband” and “wife” to apply to same-sex spouses.
4. A breach of the Prohibition of Discrimination under Article 15
The contention that denial of same-sex couples’ right to marry on the ground of their sexual orientation amounts to sex discrimination, which is outlawed under Article 15 of the Constitution, was substantial. The petitioners based their contention on the rationale used in the Navtej Singh Johar case, which interpreted sexual orientation as a legitimate ground of protection.
5. Denial of Associated Civil Rights
The petitioners also brought up in real life the issue that same-sex couples do not enjoy meaningful civil rights, such as joint adoption, inheritance, hospital visitation and nomination rights, without marriage recognition. The lack of legal recognition, they claimed, results in everyday vulnerability and legal invisibility.
Respondent’s Arguments
The Court asserted that while the equality and dignity of LGBT couples necessitate acknowledgment, Parliament, rather than the courts, ought to be responsible for legalizing same-sex marriages. The judiciary has insisted on executive action in the development of civil rights frameworks that defend LGBTQ+ families’ equality in the real world, thus it hasn’t washed its hands.
Two connected matters were addressed by the Supreme Court in a 4:1 decision: Can courts apply marriage laws to same-sex couples and do LGBTQ+ individuals have a constitutional right to marry? There were some areas of commonality between the majority and dissenting justices, but they disagreed on significant points.
1. The basic right to marry does not exist
The Indian Constitution doesn’t bestow heterosexual or homosexual couples with an inherent right to marry, a unanimous decision by all five judges determined. Chief Justice Chandrachud emphasized that while marriage often embodies constitutional values such as autonomy and dignity, it’s a statutory institution and cannot be made an inviolable right.
2. Limits on the judiciary and division of powers
The majority held that, under Entry 5 of Schedule VII, Parliament alone could redefine or redefine marriage. Since this would constitute judicial lawmaking, they held that the judiciary should exercise restraint and not allow itself to be tempted into “reading words into” the Special Marriage Act or creating civil unions.
3. Parliament Must Consider Social Consensus
Chief Justice Chandrachud noted that changing marriage requires democratic legitimacy as it is a social institution deeply embedded in public culture. He underscored that legislative debate, rather than judicial fiat, must guide legal evolution, including embracing same-sex weddings.
4. One Directive for Civil Rights
While rejecting the marriage privilege, the judges unanimously held that LGBTQ+ couples should be granted access to state-recognized civil rights such as inheritance, succession, joint bank accounts and hospital visitations. To develop policies and legal frameworks in consonance with constitutional values, the Court urged the Union Government to form a strong committee under the leadership of the Cabinet Secretary.
5. Dissident Views on Adoption Rights and Civil Unions
Chief Justice Chandrachud, who was joined by Justice Kaul, delivered a minority judgment in favor of same-sex civil unions as an interim measure to allow necessary legal recognition. The view also advocated for the modification of the CARA adoption rules to allow joint adoption by LGBT couples. This position, however, failed to gain overwhelming support while focusing on the significance of judicial empathy and vision for reforms.
Defects in the Law
Unreasonable Disassociation Between Offense and Correction
1.The Court rightly acknowledged that barring same-sex couples from marriage is discriminatory and against Articles 14 and 15. Nonetheless, it concluded, ironically, that since marriage is not “fundamental Selective Reliance on Precedent,” there was no judicial remedy needed.
2. The ruling did not adhere to the logic in Villein’s own case of Suchita Srivastava and Shafin Jahan, in which Article 21 ensured marriage right and autonomy of individuals. The Court went against settled legal precedents and eroded constitutional protections with its assertions that “not being a matter of. social desirability.”
This type of thinking “opts to acknowledge the violation but refuse enforcement,” as Kanav Sehgal points out. Article 32, which empowers courts to deal with violations of basic rights, is disregarded.
3. Excessively pessimistic estimate of judicial ability
For judicial settlement, the majority argued that granting civil unions or interpreting marriages codes was too “complex” and “interconnected” with other social conventions.
In order to avoid total disruption, however, the petitioners had proposed models that are constitutionally acceptable and generous in nature, with scope for minimal legal tweaking. The Court’s refusal to consider these practical solutions tantamounts to judicial cowardice rather than wisdom.
4. Lack of Any Specific Timetable
The Court instructed Parliament to act, but did not give a timeframe or a legally binding obligation, so its directive came across as more of a suggestion memo than as a policy. Compared to Nepal and Pakistan, these two countries have given clear implementation instructions. This ruling doesn’t motivate action in a timely manner.
5. Public Health and Social Ignorance
Protracted legal invisibility gives rise to health inequalities, such as mental health problems, impediments to medical treatment and family stress, say commentators in The Lancet.
The Court disregarded such consequences by focusing solely on institutional jurisprudence without observing the possible public health dividends of marital recognition.
While the Court’s humility in demonstrating an awareness of its limitations is admirable, judicial restraint cannot be treated as judicial abdication. By opting out of even small remedies, like civil unions, it lost the opportunity to provide gay lives with real dignity, if not full marriage. Queer couples stand to be left in ongoing limbo if there is no timeline or follow-through, which shows a troubling ambivalence. Ultimately, a constitutional moment was lost where real-time equality could have been brought by moral clarity and legal strength. In summary, the Court declined to prevent the harm even though it correctly diagnosed the problem. Parliament is not just for legislating but also for acting with the political will to act swiftly. (In my view, legislatures and courts alike often permit real reform to waste away in procedural darkness in the absence of pressure from below.)
Inference
The the decision in Supriyo v. Union of India (2023) is a mixed blessing moment in the nation’s emerging LGBTQ+ rights struggle. While holding unanimously that LGBT individuals have autonomy and dignity and are free under the Constitution to cohabitate and enter into partnerships, the Supreme Court imposed a stringent limit on the recognition of same-sex marriage. As the majority held, Parliament and not the courts must legally acknowledge same-sex relationships as marriage is a statue institution and not a fundamental right. This was the ratio decidendi in the case and founded on the separation of powers theory. But the legal prohibition has come under severe criticism. Even as it recognized outright prejudice and exclusion, the Court did not issue an immediate remedy. It did not establish a formula for a provisional civil union or impose a deadline for legislation. Queer couples were thereby put in legal suspension, recognized in principle but nevertheless forbidden by law. The everyday lives of LGBTQ+ individuals, who are still denied legal access to basic rights such as inheritance, adoption and medical autonomy, do not find echo in such judicial reluctance, even though, in its rigorous procedural demeanor, it is not more than a step forward toward visibility and not protection. It is a gesture toward inclusion, rather than practicing it. The Court left the onus on Parliament, calling on it to act with empathy and urgency—but without binding guidance, this can potentially lead to indefinite postponement. The Supriyo ruling is an instance of progress and pause—progress in accepting queer identity and pause towards granting them their full equality before the law. The way forward now is not only in lawbooks, but in popular will and legislative backbone.
Author- Ahana Banerjee
St Xavier’s University, Kolkata.