Case Comment: Ravikumar Dhansukhlal Maheta & Anr. Vs. High Court of Gujarat & Ors. Writ Petition © No. 432 of 2023

The case of Ravikumar Dhansukhlal Maheta & Anr. Vs. High Court of Gujarat & Ors. involves a significant legal dispute that touches upon the interpretation and application of the principle of “Merit-cum-Seniority” in the promotion process for judicial officers in the state of Gujarat. This case is pivotal in understanding how merit and seniority are balanced in the Indian judiciary, particularly within the context of promotions to higher judicial service posts such as Additional District Judge (ADJ). The decision of the Supreme Court in this case not only upholds the promotion process but also provides a comprehensive examination of the principles that govern judicial promotions.

Fact of the Case:

The case is based on the problem of promotion of the Judicial Officers in the Gujarat State Judicial Service with especial reference to the processes adopted by the Gujarat High Court in the year 2022 for enhancing the Civil Judges (Senior Division) to the post of Additional District Judges under the 65% quota in the principle of “Merit-cum-Seniority.” Here two challengers invoked the writ jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution, challenging the High Court’s approach to the promotion process.

Background and Recruitment Process

On April 12, 2022, the Gujarat High Court issued an advertisement/recruitment notice to fill 68 vacancies in the District Judge cadre by promoting Civil Judges (Senior Division) against the 65% quota. This recruitment was to be conducted based on the “Merit-cum-Seniority” principle, as stipulated under Rule 5(1) of the Gujarat State Judicial Service Rules, 2005. The High Court also released a list of 205 judicial officers from the Civil Judge (Senior Division) cadre, who fell within the “Zone of Consideration” for promotion. This list included the 205 most senior Civil Judges, which represented not more than three times the number of notified vacancies.

The selection process involved a multi-step assessment of the candidates’ suitability for promotion, comprising four key components:

  1. Written Test (Objective Type – MCQs): Carrying 100 marks.
  2.  Examination and Evaluation of Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs): for the last 5 years carrying the load of 20 marks.
  3.  Assessment of Average Disposal of Cases: In the last five years it has carried 20 marks.
  4.  Evaluation of Judgments: Served by the judicial officer during the previous year, which amounts 60 marks.

To be considered eligible for promotion, candidates needed to secure a minimum of 40% marks in each component and an overall aggregate of at least 50% across all components.

Outcome of the Assessment

Out of the 205 candidates considered, 175 judicial officers cleared the written test, achieving the minimum required marks. The High Court then evaluated the ACRs, judgments, and disposal rates of these 175 candidates. Following this evaluation, 149 judicial officers were deemed eligible, having met the required thresholds in each assessment component.

The final stage of the promotion process involved preparing a Select List, wherein the High Court promoted the 68 most senior candidates among the 149 eligible officers to the post of District Judge.

The petitioners’ primary grievance was that the High Court, by preparing the final Select List strictly based on seniority after determining eligibility through a minimum merit threshold, effectively applied the principle of “Seniority-cum-Merit” rather than “Merit-cum-Seniority.” According to the petitioners, this approach wrongly prioritized seniority over merit, thereby disadvantaging more capable but junior candidates, contrary to the intended application of the “Merit-cum-Seniority” principle.

Arguing that the process was not in line with Rule 5(1) of the 2005 Rules, the petitioners contended that the High Court’s method violated their right to equality under Article 14 of the Constitution. They claimed that the selection process, as applied, failed to give due importance to merit, thus leading to an unjust and unfair promotion process that favored seniority disproportionately. Consequently, the petitioners sought redress from the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution.

Issue Raised:

• Service jurisprudence, what is the extent of the applicability of the principle of ‘Merit-cum-Seniority’?

• Whether the Promotion Process of Civil Judges (Senior Division) to District Judges under Rule 5(1) of the 2005 Rules and the Recruitment Notice Dated 12. undefined A paper presented in 2022 by the Gujarat High Court Breaches the Recommendations of the Supreme Court on ‘Merit-cum-Seniority’ as Prescribed in All India Judges’ Association (3)?

• Whether the Petitioners Should Have Approached the Gujarat High Court Under Article 226 Instead of Filing a Writ Petition Directly under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution and Supreme Court of India, Where the Situation Called for an Alternative Remedy?

Contention:

Submissions on Behalf of the Petitioners

  1. Misapplication of ‘Merit-cum-Seniority’: Mr. P.S. Patwalia, Senior Counsel for the petitioners, argued that the Gujarat High Court, though claiming to follow the “Merit-cum-Seniority” principle, actually prioritized seniority over merit. The High Court assessed a minimum merit level but then promoted candidates strictly by seniority, which contradicts the required approach under service law.
  2. Dual Application of Seniority: Mr. R. Basant, Senior Counsel, emphasized that seniority was unfairly applied twice—first in determining the zone of consideration and again in the final selection. This, he argued, undermines the merit component of the promotion process, violating the intended meritocratic principle.
  3. Violation of Judicial Precedent: The petitioners highlighted that the Supreme Court has consistently ruled that promotions should prioritize merit unless candidates are equally qualified, where seniority then becomes relevant. The High Court’s method, they contend, wrongfully applied a “Seniority-cum-Merit” standard, contrary to established legal precedent like Rupa Rani Rakshit & Ors. v. Jharkhand Gramin Bank reported in (2010) 1 SCC 345 and in Dr. Kavita Kamboj v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana & Ors. reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 254.

