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Russia’s Communication Influence Operation From the Perspective of International Humanitarian Law

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Abstract

It’s said the first victim of war is the truth. In the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict while the world has acknowledged how Russia instigated the war with invasion, the state media in Russia has been forbidden to even use the word ‘invasion’.

 Instead in Russian public discourse, Russia has launched a ‘special military operation’ to liberate the people of Ukraine. The remaining independent channels and social media platforms are being curtailed. Thus, Russia has launched an Influence Operation spreading disinformation during the war. Much of the discussion on unlawful communication and Influence Operation during armed conflicts in International Humanitarian Law focuses on the adversary population. This paper, however, aims to examine disinformation propaganda launched by Russia on its citizens during the war. It also delves into the implications of the propaganda on the Russian public and its legality under International Humanitarian Law.

Keywords

– Influence Operation; Information Operation; Communication; International Humanitarian Law; Russia; Ukraine.

Introduction

“Every lie we tell incurs a debt to the truth” this quote by Valery Legasov, a scientist who acted as a whistleblower in the aftermath of the nuclear disaster in the erstwhile USSR in the infamous series Chernobyl (HBO), haunts the world as Russia curbs communication channels in the light of Ukraine-Russia conflict. Perhaps the first victim of war is truth, but how far should it get maimed under International Humanitarian Law or Law of Wars?

Globally Russia is being condemned for invading Ukraine and instigating the war in sanctions at various fronts such as economic, sport and cultural. However, it has launched an Influence Operation during the war controlling the media and communication channels in its backyard. The Russian state is hellbound to convince its citizens that war is not war rather a Special Military Operation to liberate the people of Ukraine. Reportedly[1]The Russian Government has circulated official instructions to the media houses, banning words like ‘assault’ and ‘invasion’ for reporting the news. The reportage of the Special Military Operation can only be made from the information published by the Government and shall punish anyone violating the guidelines. The Russian military forces’ news of the strikes in the Ukrainian Cities is dismissed as fake[2]. Instead, Ukraine is blamed for the strikes and even using children, women and civilian population as a human shield to cause destruction. Reports of casualties of Russian soldiers are absent in Russian media. Remaining Independent media houses and websites are being taken down off-air and slapped with inquiries and curbs for violations. Sympathy in public discourse is also being sought by comparing the present ‘special military operation’ against ‘Nazi sympathizers’ with that of the Great Patriotic War against the Nazis in World War II. Thus brazen propaganda blaming Ukraine is dominating the communication channels in Russia.

 Influence Operation during War

Before delving further it is important to understand the term Influence Operation and what impact it may have during the war. Influence Operation in the contemporary era refers to the method by which a military organisation affects individuals’ cognitive aspects rather than physical aspect[3]. Information and Communication are tools for enabling influence operation in Modern Warfare. The technologically advanced world, may utilise television, websites, social media platforms etc to impart propaganda. According to Pontus Wither, a Researcher at Swedish Defence Academy, Influence Operation can be directed against the military opponent, civilians living in an adversary state, or to any other group or individual with the aim to exercise influence[4]. A similar term relevant in the contemporary era is Information Operation. Leading social media companies such as Facebook recognize this phenomenon as –  Actions taken by organised actors (such as the government) using fake news, disinformation aimed at manipulating public opinion[5]. For this study, the term ‘Influence Operation’ shall be used to encompass the influence carried through any platform or tool. 

[1] 

The Influence Operation launched by Russia on its citizens during the war imparts disinformation and distorted versions of war and holds the capacity to influence public opinion on the war. Public opinion is pivotal to any war, as the French pacification theorist Roger Trinquier once remarked, “The sine qua non of victory in [insurgent/pacify] warfare is the unconditional support of the people[6]”. In the given case of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict, the emotive propaganda comparing World War II to Special Military Operation aims to garner public support. The large-scale sanctions have now made Russia the most sanctioned country in the world[7], affecting its economy and industries. Influence Operation is significant to Russia to convince its citizens to bear the ripple effects of the sanctions in the guise of the nation’s honour. Its implications in the ongoing war may facilitate the Russian Government with public support[8] and participation (directly or indirectly) to continue this Special Military Operation.

