ABSTRACT
This paper examines the constitutional and statutory dimensions of internet censorship in India, focusing on the jurisprudence surrounding the Information Technology Act, 2000 and its associated rules. Through landmark judgments such as Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, and Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, Indian courts have articulated privacy, proportionality, and transparency as essential guardrails for state regulation of online speech. Yet, in practice, the implementation of Section 69A blocking powers, the expansion of intermediary liabilities, and the recurrent use of network suspension orders reflect persistent opacity and overbreadth.
Adopting an analytical framework grounded in constitutional doctrine, statutory interpretation, and comparative models from the EU and UK, this paper identifies the central tension between security-driven censorship and fundamental rights. The study highlights how the lack of standardized publication practices, limited remedies against informal takedowns, and blurred lines between statutory regimes create systemic deficits in accountability.
To address these gaps, the paper advances a set of reform proposals, including a statutory transparency code, explicit proportionality standards, clarification of safe harbor obligations, and innovative concepts like a Creative Safe Harbor and Digital Justice Addendum. These recommendations aim to recalibrate India’s regulatory framework in a manner that protects constitutional freedoms while enabling effective governance in the digital sphere.
KEYWORDS
Internet Censorship; Constitutional Law; Proportionality; Section 69A IT Act; Privacy; Intermediary Liability; Network Shutdowns; Digital Rights; Safe Harbor; Transparency; Freedom of Speech.
INTRODUCTION
The internet is now India’s most vital forum for speech, association, and access to information. But it is also where the state most frequently invokes public order, national security, and misinformation risks to justify restrictions. Indian constitutional law protects speech but allows reasonable restrictions “in the interests of” security, public order, decency, and related grounds under Article 19(2). Courts have repeatedly insisted that such restrictions meet tests of legality, necessity, and proportionality. In practice, the line between lawful regulation and censorship is policed unevenly: opaque blocking orders under Section 69A of the IT Act; “notice-and-takedown” mechanisms under Section 79 and the Intermediary Rules; and network shutdowns under the Suspension Rules.
In 2024–25, this debate sharpened as the Union government defended its Sahyog portal—designed to route content-related intimation to platforms—against a constitutional challenge by X Corp (formerly Twitter) before the Karnataka High Court. The litigation surfaces core questions: When can the executive lawfully require intermediaries to remove content? What due process safeguards are constitutionally indispensable? And how should India calibrate speech rules to avoid chilling journalism, satire, and political criticism while countering unlawful content?
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This research adopts a doctrinal and policy-oriented approach, relying primarily on constitutional provisions such as Articles 19 and 21, alongside an examination of judicial decisions from the Supreme Court and High Courts. Statutory instruments, including central rules, gazette notifications, and related regulatory texts, form an integral part of the study. In addition, credible secondary commentary, such as scholarly notes, legal explainers, and journalistic reports, has been consulted to provide context and interpretative depth.
Primary sources were accessed through reliable repositories such as Indian Kanoon and official court websites, ensuring accuracy and authenticity. Key materials also included official notifications, government circulars, and filings or updates by civil society organizations engaged in digital rights advocacy. To supplement this, secondary sources were drawn from established media outlets like Reuters, NDTV, and the Economic Times, as well as specialized legal resources such as SCC Online and explanatory notes provided by the Internet Freedom Foundation. Footnotes throughout the paper reference authoritative versions of these materials to maintain scholarly rigor.
The research acknowledges certain limitations, particularly the opacity surrounding government blocking orders issued under Section 69A of the Information Technology Act. Since many of these orders remain confidential and often lack detailed reasoning, the analysis necessarily relies on principles articulated in publicly available judgments, litigation updates, and dicta from courts. By triangulating across these sources, the study attempts to construct a faithful account of the evolving jurisprudence while recognizing the structural gaps in transparency.
