Facts

On 13 January 2026, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the decision of Dinesh Biwaji Ashtikar v. State of Maharashtra, addressed the prevailing gap between the constitutional guarantee of education under Article 21A and its practical implementation through the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (RTE Act). In this case, the petitioner belongs to a poor family and sought admission of his children to a neighbourhood private unaided school. The school had a 25% reservation criterion for children from weak and disadvantaged groups. This reservation was as per the mandate by Section 12(1)(c) of the Right to Education (RTE) Act. Despite fulfilling the criteria required to attain the reservation, the petitioner could not secure admission for his children.

Information obtained under the Right to Information Act revealed that 648 seats remain vacant. Additionally, the Primary Education Officer (PEO) of the Zila Parishad expressly recommended the admission of the children due to the petitioner’s proximity to the school as well as due to his poverty. Despite that, the school rejected the application on the grounds that the petitioner did not complete the online application procedure for admission. Following this, the petitioner approached the Bombay High Court Under Article 226, where the petition was dismissed by observing that the petitioner himself failed to take the “appropriate steps” required for securing admission.

The petitioner now approached the Supreme Court through a Special Leave Petition. A period of nearly 10 years had passed by the time the case was heard, and the petitioner’s plea for admittance was moot. In a normal case, the Court would have decided the case without considering broader issues. The Court, however, was aware that thousands of children were unjustly denied their constitutional rights by similar procedures, and intentionally made the case a precedent-setting exercise. It named Senior Advocate Shri Senthil Jagadeesan as amicus curiae to review the implementation of Section 12(1)(c) across the country and the structural hindrances to the effective implementation of the statutory mandate. This transformed the proceedings from a conflict to an institutional critique of the implementation of inclusive elementary education in India.

Issues Raised

The court concerned itself with one major fundamental issue, which was regarding the Effectiveness of the Existing Implementation Framework under Section 12(1)(c) of the RTE Act.

Contentions

By plaintiff:

The petitioner argued that such a denial of admission under the 25% reservation stipulated by Section 12(1)(c) of the RTE Act amounted to an arbitrary and unconstitutional action being taken, as it failed to adhere to the fundamental right of free and compulsory education guaranteed by Article 21A of the Constitution. It was stated that the children were eligible, there were seats available in the neighbourhood school, and the Primary Education Officer had recommended them as they were in economic hardship. This meant that the mere failure to comply with the online application procedure by filling out a form was not enough to deny admission, as it defeated the very purpose of the RTE Act, which is to provide inclusive education to children belonging to weaker and disadvantaged sections.

By defendant:

The respondents argued that it was mandatory to follow the online admission procedure prescribed under Section 12(1)(c) of the RTE Act. It is important to note that the petitioner did not file the application in the manner prescribed and therefore could not be admitted as of right, even if he was eligible under the provisions of the Act and there were vacancies. They said that if the procedure were not strictly followed, there would be a lack of transparency, uniformity, and administrative efficiency in the admission process, and arbitrariness in the allocation of seats reserved for children of weaker sections and disadvantaged groups. Therefore, any change in the procedure would jeopardise the integrity and fairness of the admission process.

Rationale of the Court

A.     Article 21A as a Positive Constitutional Right

The Supreme Court reiterated that the right to free and compulsory education under Article 21A of the Constitution is a positive right and has a positive obligation on the part of the State and other stakeholders. Article 21A is different from negative rights, which only limit the actions of the State, as it calls for positive steps to be taken to ensure universal access to elementary education. The Court listed five duty bearers for the fulfilment of this constitutional obligation: the appropriate Government, local authorities, neighbourhood schools, parents/guardians, and elementary school teachers. Each has an equal responsibility to make sure that no eligible child is denied an education because of administrative or institutional shortcomings. The Court was clear that the success of Article 21A is not just about its being recognised in the legislation, but coordinated implementation by all duty bearers.

B.     Constitutional Philosophy Underlying Section 12(1)(c)

The Court rejected the suggestion that the purpose of Section 12(1)(c) was to improve access to private education facilities, and that the section was a ‘reservation provision’. It, on the contrary, interpreted it as a constitutional instrument that is intended to guarantee “substantive equality” and “fraternity and social integration”. The legislation intended to create a “shared educational space” where children from all socio-economic groups have access to private unaided neighbourhood schools, which must take at least 25 per cent of children from weaker sections and disadvantaged groups. The Court pointed out that the schools of the neighbourhoods are of a transformative nature in the process of removing the barriers of caste, class and economic status as envisioned by the Kothari Commission in their discussion on Common School System. Inclusive education was therefore seen as a means of fostering the constitutional values, more than just an extension of educational opportunities.

C.     Procedural Barriers Cannot Defeat a Fundamental Right

The Court ruled that administrative procedures should enable and not hinder the enjoyment of constitutional rights. While digital admission systems may be useful for transparency and administration efficiency, they should not disadvantage economically and socially disadvantaged families that may not be able to access digital information or who may have difficulty navigating the complex admission process. The Court pointed out that, as with any other procedure, the mandatory online application process is disproportionately affecting the very individuals Section 12(1)(c) is supposed to benefit, language restrictions are disproportionately affecting individuals, there is insufficient information on open seats, and grievance redress systems are not transparent enough to serve the purpose of Section 12(1)(c). The procedures can, therefore, never be used to substitute for the substantive right to free and compulsory education guaranteed by Article 21A.

D.    Institutional Safeguards for Effective Implementation

The Court welcomed the various systemic issues being brought to its attention by the petition and even took note of the recommendations made by the amicus curiae and the National Commission for Protection of Child Rights (NCPCR) in its Standard Operating Procedure (SOP). It pointed to the importance of a clear and inclusive admission policy for a successful rollout and a child-centred approach. In this context, the Court made several recommendations to ensure that the following measures are put in place: Publication of available seats in advance, information on admission in multiple languages, establishment of helpdesks for parents to assist them in the process of admission, opportunities to correct inaccurate applications, transparent selection processes, time-bound grievance redressal mechanisms, and continuous monitoring of applications after admission. These measures were to remove the procedural obstacles and to ensure that the right to be provided with the statutory guarantee in accordance with Section 12(1)(c) was effectively put at the disposal of the eligible children.

E.     Need for Enforceable Rules and Subordinate Legislation

The Court appreciated the Standard Operating Procedure issued by NCPCR, but pointed out that its SOP was advisory. It noted that such non-binding directions would not provide uniformity of implementation of directions across States and UTS. The Court, thus, directed the appropriate Government to have rules and regulations in place under Section 38 of the RTE Act, which are enforceable, after consulting with the NCPCR, State Commissions for Protection of Child Rights and National and State Advisory Councils. The Court’s demand for the preparation of the binding subordinate legislation was to create a uniform admission system that could function effectively to achieve the goals of Section 12(1)(c) and Article 21A.

Defects of Law

Although it is progressive, the judgment doesn’t resolve some issues. The Supreme Court recognised the defects in the working of Section 12(1)(c) in the system, but could not provide any effective relief to the petitioner as the case had become infructuous due to the lapse of time. Although the Court used the litigation to create a vehicle to reform the institution, the lack of an individual remedy underscores the scope of limitations of delayed judicial action in enforcing socio-economic rights.

Also, many of the Court’s rulings are contingent on future executive decisions. It called upon the States and Union Territories to draft subordinate legislation in terms of Section 38 of the RTE Act, thus acknowledging that advisory guidelines are not enough. Until these rules are put in place and working, however, the Court’s concerns about procedural issues could remain barriers to access to education.

The judgment also doesn’t provide a robust framework of accountability. It suggests such things as transparency in admissions, help desks and grievance redressal mechanisms, but does not prescribe consequences for non-compliance nor set up a structured mechanism to monitor implementation across States. Therefore, the success of the Court’s directions relies on the governments’ and the educational authorities’ ability to implement them.

Inference

The judgment makes it clear that the right to education under Article 21A of the Constitution is not only a right that needs to be formally recognised but also needs to be put into practice – effectively, accessibly and inclusively. The Supreme Court interpreted Section 12(1)(c) as a constitutional means for substantive equality, fraternity and social integration, which emphasised substantive access to education instead of procedural compliance. It acknowledged that digital exclusion, lack of transparency, and ineffective grievance redressal can significantly impact the rights of children from weaker sections and disadvantaged groups.

Concurrently, the judgment emphasises that achieving the commitment to inclusive education enshrined in the Constitution cannot be achieved solely by legislation. The Court strived to provide clarity between the intent of the legislation and its implementation by setting forth enforceable rules under the RTE Act. While the efficacy of these directions will hinge on executive adherence, the order will undoubtedly set a precedent for the importance of institutional mechanisms that are transparent, accountable and child-centric to promote the effective realisation of constitutional rights.

Conclusion

In Dinesh Biwaji Ashtikar v. State of Maharashtra, the Court’s contribution to education law in India is commendable, as it moved from mere compliance with the statutory mandates to achieving its goals. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the digital exclusion of various students, the absence of transparency and the absence of adequate grievance mechanisms of the RTI Act weaken the objectives of Section 12(1)(c) of the RTI Act and defeat the constitutional protection guaranteed by Article 21A. The Court’s decisions reinforce the institutional framework needed to achieve substantive equality and social integration, through the formulation of enforceable rules and by focusing on neighbourhood schooling. While the judgment leaves room for the executive authorities to implement the provisions of the law, it marks an important constitutional precedent that access to education is not only of a practical nature, but it should also be meaningful and devoid of unnecessary procedural obstacles.

Authored by: Gitanshi Premchandani

Institution: Institute of Law, Nirma University