Objective

A large proportion of the discussion on Influence Operation during the war is focused on the adversary population. Given the effect this Influence Operation by Russia on its citizens on the war, it becomes pertinent to examine its legality under International Humanitarian Law. Thus, this paper aims to examine the legality of Russia’s Influence Operation on its citizens under International Humanitarian Law.

METHODOLOGY

A mixed methodology comprising secondary and doctrinal research with critical analysis of the existing literature on Influence Operation on adversary population is done. The quantitative methodology based on secondary data sources is also done to gauge the implication of Influence operation on the Russian Public. From the position of International Humanitarian Law (about influence operation on adversaries), the legality of Influence Operation by Russia on its citizens is deduced.

LITERATURE REVIEW

  • Protecting the Global Information Space in Times of Armed Conflict by Robin Geiss And Henning Lahmann, Geneva Academy, Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights – The paper mentioned above explores the possibilities of Influence Operation based on five scenarios inspired from real life. It looks into the nuances of  Influence Operation and its severity to apply International Humanitarian Law. It also highlights the limitations of Humanitarian Law and suggests changes to the existing position.
  • Influence Operation and the Human Domain by Thomas M. Scanzillo and Edward M. Lopaciensk, Centre on Irregular Warfare and Armed Conflicts –  It showcases the significance and effect of Influence Operation in the modern and developing arena of Warfare.
  • Customary International Humanitarian Law Volume I Rulebook, Volume II (ICRC)- It elaborates the basic rule of Distinction, Proportionality and Precaution during International Humanitarian Law and various rules, including the definition of Civilian Objects, Military Objects and the aim of Humanitarian Law.
  • Military influence operations & IHL: Implications of new technologies by Pontus Winther, International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC), Blog – It delves into the implication of technologies in  communication and Influence Operation during War.
  • Quantitative data – Surveys by political scientists measuring Russian Public Opinion about the war by organisations like The Washington Post, Open Democracy.net etc have been used.
  • Further various articles, blogs and news reports by organisations like BBC, Aljazeera and Just Security Organisation (New York University School of Law), ICRC etc, have been used to study the tools of Influence Operation used by Russia and its impact on citizens.

INFLUENCE OPERATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

The legality of Influence Operation under International Humanitarian Law, as scholars have highlighted in the past[9]can be traced in IHL only tenuously and non systematically due to the traditional focus on physical aspects of War. On the other hand, Influence Operation through various media is a consequence of technological advancement in the last few decades. Also, as mentioned above Influence Operation targets the cognitive or psychological aspects of the human domain. Further, International Humanitarian Law aims to limit the effects of war, which does not imply that it is there to determine ALL the effects of war. It is for this reason, psychological aspects remain unaddressed and ambiguous under IHL.

According to the Tallinn Manual, the first book which addressed Cyber Warfare under International Humanitarian Law, “psychological operations such as dropping leaflets or making propaganda broadcasts are not prohibited even if civilians are the intended audience[10]”. However, “through the longstanding, general, and unopposed practice of States, a permissive norm of customary law has emerged, which specifically permits’ such operations ‘as long as [they] do not violate any other applicable rule of IHL[11]”. The rule mentioned above about propaganda in Tallinn Manual deals with civilians as the target population. Civilian[12] is anyone who does not participate in the armed forces. Thus the target of the Russian Influence Operation is the civilian population of Russia, which is not participating in Military Operations. At this stage a question arises, does the Influence Operation carried on by Russia violate any principle of IHL? When this question is answered in the affirmative, IHL can be applied.

