Somya Rajawat, Student of LLM, Amity Law School, Amity University Madhya Pradesh,, Gwalior, somyarajawat30@gmail.com
Hemant Singh, Associate Professor, Amity Law School, Amity University Madhya Pradesh, Gwalior, hemantsingh.nlu@gmail.com, https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1258-5187
Abstract
This paper discusses the question of cartelization in the Competition Act, 2002, and the role and powers of Competition Commission of India (CCI). The purpose of introducing the Act was to enable fair competition in the market, discourage competition-harming practices, and regulate mergers and acquisitions. However, as time has passed, most powers associated with competition regulation have been vested in one centralized authority which poses some practical and legal concerns.
The paper examines the practicality of this cartelized system and whether it poses difficulties in terms of efficiency, accessibility and accountability. It also addresses such issues as the growing workload on the CCI, the slowness of decision-making, weak regional presence, and potential conflicts with state-level economic interests.
The paper recommends that, even though cartelization has aided in ensuring uniformity in the decisions, there is need to attain a better balance. A certain degree of decartelization, as well as the institutional reinforcement, could enhance the overall performance of the competition law system in India.
Keywords
Competition Law, Competition Commission of India, cartelization, Competition Law, Competition Commission of India, Anti-competitive practices, Regulatory challenges, India.
- Introduction: –
The Competition Act, 2002 was a big step towards enhancing market economy in India by ensuring fair competition, anti-competitive behaviour and combinations (mergers and acquisitions). The Act gave rise to a cartelized body to enforce the competition law in the entire country with the establishment of Competition Commission of India (CCI). Despite the fact that this cartelized structure helps in ensuring consistency and uniformity in decisions, it also leads to a variety of issues that are related to efficiency, accessibility and accountability.[1] Overtime, the increasing cartelization of powers in the CCI have been the bone at stake including delays in decision making, heavy workload on the authority and regional outreach. It has also been questioned whether it has an impact on federal balance and whether the states have a role in regulating the economy. It is in this regard that the present study seeks to explore the concept of cartelization under the Act, analysing its practical implications in addition to whether a more balanced approach between cartelization of control and decartelization of implementation can be used to achieve greater effectiveness in the competition law regime in India.[2]
- Evolution and Development of Competition Law in India: –
The development of competition law in India can be seen as a representation of the overall economic transformation of the country, to a liberalized and market-driven economy. During the early years of independence, India followed a protectionist policy whereby it concentrated on regulating monopolies and avoiding economic concentration of power. This saw the introduction of Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (MRTP) Act, 1969, which sought to limit unfair trade practices and to regulate large business houses. Nevertheless, the MRTP Act was quite restrictive in nature and failed to actively encourage competition and to meet the demands of the complex modern economy. [3]
The advent of economic reforms in 1991, India now opened its markets to both domestic and foreign investors which has greatly enhanced competition across the sectors. This change resulted in the need to revise the old system of MRTP, which was already outdated and backward-thinking, with a more dynamic and progressive law.[4]
Consequently, the Competition Act, 2002 was established to provide a competitive environment that would foster efficiency, innovation and consumer welfare. The Act was a big shift in terms of approach as it did not only emphasise on controlling monopolies but also on fostering fair competition in the market. It resulted in the creation of Competition Commission of India (CCI), which was tasked the responsibility of regulating anti-competitive agreements, preventing the abuse of dominant position, and overseeing combination such as mergers and acquisitions. [5]
The Act has been changed over time in order to enhance enforcement mechanisms and efficiency of the regulatory system. This evolution has however led to the concentration of extensive powers in the CCI thus making it a very centralized authority. Although this has ensured there is uniformity in the application of competition law in the country, it has also raised issues regarding administrative burden, accessibility, and a more balanced regulatory structure are needed.
