Case no: Criminal appeal no. 1669 of 2009
Citation: (2019) 3 JT 16, (2019) 2 RCR(Criminal) 298, (2019) 3 Supreme 417
Hon’ble Judges: Justice. Abdul Nazeer, Justice. B. R. Gavai, Justice. A. S. Bopanna, Justice. V. Ramasubramanian and justice. B. V. Nagarathna
Bench: Division Bench
Appellant: Neeraj dutta
Respondent: State
Legislations referred:
- Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988- s. 4(1), 7, 12, 13(1)(d), 13(2), 20, 20(1)
- The Indian Evidence Act, 1872- Section 114
In this instant case, Mr. Ravijit Singh, engaged in the sale and purchase of cars through ‘Sethi Motors’ in New Delhi, faced an issue with the removal of an electric meter installed in his shop shortly after applying for it on 06.05.1995. Seeking a swift resolution, he approached Mrs. Neeraj Dutta, an LDC in a Digital Video Broadcasting (DVB) Office in 2000. Allegedly, she demanded a bribe of Rs 15,000 for the meter installation, eventually settling for Rs 10,000. Mr. Singh filed a complaint with the Anti-Corruption Branch (ACB) on 17.04.2000, reporting the demand and impending exchange at his shop the following day. Subsequently, the ACB, led by Inspector PW6, treated the intended bribe money with phenolphthalein powder, explaining the raid procedure to Mr. Singh in the presence of a shadow witness, S.K. Awasthi (PW5). During the raid, the Appellant and co-accused Mr. Yogesh Kumar were apprehended in the act of accepting the treated cash. An FIR was registered under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, by PW7. Tragically, before the trial commenced, Mr. Singh passed away. Despite this, the Ld. Special Judge, in an order dated 14.12.2006, convicted the Appellant under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) clause (i), (ii) read with Section 13(2) of the Act, and the Co-Accused under Section 12 of the Act. In response, the Appellant and Co-accused filed Criminal Appeal before the High Court of Delhi. The High Court, in a decision on 02.04.2009, upheld the Appellant’s conviction but acquitted the Co-accused, reasoning that he was unaware of the Appellant’s intentions and merely accompanied her to the Complainant’s shop. This chronicles the sequence of events leading to the conviction, appeals and subsequent decisions in a complex legal matter. The criminal appeal was filed in the Supreme Court in 2009.
Issue:
- whether in the absence of evidence of complainant/direct or primary evidence of demand of illegal gratification, is it not permissible to draw inferential deduction of culpability/guilt of a public servant under section 7 and section 13(1)(d) read with section 13(2) of Prevention of corruption Act, 1988 based on other evidence adduced by the prosecution?
Contentions:
In this case the contentions raised by the counsel for appellants is that in the absence of evidence establishing an illegal gratification demand, the appellant argues that proof of the accused receiving money alone is inadequate to establish guilt. This argument is predicated on the claim that the conviction cannot be upheld since the complainant’s death rendered important proof of the demand inaccessible. The prosecution’s case against the appellant is further undermined by its inability to use this material to support the demand.
In contrast, the respondent argues that the Court ought to apply the presumption stated in Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. In light of this argument, the Act’s presumption ought to be upheld until the accused can provide evidence to the contrary. The argument uses a series of Supreme Court rulings as evidence that this position has been abandoned in order to argue against depending solely on primary data to support a demand. Essentially, the accused must refute this assumption in order to contest the case against them, while the prosecution is released from the duty of proving the demand through conventional means thanks to the presumption under Section 20 of the Act.
Rationale:
The Apex Court addressed critical aspects of the case, notably highlighting its applicability under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, prior to the 2018 Amendment. The judgment emphasized the reliance on circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct proof, establishing the prosecution’s ability to prove the demand for gratification by a public servant.
The Court made a nuanced distinction between Section 7 and Section 13 of the Act, underscoring that Section 7 deals with the offer to pay a bribe without a specific demand from the public servant, while Section 13 centers on the public servant making a demand and the subsequent acceptance by the bribe giver. Crucially, the Court clarified that mere acceptance without prior demand does not constitute an offense under these sections. Furthermore, the Court laid down a presumption – once the act of demand and acceptance of a bribe is established, it is presumed that the public servant has accepted or attempted to obtain the illegal gratification. Notably, in cases where the complainant is deceased or turns hostile, the Court asserted its reliance on circumstantial evidence to ensure the trial’s continuity rather than acquitting the accused public servant. Applying these principles to the present case, where the complainant had passed away before trial commencement, the Supreme Court underscored its reliance on circumstantial evidence, especially the testimony of the party conducting the raid (PW5). The appellant argued her presence at the complainant’s shop was to collect dues, and cash found in her car supported her statement. However, PW5’s admission of not knowing the purpose of the cash transaction raised doubts. The Court, emphasizing the need for more than a mere demand for money, concluded that not every demand amounts to a demand for gratification under the Act. Due to the absence of additional evidence, the Supreme Court cast skepticism on the nature of the demand, illustrating the nuanced considerations in determining the illegality of gratification demands under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
Defects of law:
The defects of law in dealing with the corruption activities might be lack of resources in anti- corruption enforcement agencies. To prove the demand under illegal gratification becomes a challenging part in court especially in cases of corruptive practices.
