CASE COMMENTARY Knit Pro International v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. (2022)

Knit Pro International v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. (2022)

CASE DETAILS

Court: Supreme Court of India

Date of Judgment: May 20, 2022

Bench: Justice M.R. Shah and Justice B.V. Nagarathna

Case Citation: Criminal Appeal No. 807 of 2022

Parties

Appellant: M/s Knit Pro International (also referred to as Saloni Singh as per the image)

Respondent No. 1: The State of NCT of Delhi

Respondent No. 2: Anurag Sanghi

FACTS

M/s Knit Pro International (“Appellant”), a well-known manufacturer of knitting needles, approached the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (“CMM”) under 

Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”). The company attempted to obtain directions for the registration of an FIR against Anurag Sanghi (“Respondent No. 2”) for alleged copyright infringement. The allegations included offences under Sections 51, 63, and 64 of the Copyright Act, 1957, read with Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code. 

On October 23, 2018, the CMM directed the Station House Officer of Police Station Bawana to register FIR No. 431 of 2018 under the relevant provisions of law. Aggrieved by this, the respondent challenged this order before the Delhi High Court, arguing that offences under Section 63 were non-cognizable and therefore police could not investigate without the Court’s permission. 

The Delhi High Court accepted the pleas and sided with the accused. By its judgment dated November 25, 2019, quashed the FIR and ruled, relying on Rakesh Kumar Paul v. State of Assam that offences under Section 63 of the Copyright Act are non-cognizable in nature. This setback prompted Knit Pro International to move to the Supreme Court, arguing that the High Court had fundamentally misunderstood how copyright offences were to be classified under criminal procedure law.

ISSUES RAISED

The key issue before the Supreme Court was:

  • Whether the offence under Section 63 of the Copyright Act is cognizable or non-cognizable?

This question further gave rise to subsidiary issues, including:

  • How to interpret the phrase “may extend to three years” in Section 63 when read alongside Part II of the First Schedule to CrPC?
  • Whether the reasoning in Rakesh Kumar Paul v. State of Assam (2017) applied to offences under Section 63?
  • How copyright offences fit within the CrPC’s broader classification framework? 

CONTENTION

Appellant’s Contentions

The appellant contended that the Delhi High Court had erred in holding that, as per Section 63 of the Copyright Act, offences were non-cognizable.

They emphasised upon the following points:

  • Section 63 expressly prescribes punishment of not less than six months and up to three years; thus, the maximum punishment is three years.
  • As per Part II of the First Schedule of CrPC, offences punishable with three years and upwards but not more than seven years are classified as cognizable and non-bailable offences.
  • The High Court has wrongly relied on Rakesh Kumar Paul v. State of Assam, which, according to the Appellant, dealt with bail categories and was not applicable here.
  • The Appellant also cited Intelligence Officer, Narcotics Control Bureau v. Sambhu Sonkar (2001), where the Court held that maximum punishment cannot be disregarded for classification purposes.

Respondents’ Contentions

The respondent emphasised heavily upon the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in the Rakesh Kumar Paul’s case, urging the court to adopt the narrower reading of Section 167(2) CrPC.

The respondent further argued that:

  • The High Court was reasonable in recognising offences under section 63 as being non-cognizable.
  • The phrase “may extend to three years” should not automatically trigger cognizable status under CrPC.
  • If the Court finds the offences cognizable, the case should be remanded to the High Court for examining other grounds that have not been previously considered.

RATIONALE

The Supreme Court, in a bench composed of Justice M.R. Shah and Justice B.V. Nagarathna, adopted a very strict textual interpretation based upon following rationales:

Adherence of Statutory Framework: The Court contended that Section 63 of the Copyright Act allows for imprisonment up to three years. Thus, the maximum punishment that could be imposed is indeed three years.

CrPC Classification: Part II of the First Schedule to the CrPC makes it clear: offences punishable with imprisonment “for three years and upwards but not more than seven years” are cognizable and non-bailable. Conversely, only those punishable with less than three years or with a fine alone are non-cognizable. 

Precedential Distinction: The Court distinguished Rakesh Kumar Paul, emphasising that its context was entirely different. The language of the CrPC schedule, according to the Court, leaves no room for ambiguity.

The Court therefore held that the Delhi High Court had gravely erred in quashing the FIR. It then concluded that offences under Section 63 are cognizable and non-bailable.

DEFECTS OF LAW 

The judgment has resolved a two-decade-old controversy; however, it also raises several concerns-

  1. Ambiguity in Drafting: The phrase “may extend to three years” has been a debatable issue for a long time. Over the past two decades, at least seven High Courts have adopted conflicting views on whether Section 63 was cognizable or not. The Supreme Court’s decision resolves the conflict for now, but the drafting flaw in the Copyright Act remains.
  2. Risks of Over-criminalisation

The automatic categorisation of all Section 63 offences as cognizable and non-bailable may lead to disproportionate enforcement against minor infringements or legitimate fair dealing activities protected under Section 52 of the Copyright Act. This could have a chilling effect on creative expression and innovation.

  1. Tilt Toward Rights Holders: Classifying such offences as cognizable and non-bailable may shift the enforcement balance strongly in favour of rights holders, allowing the police to act instantly without judicial oversight of the infringement claim. Raising concerns regarding due process and individual liberty of the alleged infringer.
  2. Sparse Reasoning: The judgment consisted of only a single paragraph as decisive holdings, leaving several crucial aspects, for example, treating all offences under section 63 violations the same, irrespective of their gravity.
  3. Critics have described this judgement as a “sub silentio” ruling, raising questions about its long-term value as a precedent.
  1. Practical Challenges: Police officers who often lack expertise in Intellectual Property law are expected to distinguish between piracy and permissible use (i.e., fair dealing under section 52) at the stage of investigation. This may lead to erroneous arrests, harassment of creators, and unnecessary conflicts.

 INFERENCE

The Supreme Court’s ruling in Knit Pro International v. State (NCT of Delhi) marked a significant turning point in the copyright enforcement structure of India. By declaring and classifying offences under Section 63 as cognizable and non-bailable, the Court has settled the debate that has been long standing because of conflicting interpretations of the Copyright Act. Through this judgement, the court has successfully shifted the balance firmly towards deterrence and strict enforcement against infringement of copyright.

This judgement can be viewed as an attempt of aligning domestic law with India’s international commitments under agreements such as the TRIPS. 

Yet, such a strong stance of the Supreme Court also raises serious questions of proportionality. Copyright disputes often involve fine distinctions—such as whether a use is transformative or whether it qualifies as fair dealing, or whether a similarity is truly substantial or infringing. By putting such an intrinsic issue into the realm of immediate police action, the decision risks blurring the line between genuine infringement and legitimate creative practices. This could unintentionally expose the educators, researchers, and individual creators to criminal liability for acts that fall within the lawful exception of fair dealing.

While the Court’s reasoning is grounded in a strict reading of the statute, it seems to underplay the complexity of copyright law, a field where careful judicial scrutiny is usually needed to separate infringement from permissible and fair use. Granting police the authority to arrest in such matters could discourage innovation and chill creative expression.

Moving forward, the challenge lies in implementing this ruling without being misused by the enforcement agents. There exists a real danger of copyright law being easily exploited for harassment, or even censorship, hampering India’s diverse creative environment.

A more balanced framework, ideally introduced through legislative reforms, should differentiate between large-scale use by piracy and everyday (good-faith) use. Only by implementing such measures as earlier discussed can the copyright laws strike the balance it was meant to; protecting rights while fostering learning, creativity, and innovation.

AUTHOR

Anayza Faiyaz, Barkatullah University, Bhopal.