RULES ON INFLUENCE OPERATION AGAINST ADVERSARY

To answer this, one first must understand the rules of Influence Operation on adversary under IHL. Usually, a piece of information intended to influence an adversary is permissible if it qualifies as an alloweable ruse and is prohibited as Perfidy (violating IHL). Perfidy, defined in Article 37(1) AP I, is an act that invites “the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, with the intent to betray that confidence”.To establish that IHL was violated, there is a direct nexus between death, injury etc and the information[13]. Ruse on the other hand has a wider scope, defined as ‘acts intended to mislead the enemy or to induce enemy forces to act recklessly[14]’. Ruse includes psychological aspects of warfare. According to the 1987  Commentary on Additional Protocol I, a ruse to be prohibited, should have the capability of invoking the adversary to commit an imprudent act having at least some nexus with military operations. Based on both the definitions and the necessary proximity test, it would be wrong to qualify all the Influence Operations against an adversary as a violation of IHL. Another important rule governing information and influence operation against the adversary is Common Article 1 Geneva Conventions “The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances[15]”. This implies that if at any stage the parties to the conflict encourage the violation of Humanitarian Law, it is prohibited. Based on these principles, if a piece of information amounting to perfidy or ruse encourages the adversary to violate IHL, that information or influence operation would be illegal.

The thin line of proximity has to be determined carefully. For instance Situation 1, where the military spreads fake news on social media to incite certain groups of civilians to resort to violence, ( and it did result in violence/ riots) it would amount to be a prohibited Influence Operation under IHL. Now take for instance Situation 2, where one party to the conflict gains access to the information system of the adversary party. Through this platform, they spread disinformation about new lockdown restrictions which creates mayhem and puts the party in an advantageous position. Even though disinformation was used to create confusion and terrorize civilians of the adversary, it did not incite violence or any other physical consequences. Therefore Situation 2 does not violate IHL and hence the Influence Operation cannot be curtailed. 

INFLUENCE OPERATION ON CIVILIANS IN RUSSIA

Now that we are acquainted with the ruling of Influence Operation on Adversary under IHL, we can determine the legality of Russia’s current operation on its citizens. Now, let’s take up the question : Does Influence Operation carried on by Russia violate IHL? It can be answered by gauging the implication or effect of these influence operations.  A study[16] by political scientists (Washington Post) shows that the leaders pay attention to the public sentiment. Further surveys from 2016 reveals that merely 8% think that Russia should send its troops to Ukraine, which is half the proportion compared to 2016. However, the same researchers in the Washington Post reveal that the public backing of armed intervention spikes and changes quickly once the War unfolds as observed in 2014. In another recent survey by Russian State Media, 71% of the respondents supported the ‘Special Military Operation’; another poll by a British agency reveals that pre-war almost 50% would support Russia’s use of force to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO[17].

While the survey integrity in a State-controlled media, always remains susceptible, it does highlight the gist of Russia’s public opinion about the ‘Special Military Operation’. The more Russian media feeds them with the narrative that the west and Ukraine is to blame for the invasion, the more support the Russian Government will garner. Scholars have also highlighted the ability of Russian society to tolerate severe economic hardships in the name of National Pride[18]. However, the impact of the Influence Operation can differ significantly by its significance in the eyes of the Russian State. Nonetheless, it is assumed that public sentiment will contribute to Russia continuing the invasion for this study. However, this assumption is prima facie far-fetched as it fails to establish a direct nexus between the military actions and the Influence Operation. It might indeed encourage the public to bear the ripple effects of sanctions, but it does not violate any principle of IHL.

 Additionally, it cannot establish the proximity to incite the Russian public to resort to violence. It might act as a psychological factor to boost the morale of the military and state, but as aforementioned, customary IHL focuses on physical and direct consequences. The effect of Influence Operation on the civilian population in Russia is least likely to be linked with material aspects. On these grounds, International Humanitarian Law is not applicable on the Influence Operation.

ONGOING DEBATE

The legality of the Influence operation of the adversary remains ambiguous in IHL. To resolve the same scholars have suggested two paths[19]– either to recognize the psychological aspects in IHL, or addressing the issue under the umbrella of Human Rights. So when it comes to the legality of Influence Operation by a party on its citizens, I can suggest the same.