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
In recent years, India has witnessed a significant increase in government-imposed internet censorship, raising critical concerns about the balance between national security and the fundamental right to free speech. A notable expert perspective on this issue is provided by Subramaniam Vincent, Director of Journalism and Media Ethics at Santa Clara University’s Markkula Center for Applied Ethics. In his commentary, Vincent critiques the Indian government’s stringent content takedown regime, arguing that it is designed to stifle dissent rather than protect national security. He emphasizes the problematic nature of allowing the executive branch to simultaneously act as both the arbiter of legality and the issuer of takedown notices, suggesting a conflict of interest that undermines democratic principles.
Vincent’s analysis underscores several critical concerns regarding internet censorship in India. He emphasizes the lack of transparency in government actions, noting that opaque censorship practices not only threaten the fundamental right to free speech but also impede the free flow of information. Furthermore, he highlights the overreach of executive power, pointing out that when the executive simultaneously determines the legality of content and enforces takedown orders, it concentrates authority in a way that risks misuse and undermines democratic accountability. Vincent also draws attention to the chilling effect on expression, arguing that the broad and often vague criteria used for content removal encourage self-censorship among both users and platforms, thereby stifling open discourse and curtailing healthy debate in the digital sphere.
However, Vincent’s commentary does not fully address the legal and judicial perspectives on this issue. While he critiques the executive’s actions, he does not delve into how the judiciary has responded to these challenges or the legal frameworks that govern internet censorship in India. Additionally, his analysis does not consider the socio-political context in which these
censorship measures are implemented, such as the role of misinformation during periods of communal unrest or national security concerns.
From a legal standpoint, the Indian judiciary has played a pivotal role in shaping the discourse on internet censorship. In landmark cases like Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015), the Supreme Court struck down Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, which had been used to criminalize online speech. The Court held that the provision was unconstitutional as it violated the freedom of speech guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. This judgment underscored the importance of safeguarding online expression against arbitrary restrictions.
Furthermore, in the case of Kunal Kamra v. Union of India (2024), the Bombay High Court found that the 2023 amendment to the Information Technology Rules, which introduced a government-established “fact-checking” unit to flag or remove social media content related to government affairs, was unconstitutional. The Court ruled that the rules violated Articles 14, 19(1)(a), and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution and exceeded the authority granted by the IT Act, 2000. This judgment highlighted the judiciary’s role in ensuring that executive actions align with constitutional principles.
Despite these judicial interventions, challenges persist. The government’s continued use of Section 69A of the IT Act to block online content without adequate transparency or judicial oversight remains a contentious issue. Recent reports indicate that the government has ordered social media platforms to block thousands of accounts, including those of international media outlets, often without providing clear justifications.
A balanced view of internet censorship in India recognizes that while national security is important, it should not be used as a pretext to suppress dissent or curtail free speech. There is a need for a more nuanced approach that balances security interests with the protection of fundamental rights. This includes establishing clear legal frameworks that define the scope and limits of censorship, ensuring transparency in the decision-making process, and providing avenues for judicial review of government actions. Moreover, there should be efforts to promote digital literacy among the public to mitigate the spread of misinformation without resorting to heavy-handed censorship.
In conclusion, while the Indian judiciary has made significant strides in protecting free speech in the digital realm, ongoing vigilance is required to prevent the erosion of these rights. A collaborative approach involving the government, judiciary, civil society, and the public is essential to navigate the complex landscape of internet censorship and free speech in India.
CRITICAL REVIEW OF INDIAN INTERNET GOVERNANCE
The debate on internet regulation in India has been shaped by four central strands of judicial and scholarly engagement.
The first strand concerns overbreadth and vagueness in statutory restrictions on online speech. In Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015), the Supreme Court struck down Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, holding that categories such as “grossly offensive” and “annoying” were impermissibly vague and had a chilling effect on free expression. While doing so, the Court upheld Section 69A and the 2009 Blocking Rules, emphasizing the procedural safeguards built into that framework and the need for narrow tailoring of restrictions.
