Abstract
On 20 August 2025, Union Home Minister Amit Shah introduced three bills in the Lok Sabha—the Constitution (One Hundred and Thirtieth Amendment) Bill, 2025; the Union Territories (Amendment) Bill, 2025; and the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation (Amendment) Bill, 2025—creating a legal architecture to remove the Prime Minister, Chief Ministers and other Ministers who are arrested and remain in judicial custody for 30 consecutive days in relation to serious offences punishable with at least five years’ imprisonment. The proposal triggers automatic cessation of office on the 31st day, with a pathway for reappointment upon release on bail or acquittal. The government frames the package as a democratic hygiene measure to prevent ‘governance from jail’, while opponents warn of politicised arrests weaponising investigative processes and undermining the presumption of innocence. This paper undertakes a doctrinal and policy analysis of the bills, surveys reactions by national and state actors across the aisle, and assesses constitutional, federal and comparative implications. It concludes with a set of safeguards and implementation recommendations that could balance anti‑corruption aims with due process and federal comity.
Keywords
Constitution (130th Amendment) Bill, 2025; ministerial removal; prolonged custody; Articles 75/164/239AA; due process; presumption of innocence; federalism; good governance; anti‑corruption; separation of powers.
Introduction
On 20 August 2025, the Union government tabled a reform package in the Lok Sabha to address what it describes as a persistent problem of ‘tainted leadership’ and administrative paralysis when senior elected executives face serious criminal proceedings. The core proposal, the Constitution (One Hundred and Thirtieth Amendment) Bill, 2025, would amend Articles 75 (Union), 164 (States) and 239AA (National Capital Territory of Delhi) to provide for removal of the Prime Minister, Chief Ministers and Ministers if they are arrested and remain in custody for 30 consecutive days on charges carrying a minimum punishment of five years. Parallel amendments for Union Territories and Jammu & Kashmir align the scheme across federal units. As introduced, cessation occurs on the 31st day of custody; however, leaders can be reappointed after release on bail or acquittal. The bills were promptly referred to a Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) amid vigorous scenes in Parliament, including protests and tearing of copies by Opposition MPs.
The proposals land in a politically charged context shaped by high‑profile arrests and prolonged custodial phases involving serving or former Chief Ministers and senior ministers across parties in recent years. Proponents argue that extended custody is based on judicial orders and therefore a neutral, reviewable trigger compatible with constitutional morality and clean governance. Critics counter that arrest and remand thresholds are lower than conviction, and that embedding removal consequences at the custody stage risks incentivising politically motivated investigations and destabilising elected governments. The interpretive and design challenge is to reconcile the democratic interest in clean leadership with the constitutional values of due process, federal balance and representative continuity.
Research Methodology
This study uses a mixed doctrinal–policy method:
• Doctrinal analysis of the amendment text (as tabled) and its interaction with Articles 75, 164 and 239AA of the Constitution, together with established jurisprudence on ministerial responsibility, disqualification, and federal relations.
• Policy analysis drawing on parliamentary debates, official press releases, committee referrals, and informed commentary across national and regional media to capture stakeholder positions.
• Event analysis of recent incidents involving arrests of senior political executives to assess the practical necessity and potential impact pathways of a 30‑day custody trigger.
• Comparative references are limited and descriptive, focusing primarily on Indian constitutional design to avoid over‑generalisation.
• Limitations: This is a rapidly evolving legislative process; conclusions are calibrated to materials available as of 27 August 2025.
Review of Literature
Several interlocking literatures inform the debate. First, the line between political accountability and judicial due process is a long‑standing theme in Indian constitutional scholarship, often framed through the lens of constitutional morality, ministerial responsibility to the legislature, and the separation of investigative and adjudicative functions. Second, the experience with statutory disqualification under the Representation of the People Act after conviction—most prominently affirmed in Lily Thomas (2013)—is frequently cited to distinguish the consequences of conviction from pre‑trial custody. Third, recent commentary evaluates whether custodial milestones (arrest; remand; 30‑day continuous custody) can serve as principled, administrable proxies for loss of public trust without collapsing the presumption of innocence. Fourth, federalism literature highlights the sensitivities of central triggers that can displace state executives, especially where central investigative agencies or gubernatorial actions intersect with state politics. Finally, journalistic and civil society analyses catalogue incidents of high‑profile arrests, protests in Parliament, and public messaging that frame the perceived necessity and risks of the present bills.
