ABSTRACT:
The primary objective of ‘Law’ is to maintain Peace, harmony, and social order. The ancient Greek philosopher, also known as the first Academician, Aristotle wisely stated, “Man, when perfected, is the best of animals.” He also noted that, humans could become the worst of creatures without law and justice. When combined with intelligence and moral qualities, any injustice would become exceedingly perilous. Consequently, law functions as the adhesive that binds civilizations, ensuring a political life consisting fair order . However, what transpires when the very law intended to protect citizens’ rights becomes the source of their suffering due to its loopholes, gaps, and inadequacies, ultimately leading to lawlessness? One such instance was the failure to recognize newly emerging ‘Organized Crimes’ as a criminal offense under Indian laws, particularly during the era of Information, Technology, and Communication, specifically under the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
This research paper meticulously examines the “Digital Lawlessness” that existed under the legacy of Indian Penal Code, 1860 where the absence of a central definition for organized crime allowed sophisticated ICT-based syndicates to exploit jurisdictional gaps. The study delves into the crucial transition to the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, with a focus on Section 111, which for the first time codifies organized crime and its digital forms at a national level. By employing a doctrinal and comparative approach, the author evaluates the potential impact of this reform on India’s criminal justice system, the admissibility of electronic evidence under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, and the ongoing challenges of accessing transborder data. The paper concludes by suggesting that while the new laws provide a strong substantive foundation, their success hinges on bridging the technical-legal gap in procedural implementation.
KEYWORDS: Digital Lawlessness, Organized Crime, Section 111 BNS 2023, IPC 1860, Information and Communication Technology (ICT), Cyber-enabled Crime, Locus Delicti.
INTRODUCTION:
In today’s information society, intricate networks of information and communication technologies (ICTs) form the backbone of economic production, governance, and daily social interactions.[1] Digital connectivity has transitioned from being a mere convenience to a vital infrastructure for human progress, akin to utilities like electricity or transportation.[2] This transformation has been acknowledged by international bodies, which stress the importance of universal, affordable, and secure connectivity as a foundation for inclusive growth and sustainable development.[3] Despite advancements, with over 5.4 billion people connected, around 2.6 billion individuals remain unconnected, mainly in developing areas, underscoring the ongoing structural digital divide and the increasing necessity of digital access in modern society.[4]
In this changing digital landscape, traditional legal systems—historically based on geographically confined actions—are facing significant challenges. Digital activities occur in what can be described as a “virtual sphere,” characterized by distributed servers, cloud infrastructures, and algorithmic intermediaries that disconnect actions from physical locations.[5] The concept of “digital lawlessness” does not imply a lack of laws but highlights the inadequacy of territorially based legal systems in managing transnational, instantaneous, and often anonymous activities enabled by ICTs.[6] This structural gap between law and technology creates an operational void, increasingly exploited by organized criminal networks operating across borders with relative impunity.[7]
According to classical legal principles, crimes can be broadly categorized into mala in se acts inherently wrong and mala prohibita acts deemed illegal by statutory prohibition regardless of inherent morality.[8] This distinction gains renewed importance in the digital realm. Many ICT-enabled crimes, such as online fraud, identity theft, and exploitation, maintain their intrinsic wrongfulness and merely use a digital medium.[9] Conversely, actions like unauthorized access, encryption bypassing, or data scraping derive their illegality mainly from legislative prohibitions aimed at protecting systemic and infrastructural integrity.[10] Indian criminal law reflects this duality, where inherently wrongful acts are prosecuted under general penal statutes, while technology-specific offenses are scattered across specialized regulatory frameworks. This layered classification complicates both prosecutorial strategies and sentencing paradigms in cases of cyber-organized crime.[11]
The terminology used to describe these phenomena is itself revealing. The term “cyber” originates from the Greek word kybernetes, meaning a steersman or governor, symbolizing control over complex systems[12], while “syndicate” historically refers to organized collective entities engaged in coordinated activity.[13] The expression “digital syndicate,” therefore, denotes technologically enabled organized groups that coordinate and steer illicit flows of data, capital, and information across jurisdictions.[14] In the Indian legal context, a significant doctrinal shift is observed with the transition from the IP Code[15] of 1860 to the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita of 2023 (BNS).[16] While the former lacked a comprehensive framework for organized crime—relying largely on conspiracy provisions—the latter introduces a structured, syndicate-centric definition, explicitly encompassing cyber-crimes and economic offenses undertaken for material gain.[17] This represents a critical reorientation in recognizing the organized and systemic nature of digital criminality.