The second strand lies in the recognition of privacy and proportionality as constitutional guardrails. In Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India (2017), a nine-judge bench declared privacy a fundamental right under the Indian Constitution, while endorsing proportionality as a standard test for evaluating restrictions on fundamental freedoms. This reasoning has influenced subsequent cases on speech, surveillance, and digital regulation.
The third strand focuses on internet shutdowns and transparency in executive action. In Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (2020), the Supreme Court held that indefinite suspension of the internet is impermissible, directed that all suspension orders be published, and mandated periodic review to ensure necessity and proportionality. Scholars tracking shutdown orders note ongoing concerns regarding the duration, reasoning, and accessibility of such directives, indicating a continuing tension between doctrine and practice.
The fourth strand concerns access to the internet as a facilitative right. The Kerala High Court in Faheema Shirin v. State of Kerala (2019) recognized internet access as an integral part of the right to education and free expression, thereby framing the discourse in terms of positive obligations of the State to enable digital access.
Recent scholarship has also engaged with the 2023 amendments to the Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code Rules, particularly the proposed Fact-Check Unit (FCU) empowered to identify “fake, false, or misleading” information about the Union government. Critics argue that the provision risked overbreadth and censorship, while the Bombay High Court subsequently struck down the enabling framework. The Supreme Court has also stayed its operationalization at different stages, reinforcing the constitutional concerns surrounding this expansion of executive power.
BALANCING EXPRESSION AND REGULATION
The rapid expansion of the internet has revolutionized communication, enabling instant access to information and global connectivity. However, this digital freedom also brings challenges, such as the spread of harmful content, misinformation, and threats to public order. In India, the tension between protecting free speech and regulating online content has prompted significant legal scrutiny. The Constitution of India guarantees the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a), yet it allows reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2) to safeguard sovereignty, security, public order, decency, or morality. Complementing these constitutional safeguards, statutory provisions like the Information Technology Act, 2000, empower the government to regulate and, when necessary, restrict access to online content that violates law or public interest. This evolving legal framework reflects the ongoing effort to balance individual liberties with societal responsibilities in the digital age.
NAVIGATING DIGITAL FREEDOM
The rise of the internet has transformed communication, enabling instant global connectivity and unprecedented access to information. Yet this freedom brings new challenges—harmful content, misinformation, and threats to public order—which necessitate regulatory frameworks. In India, the Constitution guarantees the right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a), while Article 19(2) allows reasonable restrictions in the interests of sovereignty, security, public order, decency, or morality. Complementing these constitutional safeguards, the Information Technology Act, 2000, empowers the government to regulate online content, with provisions such as Sections 66A, 69A, and 79 providing both restrictions and procedural guidance. Over time, the Supreme Court has clarified the contours of these powers, emphasizing legality, necessity, and proportionality, notably in landmark judgments like Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, and Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India. These rulings underscore that while the state can regulate online speech, such restrictions must be transparent, proportionate, and subject to judicial or public scrutiny.
This constitutional baseline lays the groundwork for understanding India’s current regulatory landscape, including the procedural safeguards of Section 69A and the 2009 Blocking Rules, the safe harbor framework of Section 79 and its evolving Intermediary Guidelines, the limits on network shutdowns under the Suspension Rules, and the intersection of surveillance and privacy rights. Each of these areas reveals the tension between executive action, intermediary compliance, and individual freedoms, highlighting both the promise and pitfalls of India’s approach to digital governance. Comparative experiences, like the EU Digital Services Act, offer potential lessons in transparency, accountability, and user protection, which India can adapt to strengthen constitutional safeguards.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
A.The constitutional baseline: legality, necessity, proportionality
Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and expression, while Article 19(2) allows the State to impose reasonable restrictions. Over time, the Supreme Court has clarified the standards by which such restrictions are to be judged. In Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, the Court struck down Section 66A of the IT Act for being vague and overbroad, but upheld Section 69A because it contained procedural checks such as review by a committee, reasoned orders, and an opportunity to be heard. Later, in the Puttaswamy judgment, the Court introduced the proportionality framework, which requires that any restriction on fundamental rights must serve a legitimate aim, be rationally connected to that aim, be the least restrictive means available, and balance the benefit of the restriction against the harm caused. This reasoning was echoed in Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, where the Court held that indefinite internet shutdowns are impermissible, requiring instead that restrictions be temporary, published, and periodically reviewed. Taken together, these cases establish that executive action restricting online speech must be lawful, proportionate, necessary, and subject to judicial or public scrutiny.
