| Citation: | 2025 INSC 1308 |
| Bench: | B.R. Gavai CJI, Surya Kant J., Vikram Nath J. |
| Judgement date: | November 11, 2025 |
| Court: | Supreme Court of India |
FACTS
The Nithari serial killings first hit the headlines in December 2006 when the police found the skeletal remains of children and women in a drain near House No. D-5, Sector 31, Nithari Village, Noida. It was the house of a businessman, Moninder Singh Pandher, who had a domestic servant, Surendra Koli. On 29 December 2006, Koli was arrested in connection with FIR No. 838 of 2006 (Payal’s case/disappearance).
Koli was booked under 13 different charges in relation with the disappeared victims. All 13 prosecutions had one common basis i.e. a confession recorded under Section 164[1] of the CrPC on 1 March 2007, and allegedly the discovery of human remains made at Koli’s instance under Section 27[2] of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
Rimpa Haldar was one of the victims who was a minor and had gone missing in 2005. On 13 February 2009, the Trial Court found Koli guilty and sentenced him to death under Sections 302[3], 364[4], 376[5] and 201[6] of the IPC. The Allahabad High Court, on 11 September 2009, upheld the decision. The Supreme Court decided the case on 15 February 2011 in Surendra Koli v. State of U.P, as one of the rarest of rare cases. Review petition was dismissed on 28 October 2014. The Allahabad High Court later on 28 January 2015, changed the death sentence to life imprisonment.
Koli, in the 12 companion cases which were based on the same confession and recovery, was acquitted by the Allahabad High Court on 16 October 2023, as finding the confession involuntary and the recoveries unreliable. The Supreme Court, on 30 July 2025, by dismissing the State’s appeals, upheld these acquittals.
In a situation like this where the evidence for a conviction remains the same as the acquittal, the hiccup is obvious. That’s why, Koli filed a curative petition before the Supreme Court. Then, on 11 November 2025, the Supreme Court gave Koli the benefit of the doubt and acquitted him of all the charges in the Rimpa Haldar case, which means that the previously convicted ones were set aside.
ISSUES RAISED
1. Whether the threshold of the facts in the present case was sufficient to entitle the Supreme Court to invoke their curative jurisdiction?
2. Whether irreconcilable outcomes of the Supreme Court, based on an identical evidentiary foundation, constitute a ‘manifest miscarriage of justice’ warranting curative intervention?
3. Whether the confession recorded under Section 164[7] of the CrPC made voluntary when such is being made after the accused was kept in police custody for about 60 days without giving him any real and meaningful legal aid?
4. Whether the alleged discoveries and recoveries under Section 27[8] of the Indian Evidence Act are legally valid and admissible in court?
5. Whether sustaining a conviction on evidence judicially rejected as inadmissible in identical companion cases violates Articles 14[9] and 21[10] of the Constitution of India?
CONTENTION OF THE PARTIES
- Petitioner Arguments (Surendra Koli)
Petitioner declared that the two sets of Supreme Court judicial endings based on the same confession and the same kind of Section 27[11] recoveries cannot legally exist side by side. It was also submitted that the one made on 1 March 2007 was brought about after the petitioner was kept in police custody almost 60 days without break when he was also denied getting any legal help to the point that the confessional statement was involuntary and So in Section 24[12] of the Evidence Act. And, the petitioner argued that the alleged recoveries were not credible because there was no disclosure statement made at the time of the recovery, panchnama documents contained major contradictions, and the presence of the police personnel and general public at the recovery places went against the exclusivity doctrine required under Section 27[13].
It was also argued that a conviction based on evidence that the Supreme Court has accepted as utterly unreliable in 12 companion cases would be an arbitrary anomaly and denial of Article 14[14] (right to equality) as well as Article 21[15] (right to life and personal liberty) of the Constitution. The petitioner maintained that the situation is a “blatant miscarriage of justice” and it calls for intervention ex debito justitiae – as a matter of right and justice, as stated in the case of Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra[16].