Nonetheless, a significant obstacle remains in the realm of jurisdiction and locus delicti. Traditional criminal law assumes that crimes can be pinpointed geographically for investigation and trial purposes. In contrast, digital crimes often involve offenders, infrastructure, and victims spread across various jurisdictions, thus fragmenting legal authority and complicating enforcement efforts.[18] India’s dependence on Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) for gathering cross-border evidence highlights this limitation, as these mechanisms are frequently time-consuming and procedurally burdensome. Delays in obtaining digital evidence can lead to its alteration, deletion, or loss, thereby diminishing prosecutorial effectiveness and allowing offenders to exploit procedural inefficiencies.[19]
Institutionally, the Information Technology Act, 2000 serves as India’s main cyber law framework; however, it was initially crafted to support electronic commerce rather than to tackle sophisticated cyber-organized crime. [20]Although later amendments have broadened its scope, it still relies procedurally on general criminal law and does not adequately address cross-border enforcement challenges.[21] Recognizing these gaps, recent legislative reforms—specifically the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita of 2023 (BNSS)[22] as well as the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam of 2023 (BSA)[23] aim to modernize procedural and evidentiary aspects of criminal law. BNSS incorporates technological tools such as electronic filing, digital summons, and audio-visual recording, thereby improving procedural efficiency, while BSA introduces a significant evidentiary shift by acknowledging electronic records as primary evidence, thus enhancing the admissibility and reliability of digital proof, including server logs, emails, and metadata.[24]
The pressing issue that arises, therefore, is whether current legal frameworks—despite recent reforms—are adequately equipped to tackle the challenges posed by ICT enabled organized crime, particularly given jurisdictional fragmentation and evidentiary complexities.[25] The persistence of a territorial legal mindset in a borderless digital environment continues to create enforcement gaps, collectively resulting in “digital lawlessness.”[26] Consequently, addressing this challenge requires not only domestic legislative refinement but also improved international cooperation and the development of jurisdictional principles that align with the transnational nature of digital crime.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY:
This legal research paper seeks to conduct doctrinal research through a comparative methodology to analyze India’s legal position on digital organized crime in the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) era. The study is non-empirical, relying exclusively on the evaluation of existing legal frameworks to assess the “lawlessness” induced by technological advancements, through the reference, interpretation, and analysis of secondary data sources. The author wants to give readers a complete, systematic, and holistic view of how ICT progress and organized crime are related.
This research methodology is laid out as following :
- This study begins with an exhaustive analysis of source laws like the IP Code 1860, newly codified under the BNS 2023, Section 111, where the law criminalizes acts of organized crimes.
- Secondly, The paper looks at how substantive laws, such as the Information Technology Act, 2000, interact with procedural laws, which include the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023.
- further, this study will involve an analytical and comparative approach, this means the law isn’t studied in isolation but in context with internationally binding documents such as the Budapest Convention (2001) and the United Nations Convention against Cybercrime (2024). Moreover, this thesis looks into criminal best practices of well – established states in dealing with organized crime such as the EU and USA.
- And finally, the author reviews important court decisions from the Supreme Court of India and international courts. This is supported by an examination of Law Commission Reports and academic literature to pinpoint current legal gaps.