B. Section 69A & the Blocking Rules, 2009: due process on paper vs. secrecy in practice
Section 69A of the IT Act, along with the 2009 Blocking Rules, lays down a structured procedure for blocking online content. It requires identification of unlawful content, a reasoned order, and a hearing for the affected parties except in emergencies, with review by a committee. While this framework appears sound in principle, in practice most blocking orders are confidential, preventing affected users from challenging them before courts. Although Shreya Singhal upheld Section 69A on the assurance of procedural safeguards, the lack of transparency has undermined accountability. Moreover, platforms sometimes remove content not under formal Section 69A orders but under informal executive “intimations.” This creates what scholars call “functional equivalence”—the speech disappears without the statutory safeguards, blurring the line between voluntary compliance and compelled censorship.
C. Section 79 & the Intermediary Rules: safe harbor with string
Section 79 provides intermediaries such as social media platforms with safe harbor protection, shielding them from liability for third-party content as long as they comply with due diligence and act on lawful government orders. However, the Intermediary Guidelines introduced in 2021 and amended in 2023 imposed stricter obligations, including time-bound takedowns and traceability mandates for large platforms. The 2023 amendments, in particular, drew criticism for authorizing a government Fact-Check Unit to label content about government business as “false” or “misleading,” which risked viewpoint-based censorship. This provision was stayed by the Supreme Court and later struck down by the Bombay High Court as unconstitutional. The deeper concern is that intermediaries may lose safe harbor protections if they ignore even informal government requests, leading them to over-comply and take down lawful speech. This erodes the procedural safeguards recognized in Shreya Singhal and encourages a regime of indirect censorship.
D. Network shutdowns under the Suspension Rules
The Supreme Court in Anuradha Bhasin held that internet suspensions must be temporary, proportionate, and published with reasons. Despite this, state governments frequently impose short-term rolling shutdowns during law-and-order situations, often recycling vague justifications like “public safety.” Judicial enforcement of the Anuradha Bhasin principles has been inconsistent, and in many cases, orders are published only after the shutdown has taken effect. A doctrinal solution would be to introduce a statutory time limit—such as 24 to 48 hours—along with mandatory public reasons and a presumptive right to judicial challenge. This would align India’s practice more closely with constitutional principles and international norms.
E. Surveillance, interception, and the speech–privacy nexus
Surveillance does not always take the form of direct censorship but can nevertheless chill free expression by making individuals feel constantly watched. In PUCL v. Union of India (1997), the Supreme Court established procedural safeguards for telephone tapping, later incorporated into rules for digital interception. With the recognition of privacy as a fundamental right in Puttaswamy, the bar for justifying surveillance is now higher: it must meet the proportionality and necessity standards and be subject to oversight. This means that interception powers, if unchecked, pose risks not only to privacy but also to free speech itself.
F. The Sahyog portal litigation: where the doctrine is heading
The Sahyog litigation, ongoing in 2025, highlights the problem of blurred lines between formal censorship and informal government influence. The government argues that Sahyog merely allows agencies to flag unlawful content, leaving final decisions to platforms. However, platforms like X (formerly Twitter) contend that the volume and tone of such requests effectively pressure them into compliance, especially given the risk of losing safe harbor or facing prosecution. The High Court’s reserved judgment is expected to clarify whether these “intimations” amount to de facto compulsion, how far Section 79(3)(b) extends, and whether transparency and notice requirements should apply. The broader lesson is that even without formal bans, systems that nudge platforms toward removing lawful speech can be unconstitutional if they bypass Section 69A safeguards.