- Legal and Structural Framework of Cartelization: –
The Competition Act, 2002 is an extremely broad legal framework on competition regulation in India, with a predominant focus on centralized enforcement. The Act gives a strong power called Competition Commission of India (CCI) that has been endowed with the roles of carrying out the provisions of the Act and also ensuring that markets are run in a fair and competitive way. [6]
The CCI can investigate any anti-competitive agreements, instances of abuse of dominant position, and regulate any combination that may have an adverse effect on competition e.g. merger and acquisition. The office of the Director General (DG) that works under the supervision of the CCI is also provided in the Act and it is only through this that the cartelized nature of the enforcement mechanism is further strengthened.[7]
In addition to its investigative and regulatory functions, the CCI also possesses adjudicatory functions such as the power to penalize and issue orders to businesses which are found to be on the wrong side of the law. The decisions of the CCI can be appealed before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) to provide a certain degree of judicial control. The Act also outlines detailed procedures to be followed in the inquiry, gathering of evidence and making of the decision which is consistent throughout the country. This is a cartelized type of organization, which helps in the sustenance of consistency in the interpretation as well as enforcement of the law which is particularly important in a large and diverse economy like the one of India.[8]
However, the fact that such a number of functions is concentrated in a single authority, i.e. investigation, prosecution and adjudication, is an issue of concern. It can lead to work overload, delay in procedures and issues relating to transparency and accountability. Also, the smaller businesses become less reachable, and the system may not be as responsive to local market conditions, because of the absence of strong regional or state-level institutions. In that regard, the legal framework in the Act is powerful with a clear definition, but its cartelized structure has its positive and negative sides that should be taken into consideration. It requires significant institutional planning, expanded personnel deployment, and technological adaptation to manage polling in a unified timeframe.[9]
- Role and Benefits of the Competition Act, 2002 in Cartel Regulation: –
The Competition Act, 2002 under which cartelization has taken place has been a significant factor in the development of an effective regime of competition law in India. The Act provides a consistent and standardized method of the interpretation and application of the competition law throughout the country by delegating the major regulatory powers to the Competition Commission of India (CCI). The uniformity of application of law to all cases by one authority is one of the major benefits of this system because there is less risk of conflicting judgments when the same authority applies the same law to all cases. This is especially relevant in such a large and diverse economy as India where the regional practices may vary otherwise, creating inconsistencies.[10]
The other notable advantage of cartelization is that it leads to the creation of expertise. As a specialized organization, the CCI is able to handle complex economical and legal matters regarding market competition, mergers and dominance. This specialization enhances the quality of decisions and assists in upholding high level of regulatory oversight. Moreover, cartelized control enables more efficient monitoring of big companies and cross-border operations, which necessitate a national-level viewpoint and coordination.
There are also aspects in which cartelization helps in achieving administrative efficiency. Rather than the many bodies dealing with similar matters, one body makes it simpler and lessens the chances of duplication of efforts. It also enhances the enforcement since the CCI would be able to impose penalties and take corrective actions more easily. Moreover, a cartelized system increases the policy coherence since the government can make competition law enforcement a tool to achieve wider economic goals. Nevertheless, though the above benefits demonstrate the robustness of a cartelized structure, the benefits have to be weighed against the practical difficulties which a cartelized structure entails.[11]
- The issues and Challenges of Cartelization Under Competition Act: –
Despite the many benefits of cartelization, as provided under Competition Act, 2002, there are also great practical and structural complexities. One of the largest issues is the increased workload of Competition Commission of India (CCI) which has to solve all the problems related to competition all over the country. With the constant increase in cases that involve anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominance, approval of mergers, the burden on a single authority can easily create a slow pace in investigations and decision making. This type of delays will decrease the effectiveness of the law and may leave businesses in competitive markets in an uncertain state.[12]
The other significant challenge is the unregional availability. Given the high cartelism of the system of enforcement, businesses (particularly small and medium enterprises in various locations across the country) will find it hard to approach the CCI.
This can limit membership and generate lesser awareness with regards to a competition law at grassroots level. The cartelized form also casts doubt on the aspect of federal balance as the states have little control in the regulation of the market competition within their boundaries. It may sometimes lead to conflicts between state-level economic issues and decisions at the national level.