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
The literatures reviewed does not specifically talk about Section 111 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. It also does not directly look at its impact on digital crime or international organized crime. However, they highlight changes in laws about digital crimes, censorship, and human rights in different areas, for instance, government actions may jeopardize freedom of expression and facilitate state-imposed censorship, eventually emphasizing the issues related to digital law enforcement and its governance, are one of the key findings in one of the reviewed articles namely the article on India’s digital audiovisual sector .[27]
In a similar vein, Indonesia’s revised Criminal Code aims to strengthen laws against cybercrime in response to the rise in digital offenses, including those related to AI, reflecting a global trend towards formalizing digital crimes and tackling lawlessness.[28] The situation in Ukraine, where children are forcibly relocated, exemplifies how international law addresses organized crimes and war crimes, highlighting the importance of legal systems in bringing such actions to justice.[29]
Additionally, the Ghanaian example of decriminalizing attempted suicide highlights how legal changes can affect health-seeking behaviors and societal views, which may indirectly influence digital and social environments.[30]
While these documents do not explicitly address Section 111, they underscore the significance of amending digital and criminal legislation to combat digital and organized crime on a global scale. The complexity of digital and international organized crimes necessitates comprehensive legal frameworks which evidently highlights the imperative need for robust legal systems in order to effectively address such challenges. The framing and passing of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita of 2023 (BNS)[31] signifies India’s paramount shift in substantive criminal jurisprudence, colonial epoch legal structures to modern statutory frameworks.[32]
At the national level under Section 111 of the BNS[33] “organized crime” has been defined and introduced as a distinct substantive offense for the first time in Indian legal history, the literature review here critically examines the academic discourse of the Section 111 of BNS,2023, focusing on its application to digital lawlessness, cyber-organized crime, and the related jurisdictional and evidentiary challenges. This review also evaluates the success of India’s new legal framework in breaking down international digital networks by integrating doctrinal critiques, constitutional evaluations, and comparative legal frameworks.
The current research gives a lot of detailed information about the BNS’s main ideas but also shows some intriguing gaps that beckon further exploration.[34]
- Firstly, given that the BNS and BNSS are relatively new laws, there is a significant lack of empirical studies assessing actual conviction rates and prosecutorial outcomes under Section 111, with a focus on analyses that are largely anticipatory and statutory.
- Secondly, while the literature thoroughly addresses the conflicts between the BNS 2023, IT Act 2000[35], and PMLA 2002[36], there is a shortage of proposed normative frameworks to harmonize these laws and prevent double jeopardy.
- Lastly, although comparative studies with the US RICO Act[37] effectively highlight India’s absence of civil remedial frameworks for asset forfeiture, there is insufficient discussion on how India could adapt such civil mechanisms to specifically target the financial channels of cyber-syndicates.
Digital Lawlessness and Cyber-Organized Crime
The criminal world has changed a lot in recent years. Instead of violent, territorial gangs, we now have highly adaptable, non-violent digital businesses. The Global Organized Crime Index shows that crimes that depend on money and computers are on the rise around the world, these are now the biggest and fastest-growing illegal markets in the world.[38]Digital lawlessness relies on technological anonymity, decentralized networks, and the misuse of international jurisdictional boundaries.
Researchers studying changes in different places, for example the rapid growth of cybercrime in Indonesia under “Society 5.0,” observed that using Artificial Intelligence, Big Data, and the Internet of Things, has greatly increased the risk of cyberattacks that cross borders.[39] The evolution of international legal theory offers a critical mirror for Indian jurisprudence, highlighting a stark reality that is the static penal codes are increasingly outmatched by the fluidity of modern crime. We are witnessing the rise of criminal syndicates that treat national borders as mere abstractions, leveraging digital ecosystems to orchestrate transnational fraud and extortion without ever setting foot in the jurisdictions they victimize. These actors bypass traditional financial monitoring by funnelling assets through cryptocurrency, effectively operating as “ghost” enterprises.
Evolution of Laws in India Regarding the Organized Crime in ICT era.