Submissions on Behalf of the Respondent

Mr. V. Giri, Senior Counsel for the Gujarat High Court, argued that “Merit-cum-Seniority” is distinct from pure merit, as it considers both a candidate’s merit and seniority. He warned that interpreting this principle as purely merit-based, as proposed by the petitioners, would eliminate seniority from the equation and disrupt the existing promotion processes. This, he contended, would blur the lines between the promotion processes for different posts and undermine the distinction between merit-based and merit-cum-seniority-based promotions. He emphasized that this approach has been consistently followed since 2011.

Mr. Dushyant Dave, Senior Counsel for judicial officers in the final Select List, argued that the writ petition under Article 32 should not be entertained by the Supreme Court, as the petitioners have a remedy under Article 226 before the High Court. He asserted that the “Merit-cum-Seniority” principle, as outlined in the All-India Judges’ Association (3) case, was designed to ensure a minimum merit standard for promotions, particularly for District and Sessions Judges.

Mr. Dave emphasized that slight differences in marks do not necessarily indicate greater merit and should not override seniority. Accepting the petitioners’ view would unfairly disadvantage senior candidates, causing them to lose years of service despite minimal mark differences.

Ms. Mayuri Raghuvanshi, representing some respondents, supported this by arguing that seniority remains important, and marks alone do not reflect true merit, as they may not account for practical experience. She noted that the judicial decisions cited by the petitioners do not apply to the promotion of Civil Judges (Senior Division) to District Judges and that the statutory rules in other High Courts differ from those in Gujarat.

Ms. Raghuvanshi further highlighted that her clients, who participated in the 2020 promotion process, were not promoted despite higher marks due to their junior status. She stressed that the High Court has consistently applied the “Merit-cum-Seniority” principle since 2011, and any deviation would result in unjust outcomes, disadvantaging her clients once again.

Rational:

A preliminary objection was raised regarding the maintainability of the writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, arguing that the petitioners have an alternative remedy under Article 226. However, the Supreme Court, referencing Mohammed Ishaq v. S. Kazam Pasha (2009) and Maharashtra State Judicial Service Assn. v. High Court of Judicature at Bombay (2002), clarified that the availability of an alternative remedy does not bar the maintainability of a petition under Article 32. The Court noted that while it usually exercises self-restraint and directs parties to pursue alternative remedies, it may still entertain a petition under Article 32, especially when the facts are undisputed and the issue involves the interpretation of important rules with significant implications.

Principles of ‘Merit-cum-Seniority’ and ‘Seniority-cum-Merit’ in Service Jurisprudence:

The Supreme Court has provided clarity on the principles of “Merit-cum-Seniority” and “Seniority-cum-Merit” in several key rulings:

Merit-cum-Seniority: In Dr. Kavita Kamboj v. Union of India & Ors., the Court emphasized that this principle prioritizes comparative merit, allowing even a junior officer to be promoted over a senior if they demonstrate greater merit.

Seniority-cum-Merit: In State of Kerala & Anr. v. N.M. Thomas & Ors. (1976) and State of Mysore v. Syed Mahmood (1968), the Court held that this principle gives preference to seniority, provided the candidate meets a minimum required merit. However, seniority alone does not guarantee promotion; an officer can be passed over if they lack the necessary merit.

Balancing Merit and Seniority: In Jagathigowda, C.N. & Ors. v. Chairman, Cauvery Gramina Bank & Ors. (1996) and Rajendra Kumar Srivastava & Ors. v. Samyut Kshetriya Gramin Bank & Ors. (2010), the Court ruled that under the “Seniority-cum-Merit” principle, promotions should first ensure candidates meet minimum merit requirements, after which promotions are made based on seniority.

In Bhagwandas Tiwari & Ors. v. Dewas Shajapur Kshetriya Gramin Bank & Ors. (2006), the Court noted that imposing excessively high merit standards under the “Seniority-cum-Merit” principle could shift the emphasis towards “Merit-cum-Seniority,” where merit plays a predominant role.

These rulings illustrate how the Court balances merit and seniority in promotions, depending on the applicable principle.

Defects of Law:

The case highlighted several defects in the existing legal framework and its implementation:

Ambiguity in Promotion Principles: The case underscored the ambiguity and confusion surrounding the principles of “Merit-cum-Seniority” and “Seniority-cum-Merit.” The lack of clarity in the application of these principles led to disputes and legal challenges.

Inconsistent Application of Rules: The High Court of Gujarat’s inconsistent application of the promotion principles demonstrated the need for clear and consistent guidelines to ensure fairness and transparency in the promotion process.

Lack of Judicial Oversight: The case brought out the necessity of more independent supervision and responsibilities on the courts so as to guard against bias in the promotion process.

Inference:

The Court found that the promotion process of 65% promotional quota in the Gujarat judiciary, on the basis of the principle ‘Merit-cum-Seniority’, was correct, and rightfully obsessed with suitability and efficiency of the candidates and not on comparative merit alone. The Court did not have problem with that process as it was in line with guidelines of All India Judges’ Association (3), where promotion of the judicial officers of the required standards was done without transforming it into competitive examination. The petition challenging the Select List dated 10 The petition was filed with the following allegations: 03. 2023 was dismissed, to state clearly that this judgment does not cancel promotions by other High Courts in accordance with their rules.

In conclusion, the case of Ravikumar Dhansukhlal Maheta & Anr. Vs. High Court of Gujarat & Ors. serves as a reminder of the importance of adhering to established rules and principles in the promotion process. The judgment reinforces the need for clear and consistent guidelines, greater judicial oversight, and accountability to ensure fairness and transparency in judicial promotions in India.

Dibakar Dam 

Student, BBALLB, 4th Year, School of Law, Brainware University, Barasat, India.