There are also issues of concentration of powers to one authority which is of concern. The CCI functions in various ways (investigation, regulation, and adjudication) which can bring into question transparency and accountability. In addition to that, the inadequate institutional capacity (manpower, infrastructure etc.) may affect the effectiveness of the system. These issues mean that cartelization ensures uniformity yet, on the other hand, it introduces bottlenecks and restrictions that should be removed with the help of relevant reforms and structural adjustments[13]
- Global Perspective on Cartelization Under Competition law: –
The strengths and the weaknesses of the cartelized mechanism of competition law in India under Competition Act, 2002 can be analysed by comparison of competition law regimes in other countries. There are different models in different countries that incorporate highly cartelization models, more decartelization or hybrid models. One such case is the application of competition law in the United States, which is shared between two or more authorities, such as the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).
This dual-agency system allows the distribution of workload, as well as the provision of a system of checks and balances albeit this may at times lead to overlapping jurisdiction. In contrast, more coordinated approach is adhered to in the European Union whereby the European Commission is collaborating with national competition authorities of member states, further establishing a network based system which entails a central oversight with a local enforcement.[14]
The Indian system is very cartelized and hence, vests a lot of power on Competition Commission of India (CCI). This offers uniformity and consistency in decision making but also limits the involvement and flexibility of regions. The local authorities can be more efficient in those countries where the system is either decartelized or hybrid designed so that the local authorities could be more effective to solve the market problems specific to the region and make the cases resolved more quickly. The systems are also used to alleviate the pressure on one central authority and enhance accessibility to businesses.[15]
Cartelization brings clarity and uniformity in enforcement, but a little decartelization can make it more efficient and responsive. In the case of India, a principle of balance, where the CCI, although the overall controller, has regional support, or a coordinated mechanism, can be useful in dealing with the current challenges whilst retaining the merits of current system. other hand, it creates bottlenecks and restrictions which need to be eliminated with the assistance of appropriate reforms and structural adjustments.[16]
- Comparison of Competition Law On Cartelization: –
It is possible to examine the strengths and the weaknesses of the cartelization mechanism of competition law in India under Competition Act, 2002 by comparing competition law regime in other countries. The various countries have different models that have highly cartelized models, more decartelized or hybrid models. An example of such cases is that of the use of the competition law in the United States, which is jointly owned by two or more authorities, who include the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). This dual-agency system permits the sharing of the workload, and the provision of a system of checks and balances although this may sometimes result in overlapping jurisdictions. In contrast, more coordinated approach is adhered to in the European Union whereby the European Commission is collaborating with national competition authorities of member states, further establishing a network based system which entails a central oversight with a local enforcement.[17]
The Indian system is very cartelized and hence, vests a lot of power on Competition Commission of India (CCI). This provides uniformity and consistency in decision making as well as restricting the participation and flexibility of the regions. The local authorities can be more efficient in those countries where the system is either decartelized or hybrid designed so that the local authorities could be more effective to solve the market problems specific to the region and make the cases resolved more quickly. They also use the systems to relieve the burden that is placed on a single central authority and to increase access to businesses.[18]
Cartelization also brings about clarity and uniformity in enforcing, but a bit of decartelization can take it to a more efficient and responsive level. In India where there is a present problem, a principle of balance where the CCI, though the overall controller, has regional back-up, or a coordinated mechanism, can be helpful in addressing the current problem whilst retaining the merits of current system. other hand, it creates bottlenecks and restrictions which need to be eliminated with the assistance of appropriate reforms and structural adjustments.[19]
- Conclusion: –
The Competition Act, 2002 where the cartelization has taken place has contributed quite a lot to establishing an orderly and uniform competition law regime in India. The Act provides uniformity in enforcement, acquisition of expertise and is able to provide efficient regulation of complex market practices by giving the Competition Commission of India (CCI) substantial powers to perform its functions. The centralized organization has helped to provide fair competition, consumer protection and economic growth in a liberalized economy.
Nonetheless, the cartelization of powers within the hands of one power has also come along with it several challenges that include, work load, decision making delays, poor accessibility in regions and the federal balance and accountability issues. These problems testify to the fact that a more balanced approach to the combination of the advantages of cartelization with the aspects of decartelization is required.[20]
To conclude, although the system still needs to be centralized to achieve its ability to be both consistent and controlled, the structural changes of the system (e.g., its regional expansion, its capacity building and its better coordination) can lead to the increased effectiveness of the system. The balanced framework will not just ensure that the current issues are addressed, but also the competition law regime in India is responsive, efficient and responsive to the needs of a dynamic economy.