The Indian Penal Code of 1860 did not have a specific set of rules or ideas for organized crime until recently. As a result of which the law enforcement agencies had to rely and depend on parts of the law that weren’t always clear, like for example criminal conspiracy [40] and joint liability under Common intention [41], or Unlawful Assembly[42] whatsoever the case may be which penalized isolated episodic acts but failed to address the hierarchical and continuing nature of criminal syndicates.
To address this legislative vacuum, states enacted regional statutes—most notably the MCOCA[43], GUJCTOC[44] and KCOCA [45].[46] But each state handled it separately and since these were digital organizations easily able to hide their real assets behind shell companies based in states that didn’t explicitly outlaw lotteries, these scams just kept going.
Section 111 of the BNS resolves this structural handicap by establishing a uniform national definition.[47]
Section 111 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023[48] defines and penalises organised crime in a comprehensive manner. It provides that any “continuing unlawful activity”—including offences such as , robbery, land grabbing, kidnapping, contract killing, extortion, economic offences, trafficking in drugs, persons, illicit goods or weapons , and Cybercrime committed by an individual or group acting in cooperation, either on behalf of or as an individual of syndicate of organised crime, through intimidation, violence, corruption , coercion, or any other means of unlawful nature to gain material or financial benefit whether directly or indirectly, constitutes organised crime.
Academic writings often compare this combined method to the United States’ RICO Act of 1970.[49] RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act) works via so – called liability for enterprise damage, making a whole pattern of organized crime prosecutable using both criminal and severe civil remedies, including threefold penalty for damages and asset confiscation. Scholars often noted a critical divergence when it comes to Section 111, that is where on one side the said provision adopts a similar structural recognition of continuing criminal patterns, on other edge the same provision operates exclusively within a fixed penal framework that evidently lacks the civil litigation mechanisms that made RICO exceptionally effective in disrupting the financial infrastructure of digital and white-collar syndicates.
The provision further explains key terms[50]:
- Continuing unlawful activity requires more than one charge-sheet within the preceding ten years with court cognisance.
- Organised crime syndicate refers to a group of three or more persons engaged in coordinated criminal activity.
- Economic offence refers to any financially motivated criminal act, including fraud, forgery, counterfeiting, breach of trust, illicit transactions, or schemes aimed at deceiving institutions or individuals for unlawful monetary gain.
The section prescribes stringent punishments:
- If the crime leads to death, the accused could get the death penalty or Life imprisonment. If not, they could be punished with at least five years of imprisonment, which could be further extended to life, along with appropriate fines.
• One can also be held responsible for conspiracy, abetting, being a member of a syndicate, hiding, harbouring or aiding criminals, and obtaining the money from a crime, with harsh penalties like the forfeiture of one’s property.
Section 111 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 caused a paramount shift in Indian criminal law by officially assimilating organised crime into the penal code, an area that was previously regulated and governed by mainly by MCOCA[51] or PMLA[52] and other relevant statutes. It can be unequivocally concluded that the inclusive definition under section 111 of BNS, 2023 is indeed a strategic legislative move for addressing and regulating the dynamic and evolving nature of criminal acts, particularly those related highly or which involves economic offences and cyber-enabled syndicates. By subsuming both the conventional violent crimes and concurrent cyber offenses, the provision aligns with global trends that recognize the hybrid nature of organised crime.
Furthermore, such extensive scope can also be a substantive demerit, as including such variance of offenses from violent acts to financial fraud and cyber activities may create a gigantic risk of over criminalisation and ambiguity in the interpretation of the statutes. The term “continuing unlawful activity” establishes a threshold of multiple charge-sheets within a decade, which, although designed to prevent misuse, paradoxically limits the provision’s effectiveness against new cyber syndicates that may lack prior criminal records.
