WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.1315 OF 2018
- FACTS
On October 23, 2018, the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) issued an order removing Alok Kumar Verma from his position as the Director of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), stripping him of all his powers, functions, and supervisory roles. That same day, the Union of India executed the CVC’s order under the Delhi Special Police Establishment (DSPE) Act, 1946, leading to the appointment of M. Nageshwar Rao as the interim CBI Director.
The next day, October 24, 2018, Alok Kumar Verma filed a writ petition with the Supreme Court, challenging the orders of both the CVC and the Union of India as illegal, arbitrary, and in violation of his statutory protections under Section 4B of the DSPE Act. This section requires prior consent from a high-powered committee for the transfer of the CBI Director.
On October 26, 2018, the NGO Common Cause submitted a separate writ petition, requesting a court-supervised Special Investigation Team (SIT) to investigate the allegations against Verma and Rakesh Asthana, and challenging Rao’s appointment as the acting CBI Director.
On October 31, 2018, the Supreme Court issued notices to the CVC and the Union of India in response to Verma’s petition. The Court instructed the CVC to complete its investigation into Verma’s case within two weeks, under the supervision of retired Supreme Court Judge A.K. Patnaik.
On January 8, 2019, the Supreme Court delivered its judgment on both petitions, ruling that the CVC did not have the authority to strip the CBI Director of his powers without the high-powered committee’s prior approval. The Court also deemed the Union of India’s implementation of the CVC’s decision and the appointment of Rao as interim Director as improper and illegal, as these actions were taken without consulting the high-powered committee as required by the DSPE Act.
Following the Supreme Court’s ruling, Alok Kumar Verma was reinstated as CBI Director, pending further decision by the high-powered committee regarding his transfer or continuation according to the DSPE Act. The committee was instructed to convene within a week to review Verma’s case.
On January 10, 2019, the high-powered committee, by a majority vote of 2:1, decided to transfer Alok Kumar Verma to the position of Director General of Civil Defence, Home Guards, and Fire Services, a role of equivalent rank and pay. The Prime Minister and Justice A.K. Sikri supported the transfer, while Leader of Opposition Mallikarjun Kharge dissented.
On January 11, 2019, Alok Kumar Verma resigned, citing the lack of an opportunity to present his case before the high-powered committee and noting that he had exceeded the age limit for the Director General of Fire Services position.
- ISSUES RAISED
The three main issues raised were
- Do the supervisory powers of the Central Vigilance Commission under the CVC Act, 2003 include the authority to investigate allegations against CBI personnel?
- Did the measures taken against CBI Director Verma breach the provisions of the Delhi Special Police Establishment (DSPE) Act?
- Did the action taken against the CBI Director breach the rule of fixed tenure established by the Supreme Court guidelines in the Vineet Narain case?
- CONTENTION
The contentions laid down by both the parties and the interference by the third party, common cause was advocated by Fali Nariman, Prashant Bhushan, Dushyant Dave, and Gopal Sankaranarayanan represented the petitioner, while K.K. Venugopal represented the defendant. Kapil Sibal and Rajeev Dhavan appeared on behalf of the interveners.
THE CONTENTIONS BY THE PLAINTIFF
The Learned Counsel for the Petitioners submitted that the interpretation of the relevant statutes should align with the principles established in the Vineet Narain case, emphasizing the need to “preserve, maintain, and further the integrity, independence, and majesty” of the CBI. They argued that, for the CBI to perform its duties effectively and without interference, the Director must be granted a minimum insulated tenure of two years. This, according to the Learned Counsels, is how the CVC Act and the DSPE Act should be interpreted.
Furthermore, they contended that Section 4B (2) of the DSPE Act, which pertains to the transfer of the Director, stipulates that any divestment order cannot be executed without the prior consent of the Committee. They asserted that this section should be interpreted “in the broadest perspective” to encompass all attempts to move or remove the Director, beyond the ordinary meaning of transfer. This interpretation is essential to uphold the legislative intent and maintain consistency with the guidelines established in the Vineet Narain case.
Lastly, they argued that any action taken to prematurely curtail the Director’s tenure is invalid due to the lack of justification for such curtailment.
THE CONTENTIONS BY THE DEFENDANT
Learned Counsel for the Respondents contended that the role of the Committee under Section 4A(1) of the DSPE Act is restricted to recommending the appointment of the CBI Director by the Central Government, with no further legal role beyond that point. To support their position, they referenced the cases of Shankarsan Dash v Union of India and Jai Singh Dalal v State of Haryana. They also argued that the requirement for prior consent only applies to transfers, not other actions.
The counsel further contended that under Section 16 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the Central Government has the authority to remove the CBI Director, asserting that the power to appoint includes the power to remove. They also claimed that while a member of the Indian Police Service may be appointed as the CBI Director, this does not exempt him from disciplinary control by the competent authority.
The Union of India supported M. Nageshwar Rao’s appointment as the interim CBI Director, stating that it was lawful and appropriate. They emphasized that Rao was one of the most senior officers in the CBI, and his appointment had the CVC’s approval. The Union also dismissed allegations that Rao interfered in sensitive cases handled by the CBI.