- Respondent Arguments (State of Uttar Pradesh)
The State invoked the doctrine of finality of judicial decisions and said that the conviction of Rimpa Haldar was final as the Supreme Court upheld it in 2011 and rejected the review petition in 2014. The respondent submitted that the power of the curative jurisdiction is so limited and rare that it should not be exercised unless absolutely necessary, and that the fact of the present case does not meet the standard for such jurisdiction. Besides that, it was argued that the crimes of raping and murdering a minor are most heinous and that the evidence on record, including DNA matching and the victim’s clothes, supports the conviction, which makes Rimpa Haldar case different from the 12 acquittals.
RATIONALE
The Court in its curative jurisdiction decision was led by Justice Vikram Nath to hear the petition and decide the matter relying on the constitutional and evidentiary grounds.
- On Curative Jurisdiction
The Court in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra[17], (2002) reaffirmed the principle that the existence of curative jurisdiction is thanks to Articles 129[18] and 142[19] of the Constitution and its purpose is to remedy a fundamental defect which threatens the integrity of the adjudicatory process rather than to re-examine the evidence as in a second appeal. This matter, the Court found, had triggered the “exacting threshold” for curative jurisdiction since the petitioner had shown two completely contradictory decisions based on the same piece of evidence. The Court further stated that where the Supreme Court’s final orders on the same matter but for different results cause the judicial process to lose its integrity and shake public confidence, the requirement for intervention as a matter of justice becomes not a matter of discretion but a constitutional duty.
- On the Inadmissibility of the Confession
The Court saw main defects in the confession that were common to all 13 Nithari prosecutions and could not be blamed on peculiarities of the factual situation of any victim: (i) the confession was given after about 60 days of uninterrupted police custody, during which there was no meaningful or private access to legal aid; (ii) the Magistrate recording the confession did not record at length his being satisfied of the voluntary nature of the confession as given in Section 164[20] of the CrPC was not met; (iii) the Investigating Officer at the beginning and throughout the recording was in close proximity, Because of this the environment of voluntariness was compromised; and (iv) the content of the confession itself mentioned repeatedly the tutoring and prior coercion leading to the absolute bar under Section 24[21] of the Evidence Act. The Court ruled that there was no reason to treat the same confession as voluntary when it comes to Rimpa Haldar as it had been discredited on the same ground in all the companion matters.
- On the inadmissibility of recoveries under Section 27
The Court observed that the alleged discoveries under Section 27[22] of the Evidence Act were not tenable in law, for three reasons: no contemporaneous statement disclosing the information was made by the accused; the narration of the panchnama and the remand papers were materially contradictory; and the places of recoveries were publicly known before the investigation, which negated the very basis of Section 27[23] – that the historical information leading the police must be exclusively within the knowledge of the accused. Then again, the forensic evidence including the DNA analysis was only sufficient to indicate that the remains were of the missing victims, but there was nothing to link Koli with any criminal act in House D-5. No human blood or other incriminating biological material was found in the premises.
- On Constitutional angle
The Court ruled that it is Article 21[24] of the Constitution that is being violated when a person is convicted on evidences that the Supreme Court itself had, in fact, found to be involuntary or inadmissible in the same factual context. Besides, it passed the same through Articles 14[25] and 21[26], as it was held that the same result would be a violation of right to equality, as different treatments of like cases lead to unnecessary disparity which is the opposite of equality before law. The Court even referred to the curative jurisdiction as one of the means to stop such divergences in final decisions that eventually become precedents. The Court proceeded to retract and annul its order of 15 February 2011 and the rejection of the review on 28 October 2014, annulled the conviction by the trial court on 13 February 2009 and the confirmation by the High Court on 11 September 2009, and acquitted Koli of all the charges under Sections 302[27], 364[28], 376[29] and 201[30] of the IPC in the Rimpa Haldar case.
DEFECTS OF LAW
Though the Supreme Court’s action is a major confirmation of the constitutional values, a close analysis points out some gaps that require our attention.
Firstly, the verdict overlooks justice for the victims. While the Court recognised the point that, if both Koli and Pandher cannot be legally convicted, it means the real criminals have not been identified, still no instruction was given by the Court to the State for a re-investigation or any kind of compensation to the victims’ families-this is a major omission considering the seriousness of the crimes.