In essence , such conditions also raise profound constitutional concerns, especially regarding the Double Jeopardy , under Articles 20(1) and 20(2) of the Constitution of India, 1950.[53]
Also, the retrospective application of the ten-year requirement, when applied to offenses newly classified as organised crime, risks violating the principle of nullum crimen sine lege.[54] Additionally, the overlap with specialized statutes like the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, and the Information Technology Act, 2000 introduces the potential for double jeopardy by enforcement agencies.
From a procedural standpoint, a deterrence-focused approach an evidently be seen in the punitive regime—including life imprisonment and the death penalty under section 111. While this enhances the state’s punitive capacity, it also raises concerns about the proportionality of punishment, for instance the sections broadening liability when applied to the prosecution of economic or cyber offenses, which are non-violent in nature , or to include mere membership in a syndicate or the possession of property without a clear explanation further obscures the distinction between direct involvement and associative responsibility, potentially violating the principles of doubt Beyond reasonability and presumption of innocence, thus it could be contended that the success of Section 111 Institutionally and primarily relies on investigative capabilities to a large extent, particularly in contexts of commission of crimes in cyber and digital spaces or through them.
Constitutional and Procedural Concerns in the application of Section 111 , BNS , 2023 to digital offences
Doctrinal and Constitutional Challenges
- Threshold Challenge
The legislative fabric of the definition of Section 111 of the BNS, 2023 , though hold no stone unturned in making the definition inclusive, unambiguous and error free but it indeed introduces profound technical and doctrinal complexities, for instance the statute mandates that an accused is only liable to be taken cognizance off and tried under the aforesaid provision for organized crime if there exists a “continuing unlawful activity” that is in a competent court of law, two or more than two charge-sheets have been filed, against the accused and such charge sheets should be filed in ten consequtive years . This strict threshold on one hand prevents the misuse of the section 111 , BNS, 2023 against first-time and non-habitual offenders but on the other hand it indeed poses a significant enforcement bottleneck against newly emerging cyber- individuals and syndicates that lacks any previous criminal record..[55] Judicial precedents have strictly interpreted this prerequisite as can be seen in Mohammed Hashim v. State of Kerala[56] and Mukul Chauhan v. State of Himachal Pradesh[57], in both of these cases the hon’ble High Courts have unequivocally came to the conclusion and holds that Section 111 cannot be invoked, and custody and prosecution cannot be sustained, in the absence of more than one charge sheet in preceding ten years against the said accused .[58]
- Retrospectivity Challenges
The retroactive application of the ten-year charge-sheet requirement raises significant constitutional concerns. Legal experts contend that enforcing Section 111 on past actions—particularly those newly defined as “economic offences” and “cyber-crimes” that were not previously recognized as organized crime—could infringe upon the principle of nullum crimen sine lege (no crime without law) as outlined in Article 20 Sub clause (1)[59] of the Constitution of India , 1950, which forbids retrospectivity of criminal laws. Double Jeopardy Alongside the risk of retrospective punishment is the potential for double jeopardy under Article 20(2)[60] of the Constitution (Nemo debet bis vexari[61]).[62]
Operational and Structural Challenges
- Jurisdictional Challenges
Section 111 Under the newly enacted BNS of 2023 in its ambit consist digital crimes as well , but here is the real disadvantage, in other words it posses or at least may lead to a pivotal prosecution gap, because of the potential overlapping of conventional the Information Technology Act, 2000 provisions with that of contemporary laws of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. Traditionally, the Information Technology Act has served as the primary legislation governing computer-related offenses.[63] However, Section 111 of the BNS now incorporates “cyber-crimes” within the framework of general criminal laws. This development results in two distinct legal avenues. Law enforcement authorities may opt for the BNS due to its more severe penalties, such as life imprisonment, as opposed to the Information Technology Act, which prescribes comparatively lighter sanctions.[64]
- Evidentiary Challenges