The Bills: Structure and Core Provisions
1. Constitution (One Hundred and Thirtieth Amendment) Bill, 2025: Amends Articles 75 (Union Council of Ministers), 164 (State Councils of Ministers) and 239AA (special provisions for Delhi) to specify that the Prime Minister, Chief Ministers and Ministers shall cease to hold office if arrested and in custody for 30 consecutive days for offences punishable with a minimum sentence of five years. Cessation takes effect on the 31st day. A person so removed may be reappointed after release on bail or acquittal.
2. Union Territories (Amendment) Bill, 2025: Extends parallel rules to Ministers in Union Territories, aligning removal and reappointment mechanics.
3. Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation (Amendment) Bill, 2025: Harmonises the above framework within the special statutory‑constitutional architecture of J&K.
Removal Authority and Mechanism: For the Union, the President removes the Prime Minister or Ministers; for States, the Governor removes Chief Ministers and Ministers; and for Delhi and other UTs, the Lieutenant‑Governor acts in that capacity. The package aims for uniformity, with due regard to each office’s appointing authority.
Procedural Trajectory: The bills were introduced in the Lok Sabha on 20 August 2025 and, amid intense protests, were referred to a Joint Parliamentary Committee for further scrutiny shortly thereafter. Public statements from both the Treasury and the Opposition have sharpened the normative stakes and legislative choices now before the JPC.
Rationale and Context: Why Now?
Government messaging emphasises three drivers: (a) preventing governance from jail when a head of government or a key minister undergoes prolonged custodial phases; (b) reinforcing public trust and constitutional morality by ensuring that serious custodial thresholds have institutional consequences; and (c) creating a uniform, non‑discriminatory rule that applies even to the Prime Minister.
Opposition responses situate the bills within a wider pattern of arrests and raids against non‑ruling parties, warning that the 30‑day custody milestone could be engineered through investigative zeal, tactical remand extensions, or selective prosecutions. Critics fear destabilisation of state governments and inversion of the presumption of innocence. The debate thus pivots on whether judicial custody for 30 continuous days is a sufficiently neutral and reliable trigger that justifies removal, and whether adequate safeguards exist to deter politicised use.
Incidents and Case Narratives Related to the Bills
Recent political episodes have shaped public and legislative attention:
• Delhi’s former Chief Minister Arvind Kejriwal was arrested in 2024 in connection with liquor policy cases pursued by the ED and CBI, experiencing extended periods of custodial detention before securing bail orders at different stages. His case became emblematic of the political and legal cross‑currents surrounding custody, campaigning, and executive continuity.
• Former Jharkhand Chief Minister Hemant Soren was arrested in January 2024 in a money laundering matter linked to alleged land irregularities. He resigned at the time of arrest, later obtained bail, and the High Court recorded a prima facie absence of certain elements against him. His trajectory is frequently cited in assessing whether custody, rather than conviction, should precipitate formal removal.
• A number of ex‑ministers across parties have faced prolonged incarceration in recent years, producing a broader discourse on custodial milestones as proxies for political accountability. These episodes, though fact‑specific, create the political backdrop in which a custody‑triggered removal rule is being debated.
Stakeholder Opinions: National and State Arenas
A. Ruling Alliance Perspectives
Treasury benches and allied commentators advance a morality‑of‑governance case. The Prime Minister has argued in public remarks that governments should not be run from jail and that a uniform rule—applying even to the Prime Minister—signals serious institutional commitment to clean governance. The Home Minister has framed the bills as a long‑overdue response to public demand for probity, while emphasising parity across Union, States and Union Territories. Some legal experts support the design on the ground that 30‑day continuous custody requires repeated judicial satisfaction, making it a more objective and reviewable trigger than mere allegation or arrest.
Ruling‑side talking points include: (i) the trigger rests on judicially ordered custody, not executive fiat; (ii) the reappointment route ensures that exoneration or bail can promptly restore leadership continuity; (iii) the rule is facially neutral and covers all parties and all offices, including the Prime Minister; and (iv) a custody‑based cessation aligns with constitutional trust and good governance by preventing conflicts of interest and administrative interference.
B. Non‑Ruling Parties’ Positions
Opposition parties charge that the bills risk weaponising arrests and remand to dislodge inconvenient governments. They point to episodes of agency action against non‑ruling leaders and accuse the Centre of designing a mechanism that can be triggered without trial or conviction, thereby eroding the presumption of innocence. Senior Opposition figures have criticised the ‘morality’ framing as selective, questioned the timing, and decried the parliamentary process, including the manner of introduction and referral. On the floor of the House and in public fora, Opposition MPs staged protests and tore copies of the bills, signalling deep distrust.
