Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1011 of 2022
Supreme Court of India | Decided: October 17, 2023
1. FACTS
Supriyo @ Supriya Chakraborty & Anr. v. Union of India[1] was a batch of Petitions filed in the Supreme Court of India seeking legal recognition of same-sex marriage in India. The two lead petitioners, Supriyo Chakraborty and Abhay Dang, were a same-sex couple in a long-term, committed relationship. Denying them the right to marry on the basis of their sexual orientation is discriminatory and violates the right to life as promised in the Indian Constitution, they said.
The petitions were clubbed together and laid before a Constitution Bench of five judges. The petitioners were those challenging the constitutional validity of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 and Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 whose definition of marriage was restricted to only man and woman.The petitioners were the LGBTQIA+ community, couples and other persons who had come together to assert that the laws of marriage in SMA and HMA were unconstitutional as they permitted only marriage between a man and a woman. They argued that this exclusion continued with the historical marginalisation and was not in tune with the spirit of equality and non-discrimination that the constitution has guaranteed.
The hearings took place over 10 days in April and May 2023. Were streamed live. This made them one of the most watched constitutional debates in India’s history. The Constitution Bench had top judges. These were Chief Justice D.Y.. Justices S.K. Kaul, S.R. Bhat, Hima Kohli and P.S. Narasimha. The Bench gave its decision on issues on October 17 2023. The decision was made with 3 judges agreeing and 2 judges disagreeing.
2. ISSUES RAISED
The Constitution Bench discussed and drafted the following fundamental issues:
I. If marriage is a right for everyone in India then same-sex couples should also have this right. This is something that should be considered under Article 21 which’s about the right to life and personal freedom and Article 19 which is about the freedom to express ourselves and be who we are.
II. The rules in the Special Marriage Act of 1954 that say marriage is between a man and a woman are not fair. These rules go against what’s said in Articles 14 15 19 and 21 of the Constitution.
III. Not recognizing same-sex relationships is a form of discrimination based on orientation. This is something that is protected under Articles 14 and 15.
IV. The right to be in an union or to have legal equality in a same-sex relationship is a right that is protected by the Constitution. Same-sex couples should have the same rights as everyone else.
V. Can queer couples adopt children, under the Juvenile Justice Act of 2015 and the rules set by CARA? This is something that needs to be looked at.
3. CONTENTIONS
Contentions of the Petitioners
The petitioners argued that Section 377 of IPC was an outcome of an anti-homosexual bias and prejudice against homosexuality and that “legalisation” of homosexuality in the Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India case meant that same-sex relationships were also considered a fundamental human right to freedom of life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. They argued that the constitutional scheme was grounded on the concepts of identity, dignity and autonomy and that the prohibition on same-sex marriage based solely on sexual orientation was a classification without an intelligible differentia, or rational connection to a legitimate state objective, thus violating Article 14.
The petitioners also contended that denial of the marital status has multiple implications, including denial of rights to inheritance, insurance, medical decision-making and adoption, which is a structural denial of equal citizenship. They asked that the word ‘spouse’ be interpreted in the Special Marriage Act in a gender neutral way and alternatively, to declare the heteronormative provisions as unconstitutional.
Contentions of the Respondents
The Union of India (represented by Solicitor General) had contended that marriage is a socio-legal institution that has an integral place in Indian traditions, customs and religious beliefs and that changing its definition by judicial interpretation would lead to the erosion of the legislative powers. This right to marry is not a constitutional fundamental right and even if it does exist, it can never extend to same-sex couples without a law that is in accordance with the people’s will.
The Union also used the principle of separation of powers, which forced them to argue that the redefinition of marriage is a policy issue and therefore only Parliament can make the decision. Many intervenors, such as religious and civil society organizations, claimed that the decision to recognize same sex marriages would “offend the fundamental morality and religious convictions” of the majority. The States of Rajasthan and others also became members of the Union to assert the federal legislative aspect of personal laws.
4. RATIONALE
There were four separate opinions given by the Constitution Bench, the Chief Justice giving the widest opinion. The Bench was split on the final outcome, though there was much overlap in the constitutional analysis.
Four judges (Justices Chandrachud, Kaul, Bhat and Kohli) concluded that the Indian Constitution does not grant an unqualified fundamental right to marry. In his capacity as Chief Justice Chandrachud, he also held that the right to form a union and the right to have a union recognized is inextricable from the rights of identity, dignity and equal citizenship guaranteed by Article 21. He said that the Court, in its judicial review jurisdiction, cannot impose new provisions on the existing law and adding a new definition of “marriage” in the Special Marriage Act would be an act of the legislature.
A minority of two (the Chief Justice, Justice Kaul) went further and decided that gays and lesbians have the right to have a civil union and that all the benefits of that union would accrue to them. They instructed the Union to form a committee to consider the rights of people in same-sex unions. The majority of these, however, held that any civil union framework had to be legislated and refused to create one of their own.