Evidentiary limitations indeed can be a big hurdle and may catalyst the complexity of the prosecution when it comes to deal with investigation , trial , prosecution and punishing cyber-organized criminals who commit cyber offenses. Various eminent Scholars caution that there may occur a serious procedural chaos due to the lack of harmonious construction between the two or more legal frameworks as under Section 63[65] of BSA , 2023 , there now exists a paramount change regarding the admissibility of electronic records in a competent court of law which perhaps eventually leading adjudication of transnational digital syndicates and organisations excessively difficult. While the BSA, 2023 includes the primary digital evidence to be admitted without a certificate under certain conditions, Section 63(4)[66] requires a strict, bifurcated certification process involving the presentation of Hash Values (digital fingerprints) by recognized technical experts. This evidently creates a gigantic problem. Digital evidence can be a fragile piece of evidence , so even a small mistake in calculating hash values by untrained local police or person who has no experience , training and adequate technical expertise can make critical and crucial evidence against cyber-criminals in vain. Proving how these criminal groups work, their money trails, and handling digital evidence is very hard thus such challenges and issues can make it difficult to tried and prosecute the accused offenders to escape liability, even with strong laws in place.[67]
Challenges in Practical Implementation and Governance Framework
- Institutional Challenges
The ambitious legislative goals of Section 111 are significantly hindered by the institutional and infrastructural conditions in India. A recurring theme in scholarly discussions is the significant gap between the technological requirements of the BNS and the actual capabilities of Indian law enforcement agencies. Tackling cyber-organized crime necessitates swift extraction of digital evidence, yet India suffers from a severe shortage of certified cyber-forensic experts. Cases often experience delays of months at State Forensic Science Laboratories, and in the fast-paced world of digital crime, forensic reports can become outdated before they are presented in court. At the same time, the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023, requires under Section 105[68] that all search and seizure activities be recorded using audio-video electronic methods. Although this promotes transparency in physical operations, experts point out the impracticality of requiring videography for forensic tasks like extracting volatile RAM data or imaging cloud servers during cyber-investigations, which could compromise investigative confidentiality and operational practicality.[69]
- Enforcement Challenges
Moreover, the procedural frameworks of the BNSS face challenges due to the inherent anonymity of digital networks. Section 173[70] of the BNSS allows for the filing of electronic FIRs (e-FIRs) but requires physical verification within three days. This stipulation creates obstacles when dealing with victims of international cyber-scams or whistleblowers using TOR browsers and end-to-end encryption. In situations where devices are confiscated, the ambiguity surrounding “compelled decryption”—and whether forcing a suspect to unlock a device infringes on the constitutional right against self-incrimination—remains an unresolved legal issue. It can be thus inferred that Section 111 will be practically limited if in order to prosecute global cybercrime networks India and its legal system solely rely on domestic and local laws and exclude advanced MLATs[71] through which if signed and ratified and enforced adequately large amount of required and relevant data from foreign tech firms and companies, can be obtained as soon as possible .
Findings and Conclusion
The current research highlights a major doctrinal and structural advancement in Indian criminal law due to the implementation of Section 111 within a unified legal framework that is the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 by officially acknowledging organized crime which also includes its digital and cyber forms. This development undoubtedly surpassed the historical gap left by earlier laws namely, Indian Penal Code, 1860, because of the lack of a comprehensive legal or doctrinal definition, it was easy for cyber-computer based and technologically advanced criminal syndicates to escape criminal liability and punitive implementations by exploiting jurisdictional and legislative inconsistencies. The paramount shift from scattered and passive legal measures to a more organized and syndicate focused strategy represented by Section 111 , eventually adopting global efforts into Indian legislation in order to combat transnational organized crime is also one of the key findings of this study.
The research further unravels the challenges and demerits of paramount essence , covering from the operational aspect and procedural dilemma like strict requirement of more than one filed charge-sheets before the appropriate court of law , that too within prior consecutive ten years to revealing crucial doctrinal challenges like the risk of double jeopardy because of the potential retroactive application due to possibility of overlapping legal frameworks. Combinedly on one hand the provision may lead to a serious constitutional breach under Article 20(1) , and may also expose a substantial barrier in preventing and punishing emerging cyber-syndicates if they are non-habitual offenders with no previous criminal records. Ultimately causing hinderance in the effective enforcement of this provision necessitating careful doctrinal alignment.