C. State-Level Perspectives (Ruling and Opposition)
At the state level, responses vary with partisan alignment and recent experience with central agencies. Leaders from non‑ruling parties at the Centre—particularly in states governed by regional parties—warn that a custody‑based removal rule could become a lever to unsettle state executives through investigative processes. Conversely, ruling‑aligned state leaders stress that prolonged custody is a judicial outcome and that a clean‑governance norm should not stop at state borders. Public statements by prominent state leaders have framed recent raids and arrests as either necessary anti‑corruption action or, alternatively, as politically motivated attempts to delegitimise adversaries. The federal undertone is unmistakable: the bills’ operation will be felt most sharply in states, where the Governor’s role, central agencies, and coalition dynamics intersect.
Constitutional Analysis: Due Process, Federalism and Separation of Powers
1. Presumption of Innocence vs. Constitutional Morality: A constitutionally salient question is whether 30‑day continuous judicial custody can justifiably trigger loss of office without violating the presumption of innocence. While cessation is not a criminal penalty, it is a severe civil consequence with political effects. Proponents contend that repeated remand orders reflect judicial evaluation of prima facie grounds and custodial necessity, supplying a neutral benchmark. Critics respond that pre‑trial custody is shaped by investigative cadence and bail standards, which vary across forums and may be affected by systemic delays.
2. Federal Balance and Gubernatorial Action: Empowering the Governor to remove a Chief Minister upon meeting the custody trigger implicates well‑worn debates about gubernatorial neutrality. Although the rule purports to be automatic, the administrative act of removal may still invite political contestation, necessitating process clarity (notice, certification of custody, verification of offence category) and potential judicial review.
3. Parliamentary Responsibility and Continuity of Government: Ministerial tenure ordinarily rests on legislative confidence, not on pre‑trial process milestones. A custody trigger re‑weights that balance, prioritising functional governance and public trust over continuity of electoral mandate during periods of prolonged custody. Design choices—reappointment on bail, interim‑in‑charge mechanisms, and clarity on Council continuity—will determine whether the system preserves stability.
4. Equality and Non‑Discrimination: The bills’ facial neutrality (covering PM, CMs and Ministers across parties) supports an equality rationale. However, equality in text must be matched by equality in application. Implementation safeguards must therefore address risks of selective initiation, forum shopping, or undue delay in bail adjudication.
5. Relationship with Existing Disqualification Regimes: The Representation of the People Act disqualifies upon conviction for specified offences. The proposed custody‑based cessation operates earlier in time and on executive tenure, not on legislative membership. The interaction between cessation of office and continued membership of the House raises practical and normative questions—e.g., whether a dislodged Chief Minister can immediately be reappointed as CM after release on bail, and how interim governance is structured.
Anticipated Advantages and Potential Disadvantages
Potential Advantages:
• Clean‑Governance Signal: Establishes a bright‑line consequence for prolonged custody, reinforcing constitutional morality.
• Administrative Continuity: Avoids paralysis associated with leaders managing portfolios or coordinating governance from jail.
• Uniformity Across Tiers: Harmonises rules for Union, States and UTs, reducing ad hocism.
• Reversibility: Reappointment on bail/acquittal mitigates the harshness of premature cessation and encourages judicially supervised correction.
Potential Disadvantages:
• Risk of Politicised Custody: Incentivises strategic arrests and remand extensions, inviting allegations of weaponisation.
• Due Process Concerns: Implicates presumption of innocence by attaching severe civil consequences pre‑trial.
• Federal and Gubernatorial Strain: Places Governors at the centre of politically charged removals; may intensify Centre–State friction.
• Incentives for Forum Shopping: Parties may litigate aggressively around bail and remand to trigger or avoid cessation.
• Administrative Whiplash: Recurrent removal–reappointment cycles could unsettle policy continuity and bureaucratic morale.
Method / Analytical Framework
The analysis employs a triadic framework: (i) legality—textual and structural compatibility with the Constitution and statutes; (ii) legitimacy—procedural fairness, non‑arbitrariness, and public reason; and (iii) practicality—administrability, resilience to strategic behaviour, and governance effects. Each recommendation below is keyed to one or more of these axes.
Suggestions and Safeguards
1. Judicial Certification of Trigger: Require a designated higher court (e.g., a single‑judge bench of the High Court/Supreme Court) to certify that the 30‑day continuous custody criterion is satisfied for a qualifying offence before cessation takes effect. This adds an independent check.
2. Qualifying Offences Schedule and Mens Rea Filter: Define ‘serious offences’ through a schedule focused on corruption, violent and national‑security offences with minimum five‑year sentences, and exclude regulatory or technical offences that may involve strict liability without moral blameworthiness.
3. Exclusion of Preventive Detention and Civil Contempt: Limit the trigger strictly to criminal prosecutions under the Code of Criminal Procedure to prevent misuse via preventive detention or ancillary custodial orders.
4. Time‑Bound Charge‑Sheet and Bail Review: Link the trigger to the filing of a charge‑sheet or require a reasoned, time‑bound judicial review of continued custody to ensure the remand is not purely investigative drift.
5. Interim Governance Protocols: Codify succession and acting‑in‑charge arrangements to avoid policy vacuum, while preserving legislative confidence as the anchor of executive legitimacy.
6. Transparent Data and Audit: Mandate publication of annual statistics on qualifying arrests, custody durations, and instances of cessation/reappointment, broken down by party and jurisdiction, audited by an independent authority.
7. Sunset Clause and Post‑Legislative Scrutiny: Insert a five‑year sunset with mandatory parliamentary review to assess real‑world effects and recalibrate thresholds.
8. Protection Against Double Use: Prevent the same 30‑day block from being counted more than once if multiple FIRs are clubbed or split to engineer cycles.
9. Anti‑Retaliation Shield: Provide explicit penalties for officials who manipulate or misrepresent custody status to trigger cessation.
10. Clear Reappointment Procedure: Stipulate timelines and documentary requirements for swift reappointment upon bail or acquittal to reduce governance disruption.
Conclusion
The 2025 amendment package presents a stark policy trade‑off. By anchoring removal to 30‑day continuous custody, Parliament would create a powerful, uniform tool to prevent governance from jail and to signal a higher standard of public ethics. Yet the same design risks normalising pre‑trial custody as a lever of political change, stressing due process, federal comity and administrative stability. The way forward is neither wholesale embrace nor categorical rejection, but a carefully hedged architecture that places independent judicial certification, precise offence‑scoping, and time‑bound review at its core. Done well, the reform can advance clean governance without eroding bedrock constitutional commitments; done poorly, it could deepen cynicism and accelerate a tit‑for‑tat politics of criminal process. The Joint Parliamentary Committee stage offers a critical opportunity to embed safeguards that keep the promise while limiting the peril. This paper has outlined a feasible path to that balance.
References (Selected)
• Press Information Bureau (20 Aug 2025). ‘Union Home and Cooperation Minister introduces the Constitution (One Hundred and Thirtieth Amendment) Bill, 2025, the Union Territories (Amendment) Bill, 2025, and the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation (Amendment) Bill, 2025)’.
• DD News (Aug 2025). ‘Amit Shah tables bills in Lok Sabha to remove PM, CMs, Ministers held on serious charges’.
• NDTV (21–22 Aug 2025). ‘Opposition protests as Amit Shah introduces Bills; copies torn; Inside story on Bill to sack jailed Chief Ministers’.
• The New Indian Express (20–24 Aug 2025). ‘Fierce Opposition protests…’; ‘Bills disqualifying PM, CMs aimed at Opposition…’
• The Economic Times (Aug 2025). ‘Constitution Amendment Bill to remove ministers from power tabled in Parliament’.
• Times of India (21 Aug 2025; 26 Aug 2025). ‘Bills for removal of PM, CMs, mins tabled in Lok Sabha, sent to JPC’; commentary and reactions including Kapil Sibal’s remarks.
• The Leaflet (Aug 2025). ‘New Constitution amendment bill to remove PM, CMs detained for 30 days — All that is at stake’.
• Al Jazeera (23 Aug 2025). ‘A new Indian bill punishes jailed politicians — why has it sparked outrage?’.
• Indian Express (Op‑Ed, Aug 2025). ‘Bill for removal of arrested ministers offers promise of clean governance’.
• Verfassungsblog (Aug 2025). ‘Weaponising Disqualification?’
• Supreme Court Observer (2024–2025). Case timelines: arrests of Arvind Kejriwal and Hemant Soren.