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[2] Kaur, H. and Mehndi, M., 2025. Decoding Collusion: Analyzing Cartel Practices and Their Implications in Competition Law. LawFoyer Int’l J. Doctrinal Legal Rsch., 3, p.69. visited on March 5, 2026
[3] Fairoze, Lubna. “Cartelization in the Indian Competitive Market.” International Journal of Law and Legal Jurisprudence Studies 3.1 (2016). Visited on March 5, 2026
[4] Singh, Hemant, and Radha Naruka. “Competition Commission of India and Consumers’ Welfare: An Analysis.” Social Science Research Network, Available at SSRN 2252526 (2013).
[5] Fairoze, Lubna. “Cartelization in the Indian Competitive Market.” International Journal of Law and Legal Jurisprudence Studies 3, no. 1 (2016). visited on March 5, 2026
[6] Kaur, Harmanpreet, and Mohd Mehndi. “Decoding Collusion: Analyzing Cartel Practices and Their Implications in Competition Law.” LawFoyer Int’l J. Doctrinal Legal Rsch. 3 (2025): 69. Visited March 5, 2026
[7] Symeonidis, George. The effects of competition: Cartel policy and the evolution of strategy and structure in British industry. MIT press, 2002.visited March 5, 2026
[8] Singh, Hemant, and Radha Naruka. “Telecom Regulatory Authority of India & Competition Commission of India: Jurisdictional Conflicts.” Social Science Research Network. Available at SSRN 2252530 (2013).
[9] Bloom, Margaret. “Key challenges in enforcing the Competition Act.” Competititon LJ 2 (2003): 85. Visited March 5, 2026
[10] Chauhan, Shalvi. “Unfair Trade Practices: A Legal Analysis within the Scope of Competition Act, 2002.” Issue 3 Int’l JL Mgmt. & Human. 7 (2024): 444. Visited March 5, 2026
[11] MOHAMMED, NAUMI KASSIM. “Challenges of Cross–border Cartel Enforcement.” Visited March 6, 2026
[12] Aydin, Umut, and Kenneth P. Thomas. “The challenges and trajectories of EU competition policy in the twenty-first century.” Journal of European Integration 34, no. 6 (2012): 531-547.visited March 6, 2026
[13] Uwadi, Dr Enyinnaya. “Prospects and Challenges of Implementing Competition Law in Developing Countries: A Review of the Nigerian Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Act, 2019.” Available at SSRN 3863955 (2019). Visited March 6, 2026
[14] Afrika, Sasha-Lee, and Sascha-Dominik Bachmann. “Cartel Regulation in Three Emerging BRICS Economies: Cartel and Competition Politics in South Africa, Brazil, and India-A Comparative Overview.” Int’l Law. 45 (2011): 975. Visited March 7, 2026
[15] Bhattacharjea, Aditya. “India’s new competition law: A comparative assessment.” Journal of Competition Law and Economics 4, no. 3 (2008): 609-638.
[16] Afrika, Sasha-Lee, and Sascha-Dominik Bachmann. “Cartel Regulation in Three Emerging BRICS Economies: Cartel and Competition Politics in South Africa, Brazil, and India-A Comparative Overview.” Int’l Law. 45 (2011): 975.visited March 7, 2026
[17] Symeonidis, George. The effects of competition: Cartel policy and the evolution of strategy and structure in British industry. MIT press, 2002. Visited March 7, 2026
[18] Ikejiaku, Brian, and Cornelia Dayao. “Competition Law as an Instrument of Protectionist Policy: Comparative Analysis of the EU and the US.” Utrecht J. Int’l & Eur. L. 36 (2021): 75. Visited March 7, 2026
[19] Bradford, Anu, Adam S. Chilton, Christopher Megaw, and Nathaniel Sokol. “Competition law gone global: introducing the comparative competition law and enforcement datasets.” Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 16, no. 2 (2019): 411-443.visited March 7, 2026
[20] Bloom, Margaret. “Key challenges in enforcing the Competition Act.” Competititon LJ 2 (2003): 85. visited March 7, 2026