Secondly somehow the Court panel’s logic is at odds offline. The 2011 conviction was based on the confession and the recoveries as well as the DNA evidence and the identification of the victim’s clothing. The verdict does not give a separate reason why even this additional piece of evidence alone was not enough to uphold the conviction. As a result, we have this gap in reasoning as the evidence that was admissible and inadmissible seem to have been thrown out without sufficiently differentiated.
Thirdly, the Court has failed to take advantage of the moment to hold reasonably accountable the investigating agencies. The Allahabad High Court had openly reprimanded the UP Police and CBI for a ‘casual and perfunctory’ investigation. Neither of the two courts have yet taken any steps to bring to book the agencies that kept on making the capital prosecutions based on the forced confessions and fabricated recoveries for almost 20 years.
Lastly, the case points to the lack of sufficient safeguards through Section 164[31] of the CrPC. Over the years, several courts even accepted a confession which on the face of it disclosed the giving of instruction to the accused, and at the same time the coercion. Recent years have seen the proposal for reformation through the making of audio-visual recording of confessions and mandatory presence of independent legal counsel to be no longer optional. These measures are the ones through which the Articles 20(3)[32] and 21[33] be safeguarded and so both these reforms are much regretted delay.
INFERENCE
The decision in Surendra Koli v. State of Uttar Pradesh[34], 2025, goes down as a watershed moment in the history of Indian criminal law. The most important philosophical piece of it is the establishment of a constitutional foundation for curative jurisdiction in scenarios of extreme evidentiary disparity. By deciding that contradictory judicial outcomes based on the same set of evidence are violations of Articles 14[35] and 21[36], the Court has expanded the reasons for curative resort beyond the limited scope of Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra[37] case.
Also, the ruling endorses the principle that a mere suspicion, no matter how strong, cannot stand in place of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Taking into account this was a matter of national indignity, the Court’s standing by this criterion is a proof of the constitutional adjudication being well guarded against popular emotions a key feature of the rule of law.
More generally, this proceeding is a very serious reflection on India’s criminal law system. An individual went to jail for 18 years and 8 months from the police getting a false confession and making unreliable recoveries while the real culprits are still at large. The decision, although following the constitution, leaves a huge empty space behind in the quest for justice of the victims and their relatives.
Among other things, this case highlights the legislation around confession and evidence law as most urgent of needs for reform; additionally thorough accountability of police; and establishing a victim-oriented setup whereby families of the brutal crimes are not made to suffer as the indirect ‘victims’ of the failure of the evidences.
REFERENCES
Cases
1. Surendra Koli v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., 2025 INSC 1308 (India).
2. Surendra Koli v. State of U.P., (2011) 4 SCC 80 (India).
3. Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra, (2002) 4 SCC 388 (India).
4. Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 (India).
Statutes
1. The Constitution of India, arts. 14, 20, 21, 129, 137, 142, 145.
2. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, § 164.
3. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872, §§ 24, 27.
4. The Indian Penal Code, 1860, §§ 201, 302, 364, 376.
5. Supreme Court Rules, 2013, Order XLVIII.
Priyamvada B.S
Symbiosis Law School, Pune
[1] The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, § 164
[2] The Indian Evidence Act, 1872, § 27.
[3] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 302
[4] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 364.
[5] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 376.
[6] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 201
[7] Id at 1
[8] Id at2
[9] The Constitution of India, arts. 14
[10] The Constitution of India, arts. 21
[11] Id at 2
[12] The Indian Evidence Act, 1872, § 24.
[13] Id at 2
[14] Id at 9
[15] Id at 10
[16] Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra, (2002) 4 SCC 388 (India).
[17] Id at 16
[18] The Constitution of India, arts. 129
[19] The Constitution of India, arts. 142
[20] Id at 1
[21] Id at 12
[22] Id at 2
[23] Id at 2
[24] Id at 10
[25] Id at 9
[26] Id at 10
[27] Id at 3
[28] Id at 4
[29] Id at 5
[30] Id at 6
[31] Id at 1
[32] The Constitution of India, arts. 20(3)
[33] Id at 10
[34] Surendra Koli v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., 2025 INSC 1308 (India).
[35] Id at 9
[36] Id at 10
[37] Id at 16