The study continues with more aggregating hurdles and legal challenges, at both the enforcement level and Evidentiary aspect of such provision, such as the technical demands related to digital certification and hash values under BSA of 2023 may act as a practical obstruction for law enforcement agencies which lacks specialized training and required expertise. Such Procedural requirements may prove to be impractical in the context of dynamic cyber investigations. Moreover, the enforcement of BNS of 2023 read with the IT Act, 2000 creates vagueness and ambiguity undermining certain legal infrastructural drawbacks , say for delays in forensic analysis and other critical systemic deficiencies like shortage of trained cyber experts. All of which ultimately widen the gap between legislative intent and practical implementation.
One of the other significant findings of this paper is the crucial transformation in India’s criminal legal system after the insertion Section 111 under the new criminal laws , namely Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, by specifically including economic and cyber based offenses under the ambit of Organised Crime, BNS marks a pivotal movement from a fragmented legal system to a cohesive statutory framework and thus indeed acknowledges the modern challenges posed by digital crime, international syndicates and how to tackle and deal with them .
The study further infers the necessities for effective application in order to combat global digital syndicates and to fully harness the dissuasive and legal punitive power of Section 111, so that it works not just based on its mere legal design but also on how well the state can connect technology with law enforcement. The research suggests a comprehensive reform approach which includes aligning overlapping legal systems along with improvement in digital forensic tools, and creating simple ways for accessing data across borders and to boost institutional abilities which can lead to the success of Section 111 will turning the statutory reform into effective control over digital lawlessness.
In conclusion, it can be significantly inferred that, although Section 111 represents a progressive and essential reform intended to combat organized crime in the digital age, its extensive scope, constitutional dilemmas, and practical enforcement difficulties necessitate meticulous judicial interpretation and harmonization with existing specialized legislation. The ten-year charge-sheet requirement is very strict, and there are constitutional issues with retrospectivity and double jeopardy. The BSA and BNSS also make things much more complicated when it comes to evidence and procedures. All of these things together make the statute less useful in practice.
AUTHOR – Vibhor Shrivastava , LLM , ALS, Gwalior , AUMP.
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[35] In the entire paper , IT ACT/IT ACT 2000 shall be construed as Information Technology Act , 2000.
[36] Prevention Of Money Laundering Bill , 2002
[37]Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) | Wex | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute
[38]Global Organized Crime Index 2025 Crime at a crossroads https://ocindex.net/assets/downloads/2025/english/global-ocindex-report.pdf
[39]Suseno, S., Ramli, A. M., Mayana, R. F., Safiranita, T., & Tiarma, B. A. N. (2025). Cybercrime in the new criminal code in Indonesia. Cogent Social Sciences, 11(1), 2439543. https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2024.2439543
[40]Section 120B in The Indian Penal Code, 1860
[41]Section 34 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860
[42] Section 149 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860
[43] Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999
[44] Gujarat Control of Terrorism and Organised Crime Act, 2015
[45] Karnataka Control of Organised Crime Act, 2000
[46] Gujral, B. (2024, July 27). A critical appraisal vis-à-vis existing legal structure: Organised crime under Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita. Jus Corpus. https://www.juscorpus.com/a-critical-appraisal-vis-a-vis-existing-legal-structure-organised-crime-under-bharatiya-nyaya-sanhita/
[47] SAMARTH R, ORGANISED CRIME: ANALYSING INDIA’S UNIFORM APPROACH UNDER
SECTION 111 OF THE BNS — A COMPARISON WITH THE U.S. “RICO” MODEL, INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW
(IJLR), 6 (3) OF 2026, PG. 288-301, APIS – 3920 – 0001 & ISSN – 2583-2344
[48] BNS Section 111 – Organised crime. | Devgan.in
[49] Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) | Wex | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute
[50] Section 111 , BNS , 2023 , Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section,—
(i) “organised crime syndicate” means a group of two or more persons who, acting either singly
or jointly, as a syndicate or gang indulge in any continuing unlawful activity;
(ii) “continuing unlawful activity” means an activity prohibited by law which is a cognizable
offence punishable with imprisonment of three years or more, undertaken by any person, either singly
or jointly, as a member of an organised crime syndicate or on behalf of such syndicate in respect of
which more than one charge-sheets have been filed before a competent Court within the preceding
period of ten years and that Court has taken cognizance of such offence, and includes economic
offence;
(iii) “economic offence” includes criminal breach of trust, forgery, counterfeiting of currency-
notes, bank-notes and Government stamps, hawala transaction, mass-marketing fraud or running any
scheme to defraud several persons or doing any act in any manner with a view to defraud any bank or
financial institution or any other institution or organisation for obtaining monetary benefits in any
form.