The majority reversed the CARA circular which had barred same-sex couples from adopting on the ground that a blanket ban on adoption on the grounds of the sexual orientation of prospective parents was not in the child’s best interest and contravened Article 15. This was the most direct immediate relief which the Court gave. The judgment made extensive reference to the rights to privacy case of K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India[2] as well as Navtej Singh Johar to reaffirm that the constitutional protection of LGBTQIA+ identities has not come under any doubt.
5. DEFECTS OF LAW
The judgment, although a landmark exercise in constitutional reasoning, has its analytical and practical shortcomings.
First, the internal contradictions of the majority opinion are quite extraordinary. The denial of legal recognition to same sex relationships violates the rights to dignity, equality and autonomy, but the Chief Justice notched up, on the principle of judicial restraint, no enforceable relief based on these rights. The Court thus struck an unusual balance in this case that it acknowledged that there was a violation of the right but would not correct it in reality.
Second, the Bench failed to consider the proper standard of review for bills based on sexual orientation discrimination. In view of Post-Navtej, the discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation should be given greater importance with the help of Article 15. The Court’s resort to deferential review of the Special Marriage Act does not jibe with the doctrine that the constitutional court must review constitutional issues “in a more searching and exacting way when fundamental aspects of personal identity are involved.
Third, it is hard to reconcile the majority’s doctrine of separation of powers to prevent relief with the Court’s activist role elsewhere. It is a principle of the Supreme Court to read broadly and to imply unenumerated rights in the Constitution. This demeanor of self-denial seems to be selective, and the “too complex” argument for not letting the court decide the issue is not in line with the Court’s role as a protector of basic rights.
Fourth, the minority’s decision to establish a government committee to examine the rights of same-sex couples is advisory only and doesn’t have any binding effect or enforceable obligations. The position for the Union after the verdict has been to consider it as an “approval” of the status quo, and thus to downplay even the modest relief offered to them in the judgment.
6. INFERENCE
Supriyo marks a very important, but not yet full, step in Indian constitutional jurisprudence. The Court finally ruled that LGBTQIA+ people are equal citizens deserving full protection of fundamental rights and the state cannot discriminate against them based on their sexual orientation or gender identity. The ruling that struck down CARA’s circular ban on same-sex couples taking up adoption will be a tangible and practical measure towards the recognition of the parenthood of queer people.
But there were also limits to judicial constitutionalism in its face-to-face encounter with highly contested social policy issues, as the judgment demonstrates. The Court’s refusal to look at the Special Marriage Act in a genderless way, or to set up a parallel system for civil marriage, leaves the main concern of the petitioners is legal recognition of their relationships that are untreated. It is now up to Parliament to act, but in the current political environment, it is unlikely that Parliament would take action on the issue in the near future.
From the jurisprudential perspective, the case would be further development of the rights framework that had been built in Puttaswamy and Navtej, based on rights to privacy and dignity. But it’s not a binding precedent because there wasn’t a single opinion on key issues. The split views will prompt further legal conflict over the extent of the rights of same sex couples in areas from inheritance to insurance, medical surrogacy to employment benefits, etc.
7. CONCLUSION
In spite of not achieving the ultimate objective that the petitioners had in mind, the landmark case of Supriyo @ Supriya Chakraborty v. Union of India is likely to be remembered as a milestone in the development of LGBTQIA+ rights in India. It is constitutionally significant that the Constitution Bench affirmed the inherent dignity and equal citizenship of queer persons, while it refused to give the primary relief sought is a reminder of the limitations to which judicial institutions will confine themselves in the midst of contested social change.
The ruling underscores the lesson that despite having the moral and legal means to intervene, constitutional courts may opt for deferring to a transformation. While the democratic legitimacy argument is powerful, it must not be allowed to serve as an ever growing barrier to the constitutional rights of minorities who have so far not been able to go to the political process for relief. There is no condition of legislative grace to the right not to be discriminated against.
The judgment opens up a whole new field of issues regarding the civil, social, and economic rights of same sex couples as Indian society and its legal structures change. The task for advocates, legislators and courts will be to make sure that the constitutional guarantee of equality is never deferred. The failure of Parliament to act or, if the Court has not yet had the institutional will to do so, to reconsider the issue the legal invisibility of same-sex relationships in India will continue to be a constitutional contradiction recognized in the judgment and, sadly, not addressed.
Author: AVANIJA TYAGI
College/Institution: Amity Law school, Noida
Year/Course: LL. B (H), Final Year
Date: June 2026
[1] Supriyo @ Supriya Chakraborty & Anr. v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1011 of 2022, decided October 17, 2023.
[2] Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1.