  1. To recognize psychological aspects – Customary International Humanitarian Law focuses on physical consequences and aspects especially when it comes to Influence operations on adversaries. It can extend to Influence Operation on a state’s civilians. The present proximate text does not consider the Influence Operation launched by Russia as illegal, even though it is filled with disinformation, blaming Ukraine for the invasion. It should revisit the standard test of nexus between violence and information. Scholars have previously argued that International Humanitarian Law should consider the intangible effects of wars pouring out of Influence Operation of Communication in the changing circumstances of the 21st century. Given the dynamic technological development in the field of communication, Influence Operation becomes significant in affecting public sentiment. It targets the psychological or cognitive factors and thus influences public opinion. At present even Influence Operation on adversaries remains dubious, let alone Influence on one’s civilians. Despite discussions among scholars, there exists reluctance to include psychological aspects under IHL. After all, IHL, or any other law,can’t be expected to conquer all the consequences and address all the aspects.
  2. To apply Human Rights Law- The second option is to accept the limitations of IHL and to view these Influence Operations from the perspective of Human Rights Law. For instance, the circulation of disinformation can be addressed by Article 19(2) ICCPR(International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) to which Russia is a party[20]. The same is enshrined in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Additionally, Article 55, Part 3, Constitution of the Russian            Federation provides for the Right to Information. In light of the gross manipulation and control of media, international watchdogs, as well as the civil society in Russia has to speak up against the Influence Operation. Only when  Reportedly[21] anti-war protests have found some ground in Russia. Given the autocratic control of the Kremlin, how far anti-war sentiments can reach remains yet to be explored. Perhaps the words of Abid Hussain, the first UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, 1995, stand relevant- “In contemporary society, because of the social and political role of information, the right of everyone to receive information and ideas has to be carefully protected. This right is not simply a converse of the right to impart information but it is a freedom in its own right.”.

CONCLUSION

 Concerning communication of disinformation, Tallinn Manual psychological operations and propaganda against the civilians are permissible.  The bottom line is if such propaganda violates any other applicable rule of IHL or encourages violation of IHL , then it is not permissible. The same agrees with the interpretation of Common Article 1 of Geneva Conventions that encouragement of violation of IHL is prohibited.  It is noteworthy that the subject of these laws, in this case, is not the civilian population of the adversary i.e Ukraine, but the population of Russia.  The purpose of IHL is to limit the effects of war and to restrict the means and methods of war.  Thus, prime contention to enable the application of IHL can be that the communication of disinformation provokes the population to violate or contribute to the violation of IHL. Under the customary rules, to extend IHL’s application on certain acts, a causal nexus must exist between the communication and violence. So if the Influence Operation does help Russia garner support among the population to continue the war, it is based on inferences that are far stretched and is not a direct consequence. Therefore, as per the customary interpretation, the Information Influence Operation does not come under the ambit of IHL.

It should revisit the standard test of remoteness of certain acts of violence. The same stands true for Influence Operations by a country on its population which consequently facilitates the Government to continue the war. In curbing these communication channels under IHL the psychological factors such as the public’s attitude towards the effects of economic sanctions and support for the government should be seen as indirect but significant acts strengthening the government’s stance on war.

Even though International Humanitarian Law may not be applicable on the Russian Influence Operation on its public, it still violates their basic Human Right i.e. Right to Information under Article 19 (2) ICCPR. With the increasing curb on News channels and social media, the public is unfamiliar with the casualties of its own country’s soldiers and the invasion Russia has launched on Ukraine in the guise of ‘Special Military Operation’.