THE CONTENTION OF THE INTERVENOR
Common Cause supported Alok Verma’s claim that the CVC and the Union of India did not have the authority to divest the CBI Director of his duties without obtaining prior consent from the high-powered committee. They argued that this action violated Verma’s legal protections under Section 4B of the DSPE Act, 1946.
Common Cause emphasized the necessity of a Special Investigation Team (SIT) to investigate the charges against Verma and Asthana under court supervision. They believed that such an investigation was crucial for ensuring accountability and transparency within the CBI’s operations. Additionally, they requested the establishment of guidelines to maintain the CBI’s independence and autonomy.
- RATIONALE
In the case of Alok Kumar Verma v. Union of India and Common Cause v. Union of India, the main issue before the three-judge bench was whether the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) and the Government of India had the authority to remove all powers, functions, duties, and supervisory roles from the CBI Director without first obtaining the consent of the Committee established under Section 4A(1) of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (DSPE Act), which is responsible for recommending the appointment of the CBI Director.
The court’s decision aimed to safeguard the independence and autonomy of the CBI Director as an institution, ensuring protection from external influence or pressure from any authority, including the State. The court emphasized the importance of due process and natural justice, allowing Verma the opportunity to present his case before the high-powered committee. The committee, which included the Prime Minister, was upheld by the court in matters related to the CBI Director’s appointment.
The Union of India defended its actions by asserting that they were taken in the public interest to address the CBI’s credibility issues stemming from allegations of corruption and misconduct against Verma and his deputy, Rakesh Asthana. While the court acknowledged the importance of maintaining the integrity and credibility of investigative agencies like the CBI, it ruled that any measures taken must comply with the law and regulations, respecting the protections provided to the CBI Director under Section 4B of the DSPE Act, 1946.
The court also stated that the appointment of M. Nageshwar Rao was neither legitimate nor reasonable, as the high-powered committee was not involved in the decision.
- DEFECTS OF LAW
There were many defects that were related to the case that made the Supreme Court to quash the orders of the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) and the Department of Personnel and Training (DoPT) that had removed Alok Kumar Verma from his position as CBI Director, reinstating him with the caveat that the selection committee would need to deliberate on his continuation.
The following defects were found: –
- Due Process and Natural Justice: The Supreme Court found that the principles of natural justice were violated when Alok Kumar Verma was divested of his powers and functions as the Director of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). The decision to remove him was made without providing him an opportunity to be heard.
- Role of the Selection Committee: The selection committee, which is responsible for the appointment of the CBI Director, should have been consulted before making any decision regarding Verma’s removal. The Supreme Court noted that bypassing this committee undermined the integrity of the process.
- Fixed Tenure Protection: As per the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, the CBI Director is provided a fixed tenure of two years to ensure independence and avoid undue influence. The court observed that removing Verma before the completion of his tenure without following due process defeated the purpose of this protection.
- Appointment of Interim Director: The appointment of M. Nageshwar Rao as the interim Director of the CBI was made without following the statutory procedure outlined in Section 4A of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946. This section requires consultation with the high-powered committee for appointing the CBI Director. The deviation from this mandated process raised significant concerns regarding the validity and reasonableness of Rao’s appointment, casting doubts on the procedural integrity of the decision-making.
- INFERENCE
The case of Alok Kumar Verma v. Union of India stands as a landmark decision by the Indian Supreme Court, emphasises the enforcement of the Rule of Law through the Court’s exercise of constitutional judicial review. In situations where authorities misuse their power or delegate responsibilities inappropriately, judicial intervention becomes crucial to ensure justice. This case effectively addressed such misuse by correctly interpreting legislative intent and showcasing the strength of a competent judiciary. The Court’s judgment suggested measures to resolve inconsistencies, further underscoring its significance.
Judicial review is a fundamental mechanism for upholding the Rule of Law and reinforcing the principle of separation of powers. It helps demarcate authority and jurisdiction among state agencies and institutions, enhancing administrative efficiency and promoting good governance. This process ensures that standards of credibility, probity, and independence are maintained, thus contributing to democratic maturity and constitutional morality.
The Alok Verma case highlights how delays and ambiguity in Supreme Court rulings on crucial matters can enable the government to evade judicial scrutiny. To prevent such situations, it is imperative for the judiciary to deliver timely and clear decisions.
In this case, the Supreme Court underscored the importance of the CBI Director’s independence and autonomy for the effective functioning of the agency and for upholding democratic principles and the Rule of Law. The Court reaffirmed the necessity of adhering strictly to the statutory provisions and procedures of the DSPE Act, 1946, for appointing, transferring, or removing the CBI Director. This adherence is crucial to avoid arbitrary decisions, ensure transparency, accountability, and proper involvement of the high-powered committee.
The ruling also emphasized upholding principles of natural justice and fairness, asserting that the affected individual must be given an opportunity to present their case before any adverse actions are taken. The Court stressed that the integrity and reliability of institutions like the CBI should not be undermined by bypassing legal protections afforded to the Director. Additionally, the case served as a reminder of the judiciary’s role in upholding constitutional values, ensuring fair trials, and protecting citizens’ rights from arbitrary government actions.