[51]Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act,1999.
[52] Prevention of Money Laundering Act , 2002.
[53] Article 20 in Constitution of India
[54] The principle of nullum crimen sine lege ensures that criminal liability is based on pre-existing law, protecting individuals from arbitrary or retroactive prosecution. In simple terms, an act cannot be considered a crime unless a law explicitly declares it so before the act occurs, and a person cannot be punished for something that was legal when performed. This principle is a cornerstone of the rule of law and due process in modern legal systems. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/nullum_crimen_sine_lege
[55]SAMARTH R, ORGANISED CRIME: ANALYSING INDIA’S UNIFORM APPROACH UNDER
SECTION 111 OF THE BNS — A COMPARISON WITH THE U.S. “RICO” MODEL, INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL REVIEW
(IJLR), 6 (3) OF 2026, PG. 288-301, APIS – 3920 – 0001 & ISSN – 2583-2344
[56] 2024:KER:61510
[57] 2025:HHC:14073
[58] Anshul Rana vs State of Himachal Pradesh – 2025 0 Supreme(HP) 343
[59] Article 20-1 of Indian Constitution | Constitution of India
[60] Article 20(2) in Constitution of India
[61] The Latin maxim “Nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa” translates to “no one shall be punished or harassed twice for the same offense”. It is a foundational principle in law that prevents an individual from being tried or punished multiple times for the same act, ensuring fairness and protecting against judicial abuse. This principle is widely recognized in criminal law and is often referred to as the double jeopardy rule.
[62] Vijayalakshmi, A. (2025). Retrospective effect of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023: A boon or bane—With specific reference to organised crimes. International Journal of Advanced Research, 13(12), 411–422. https://doi.org/10.21474/IJAR01/22370
[63]“General things do not derogate from specific things” is what the Latin phrase “generalia specialibus non derogant” means. This legal principle is very important for interpreting laws because it tells courts how to settle disagreements between general and specific laws. When both types of laws apply to a situation, the specific law is more important than the general law. This principle makes sure that more general laws don’t override laws that are made for specific situations unless it says so.
[64]Bagaria, A. K. (2025). Cybercrime prosecution gaps under IT Act and new codes in India. International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Invention, 14(12), 49–55. https://doi.org/10.35629/7722-14124955
[65]Section 63 – Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA) – Admissibility Of Electronic Records. – ApniLaw
[66] Section 63(4) in Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023
[67]Bagaria, A. K. (2025). Cybercrime prosecution gaps under IT Act and new codes in India. International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Invention, 14(12), 49–55. https://doi.org/10.35629/7722-14124955
[68] Section 105 BNSS In Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita
[69] Amit Kumar Bagaria, Cybercrime Prosecution Gaps under IT Act and New Codes in India, 14(12) Int’l J. Human. & Soc. Sci. Invention 49 (2025), https://doi.org/10.35629/7722-14124955
[70] Section 173 BNSS In Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita
[71]Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties.