STATE OF TAMIL NADU V. GOVERNOR OF TAMIL NADU (2025)

CASE COMMENT:

STATE OF TAMIL NADU V. GOVERNOR OF TAMIL NADU (2025)

_______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1239 OF 2023

STATE OF TAMIL NADU …………………….……………………………………………….Petitioners

VERSUS

GOVERNOR OF TAMIL NADU ……………………………………………………………….Respondents

I. Facts

The case of State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu originated from a constitutional impasse between the elected Tamil Nadu government and the Governor. The petitioner in this matter was the State of Tamil Nadu, represented by its Legislative Assembly, while the respondent was the Governor of Tamil Nadu. The dispute primarily arose from the Governor’s delays and inactions in granting assent to several bills that had been duly passed by the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly. These included a set of twelve crucial bills, some of which had been passed as far back as 2020. Despite repeated communications and reminders from the State Government, the Governor neither assented to, withheld, nor reserved the bills for the consideration of the President, as provided under Article 200 of the Constitution.

This inaction created an impasse in the legislative process, stalling governance and undermining the will of the elected representatives of the people. Among the most prominent bills affected were those concerning the regulation of universities, anti-NEET (National Eligibility-cum-Entrance Test) legislation, and administrative reforms. The delay was not limited to these bills; the Governor also remained inactive in other important matters, such as sanctioning prosecution in corruption cases, approving premature release of prisoners, and making appointments to the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission (TNPSC). This widespread inaction raised serious questions about constitutional morality, the role of the Governor, and the balance of power between elected representatives and the constitutional head.

In response to this unprecedented delay, the State of Tamil Nadu approached the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution, seeking relief against what it described as a violation of the federal structure, constitutional propriety, and democratic principles. The core of the dispute revolved around whether the Governor could indefinitely delay assent to bills, thereby frustrating the democratic mandate of an elected legislature.

II. Issues Raised

The question pertains to whether the Governor has the authority to indefinitely postpone the approval of bills that have been duly enacted by the State Legislature, without providing, withholding, or reserving assent in accordance with Article 200 of the Constitution.
Whether such prolonged inaction amounts to a violation of constitutional morality, legislative supremacy, and the democratic principles enshrined in the Constitution.
Whether the Governor, as a constitutional head, possesses discretionary power to stall the functioning of the State Government in matters beyond what is expressly provided under the Constitution.
Whether judicial review can be invoked to compel the Governor to act within a reasonable time frame under Article 200.
Whether the doctrine of separation of powers and federalism is undermined when an unelected Governor disregards the advice of the elected Council of Ministers.

III. Contentions

Petitioner’s Contentions (State of Tamil Nadu)

The Governor has no constitutional authority to indefinitely withhold assent to bills passed by the State Legislature. Under Article 200, the Governor is required, within a reasonable time, to either (a) grant assent, (b) withhold assent, or (c) reserve the bill for consideration of the President.
Indefinite inaction by the Governor constitutes a violation of the democratic mandate and undermines the sovereignty of the people, which is expressed through their elected representatives in the Legislature.
In light of Article 163, the Governor is bound to act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, save in narrowly circumscribed discretionary matters. The Governor is not an independent political actor.

The prolonged delay in dealing with the bills amounts to a subversion of constitutional provisions and poses a grave threat to the principles of parliamentary democracy and constitutional morality.
The Governor’s role within the constitutional scheme is essentially ceremonial and supervisory, not one of political veto, and his conduct must therefore conform to the principle of responsible government.

Respondent’s Contentions (Governor of Tamil Nadu)

Article 200 of the Constitution does not stipulate a fixed time limit for the exercise of gubernatorial discretion. Hence, the Governor retains the authority to decide the timing of assent, withholding, or reservation of bills.
Judicial directions prescribing a timeframe would amount to judicial legislation, thereby trespassing into the constitutional domain of a high constitutional office.
In specific cases, particularly where legislation has implications beyond the State, such as the anti-NEET Bill, the Governor is justified in withholding assent or reserving the matter for the consideration of the President in order to safeguard national interests.
The Governor’s discretion functions as a federal check, ensuring that State legislation remains consistent with the Union’s constitutional framework and legislative policies.
Accordingly, the Governor’s conduct falls within the ambit of constitutional discretion, and is not subject to compulsion by the judiciary.

IV. Rationale

The Supreme Court, while addressing this constitutional stalemate, adopted a purposive interpretation of Article 200. The Court held that although the Article does not prescribe a specific timeline, the Governor is constitutionally bound to act within a reasonable time. Allowing indefinite inaction would effectively empower the Governor to veto the legislature’s functioning, a scenario not contemplated by the Constitution’s framers. The Court highlighted the constitutional framework, which designates the Governor as a ceremonial figurehead bound by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers as stipulated in Article 163. It reaffirmed that the Governor is not an autonomous authority but a constitutional figurehead who cannot impede the operations of a democratically elected government. The power to withhold assent or reserve bills must be exercised sparingly, and in cases where the legislature re-passes a bill, the Governor is bound to give assent without further delay.

Additionally, the Court underscored the principles of constitutional morality and democratic accountability. A Governor’s refusal to act within a reasonable time undermines both. The Court drew parallels with previous rulings, including Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab (1974), which clarified the limited discretionary powers of the Governor. The Court also invoked its power of judicial review, noting that gubernatorial inaction can be subjected to scrutiny when it violates constitutional provisions. It even suggested that in cases of undue delay, the Court could, under Article 142, deem assent to have been granted to preserve democratic functioning.

Through this interpretation, the Supreme Court preserved the balance of federalism by ensuring that Governors cannot act as agents of the Centre to destabilise State Governments. The decision reinforced legislative supremacy and the primacy of representative democracy.

V. Defects of Law

Absence of Specific Timelines – While the Court emphasized that assent must be given within a “reasonable time,” it refrained from prescribing a fixed timeline. The ambiguity of the term “reasonable” leaves scope for varied interpretations, which may perpetuate future disputes.
Unaddressed Immunity under Article 361 – The judgment did not adequately clarify the implications of the Governor’s constitutional immunity under Article 361. This omission may complicate mechanisms for ensuring accountability of the Governor’s actions or inaction.
Dependence on Judicial Review – The Court relied on judicial review and its extraordinary powers under Article 142 to correct instances of delay. This approach creates an excessive dependence on the judiciary for case-by-case intervention instead of offering a permanent structural solution.
Lack of Legislative Codification – The decision highlighted constitutional principles but did not prompt legislative reform. The absence of statutory timelines under Article 200 continues to leave a grey area, risking recurring constitutional deadlocks.
Unclear Scope of Discretion – The judgment did not comprehensively define the limited circumstances in which the Governor may legitimately withhold or reserve assent. This lack of clarity leaves scope for subjective interpretation in exceptional cases.

VI. Inference

The Supreme Court’s judgment in *State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu* is a significant development in Indian constitutional law, reaffirming democratic principles and constitutional morality. The Court ruled that Governors cannot impose unreasonable delays in assenting to bills passed by state legislatures, thereby asserting the supremacy of legislative authority and the principle that sovereignty rests with the people and their elected representatives. This decision aims to prevent unelected constitutional functionaries from obstructing the democratic will through inaction or partisan motives.

The ruling has several key implications. Firstly, it clarifies the confined constitutional role of Governors within India’s federal structure, emphasizing that they are constitutional safeguards meant to act on the advice of the Council of Ministers, except in specific constitutional circumstances. By curbing indefinite delays in granting assent, the Court restored the balance envisioned in Articles 154, 163, and 200, ensuring executive and legislative powers remain accountable to the electorate. Secondly, it sets a nationwide precedent, addressing conflicts experienced by several states where Governors have delayed assent to legislation or administrative decisions. The Court’s directive that unreasonable delays can be considered implied assent provides a constitutional safeguard against the potential misuse of gubernatorial powers.

Furthermore, the Court’s use of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 to consider assent granted in cases of unreasonable delay indicates a proactive stance. The judgment adopted a purposive interpretation of constitutional provisions to prevent their misuse, highlighting the importance of safeguarding both the procedural and substantive aspects of democracy. This reflects a broader constitutional philosophy where interpretations should favour democratic governance.

The judgment also reinforces India’s quasi-federal structure by recalibrating the Centre-State relationship. Governors, often seen as emblems of Union authority, are now restricted from partisan obstruction, ensuring they respect state legislative autonomy and do not function as parallel veto powers. This bolsters cooperative federalism by curbing unwarranted central interference.

However, the ruling also exposes structural deficiencies. Article 200, concerning gubernatorial assent, lacks specific timeframes, leaving room for future disputes despite the Court’s inference of a “reasonable time” principle. This underscores the need for explicit legislative reforms or constitutional amendments to define clear timelines for gubernatorial assent, thereby preventing future impasses.

Ultimately, the judgment asserts that constitutional silence should not be used to undermine democratic principles. Instead, such gaps must be addressed through interpretations that uphold the Constitution’s spirit and letter, prioritizing substantive principles of democratic accountability and constitutional morality. The Court’s intervention serves as a safeguard against the subversion of constitutional provisions through inaction or bad faith, confirming the Constitution as a living, purpose-oriented document. The ruling reinforces that in a constitutional democracy, authority must serve the populace, and unelected constitutional figures like the Governor are not empowered to impede governance or supersede legislative will, thus strengthening democratic values, federal equilibrium, and constitutional morality.

VII. Conclusion

The ruling in the case of State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu represents a significant development in India’s constitutional jurisprudence. By interpreting Article 200 as mandating that the governor must act within a reasonable timeframe, the Supreme Court limited arbitrary discretionary powers and safeguarded democratic principles against potential erosion through inaction. Although questions persist regarding the exact duration for gubernatorial decision-making and the extent of immunity granted to such officials, the judgment decisively affirms the primacy of elected legislatures, maintains the constitutional equilibrium between Centre and states, and reinforces the democratic framework of parliamentary governance. It prevents unelected constitutional authorities from obstructing the will of the electorate, thereby reinforcing the foundational democratic values of the nation.

Aditi Mundankar

University of Mumbai