Presently, there are several enforcement steps taken to prevent corruption like setting up of special court under the Prevention of corruption Act, 1988, it can proceed with person who are accused for offences under the Act and also under the Indian penal code, 1860. And also Lokayukta plays a major role in anti-corruption practices.
Inference:
On April 17th, 2000, Ms. Neeraj Dutta, a Lower Divisional Clerk at the Delhi Vidyut Board demanded a bribe of ₹10,000 from Mr. Rajvit Singh Sethi for the installation of an electricity meter at his shop. She agreed to receive the amount the same day at Mr. Sethi’s shop between 03.00 PM and 04.00 PM. Mr. Sethi registered an FIR against Ms. Dutta that morning and got the police to undertake a sting operation to catch Ms. Dutta in the act.
After successfully executing the sting operation and finding that Ms. Dutta had in fact received the bribe, the police filed a charge sheet. Ms. Dutta was charged under Sections 7 and 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, which punishes public officials for taking bribes or ‘illegal gratification’, and for misconduct. Further, it prescribes a punishment of three to seven years imprisonment and a fine. Mr. Sethi, who made the complaint against Ms. Dutta, passed away before the trial began. As a result, the case no longer had a primary witness. Primary witnesses are crucial in proving the facts of a case as they provide oral evidence of the events, which is considered direct evidence under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
In the past, the SC has held that in case the person to whom the demand was made is either dead or unavailable for providing direct evidence, the accused is acquitted. However, in this case, the Trial Court relied on evidence based on other circumstances surrounding the event such as the police statements to convict Ms. Dutta. Ms. Dutta appealed the Trial Court’s decision at the Delhi High Court. She stated that circumstantial evidence was not enough to convict her under the Act. The Delhi HC however, upheld the decision of the Trial Court to convict her on April 2nd, 2009. A few days later, on April 15th, 2009, Ms. Dutt, appealed this decision at the Supreme Court.
At the SC, a 2-Judge Bench comprising Justices R. Banumathi and Subhash Reddy heard her appeal. They examined previous judgments relying on circumstantial evidence when the primary evidence of the complainant is unavailable. In P. Satyanarayana Murthy v District Inspector of Police, State of Andhra Pradesh,the court held that relying on circumstantial evidence, was not permissible under the law. The Bench viewed that this conflicted with the SC’s previous judgements in B. Jayaraj v State of Andhra Pradesh and M. Narsinga Rao v State of A.P.
The Bench concluded that there was a conflict in these decisions on the nature and quality of proof necessary to convict a person under the PCA when the primary evidence of the complainant is unavailable. Seeing that a significant question of law was raised in the case, the Bench referred it to a 5-Judge Constitution Bench. The Constitution Bench comprising Justices Abdul Nazeer, B. R. Gavai, A. S. Bopanna, V. Ramasubramanian and B. V. Nagarathna heard the matter. The primary question before them was whether a public official could be held guilty for the crime of demanding a bribe or an illegal gratification under Sections 7 and 13 of the PCA based on circumstantial evidence. The Bench also had to decide whether the three decisions of the SC in P.Satyanarayana Murthy (2015), B. Jayaraj (2014) and M. Narsinga Rao (2001) were in conflict with each other.
The Bench unanimously held that a person could be convicted based on circumstantial evidence for the crime of demanding a bribe or illegal gratification under the PCA, 1988. In the Judgment delivered by Justice Nagarathna, the Bench also clarified that the three judgments were not in conflict with each other. On the question of conflict in the judgments of P. Satyanarayana Murthy, B. Jayaraj and M. Narsinga Rao, the Bench held that the facts in each case were slightly different from each other which resulted in differing decisions.
Justice Nagarathna wrote that Courts have the discretion to make ‘presumptions’ of facts based on the evidence available when considering a demand for a bribe, as long as this presumption is not directly rebutted. Additionally, the Bench also stated that the death of a complainant does not directly result in an acquittal of the accused. This Judgment has significantly reduced the high degree of proof that was previously required to convict an official for seeking illegal gratification.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s judgment underscored the importance of circumstantial evidence in proving allegations under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The ruling clarified the distinction between mere demand and illegal gratification, emphasizing the necessity of demonstrating both demand and acceptance to establish guilt. Furthermore, the Court’s decision highlighted the judicial recourse of relying on circumstantial evidence in cases where the complainant is unavailable, ensuring the continuity of trials and upholding the integrity of legal proceedings.
DETAILS:
Name: B. Shermi Adams
BA.LLB(Hons)- 4th year.College: REVA University.