[1] Just Security,  “Influencing Putin’s Calculus: The Information War and the Russian Public” https://www.justsecurity.org/80433/influencing-putins-calculus-the-information-war-and-the-russian-public/ accessed 10 March, 2022

[2] Simona Kralova & Sandro Vetsko, “Ukraine: Watching the war on Russian TV – a whole different” story  https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60571737 , accessed 10 March, 2022

[3] Pontus Winther, “Military influence operations & IHL: Implications of new technologies” https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2017/10/27/military-influence-operations-ihl-implications-new-technologies/  accessed 11 March, 2022

[4] Ibid

[5]Jen Weedon, “William Nuland and Alex Stamos, Information Operations and Facebook”, https://i2.res.24o.it/pdf2010/Editrice/ILSOLE24ORE/ILSOLE24ORE/Online/_Oggetti_Embedded/Documenti/2017/04/28/facebook-and-information-operations-v1.pdf [2017], Facebook Security, accessed 10 March, 2022

[6] Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency,

trans., Daniel Lee (New York, NY: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), 8

[7] Economic Times, “Russia becomes world’s most sanctioned country” https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/russia-becomes-worlds-most-sanctioned-country/articleshow/90070310.cms , last visited 10 March, 2022

[8]  Just Security,  “Influencing Putin’s Calculus: The Information War and the Russian Public” https://www.justsecurity.org/80433/influencing-putins-calculus-the-information-war-and-the-russian-public/  accessed 10 March, 2022

[9] Robin Geiss And Henning Lahmann, ‘Protecting the Global Information Space in Times of Armed Conflict by’, Geneva Academy, [2021]

[10] Schmitt MN, Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations (2nd ednCambridge University Press 2017) Rule 93, para 5

[11] “Scenario 12: Cyber Operations against Computer  Data.” In International Cyber Law in Practice: Interactive Toolkit, (ICRC 2020), https://cyberlaw.ccdcoe.org/wiki/Scenario_12:_Cyber_operations_against_computer_data  accessed 11 March, 2022

[12] Customary International Law , Volume II , Chapter 1, Rule 5

[13] Tallinn Manual 2.0, rule 122, para. 5

[14] Tallinn Manual 2.0, rule 123, para. 2.

[15] ICRC, “Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions” https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/article/other/57jqcp.htm#:~:text=Article%201%20common%20to%20the,4%2C%20of%20Additional%20Protocol%20I. Last visited 11 March, 2022

[16]Henry E. Hale, Ora John Reuter, Bryn Rosenfeld, David Szakonyi and Katerina Tertytchnaya , “Russia may be about to invade Ukraine”, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/02/11/russia-may-be-about-invade-ukraine-russians-dont-want-it/ , accessed 11 March, 2022

[17]Maxim Alyukov, “In Russia opinion polls are a political weapon” https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/russia-opinion-polls-war-ukraine/ , accessed 11 March, 2022

[18] Just Security,  “Influencing Putin’s Calculus: The Information War and the Russian Public” https://www.justsecurity.org/80433/influencing-putins-calculus-the-information-war-and-the-russian-public/ accessed 10 March, 2022

[19]  Robin Geiss And Henning Lahmann, ‘Protecting the Global Information Space in Times of Armed Conflict by’, Geneva Academy, [2021]

[20] https://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/russia1007/4.htm

[21] Aljazeera “Anti-war protests intensify in Russia along with police crackdown” https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/10/anti-war-protests-intensify-in-russia-along-with-police-crackdown accessed 11 March, 2022

Influence Operation during War

Before delving further, it is important to understand the term Influence Operation and its impact during the war. Influence Operation in the contemporary era refers to how a military organization affects individuals’ cognitive aspects rather than physical aspects. Information and Communication are tools for enabling influence operation in Modern Warfare. The technologically advanced world may utilize television, websites, social media platforms, etc., to impart propaganda. According to Pontus Wither, a Researcher at Swedish Defence Academy, Influence Operation can be directed against the military opponent, civilians living in an adversary state, or any other group or individual to exercise influence. A similar term relevant in the contemporary era is Information Operation. They are leading social media companies such as Facebook to recognize actions taken by organized actors (such as the Government) using fake news and disinformation to manipulate public opinion. For this study, the term ‘Influence Operation’ shall be used to encompass the influence carried through any platform or tool.

Submitted by Sabahat Wali Khan

III Sem, BALLB (Hons), AMU