G. Comparative notes worth adopting
Other jurisdictions provide useful lessons for India. The European Union’s Digital Services Act, for instance, requires platforms to give reasons for takedown actions and maintains public databases of state requests, which strengthens accountability. India could adopt a lighter version of this approach through a “blocking transparency code” suited to its own context. Additionally, some countries rely on independent review bodies such as tribunals or ombudsmen for rapid checks on blocking orders. India could create a limited “Online Speech Review Panel,” comprising retired judges and technical experts, empowered to review blocking decisions within a fixed time frame. Such mechanisms would not replace judicial review but would provide a faster and more transparent safeguard against arbitrary censorship.
SUGGESTIONS
Strengthening trust in India’s digital space requires urgent reforms in transparency and accountability. Section 69A blocking orders remain secretive, leaving citizens and platforms in the dark. Publishing them within 48 hours—with legal basis, affected URLs, duration, and review outcomes—would limit misuse. While temporary confidentiality may be justified in emergencies, it must be time-bound and subject to judicial or independent oversight. Orders for blocking and shutdowns, despite Anuradha Bhasin, are often delayed or hidden, undermining proportionality. Independent audits by parliamentary or quasi-judicial panels could ensure consistency.
Content regulation suffers from vagueness, as noted in Shreya Singhal. Delegating fact-checking or takedown powers to executive bodies risks unchecked censorship. Clear standards, reasoned orders, and fair review mechanisms are needed. Users whose content is removed should receive notice and an appeal route, with judicial review always available. Section 79 must be clarified to protect intermediaries from liability for refusing vague or informal instructions.
Restrictions should follow proportionality: post-level moderation or fact-labeling should precede account bans. Shutdowns should default to 24 hours, with renewals requiring justification and oversight. Combating misinformation should focus on public clarifications and existing fraud laws rather than centralized censorship. Training nodal officers in constitutional principles and precision drafting would help keep orders rights-respecting.
Finally, human-centered reforms—a “Creative Safe Harbor” for satire, research, and artistic expression, and a “Digital Justice Addendum” weighing psychological and community impact—would ensure governance balances law with empathy, strengthening both accountability and trust in India’s digital democracy.
CONCLUSION
The constitutional discourse around internet censorship in India demonstrates the complex balance between liberty and security in the digital age. The jurisprudence from Shreya Singhal through Puttaswamy and Anuradha Bhasin has gradually established proportionality, reasoned orders, and transparency as non-negotiable constitutional standards. Yet, the statutory and executive framework continues to operate in opacity, as seen in the secrecy of Section 69A orders, the tightening of intermediary obligations under Section 79 and the 2021 Rules, and the frequent use of network shutdowns under the 2017 Suspension Rules. This gap between judicial doctrine and administrative practice represents the central constitutional challenge of India’s digital governance.
Addressing this challenge requires not the abandonment of state power, but its recalibration. National security and public order are legitimate state interests, yet they must be pursued through narrowly tailored, transparent, and accountable mechanisms. India’s constitutional framework does not demand the silencing of digital spaces; rather, it insists that restrictions on speech be demonstrably necessary, proportionate, and subject to oversight. Comparative experiences, such as the EU’s Digital Services Act and the UK’s Online Safety Act, underscore that robust accountability and user rights can coexist with regulatory oversight.
The reform proposals advanced in this paper—a statutory transparency code, an explicit proportionality clause, clarification of safe harbor obligations, and novel concepts such as a Creative Safe Harbor and a Digital Justice Addendum—are steps toward harmonizing state interests with constitutional freedoms. If institutionalized, they can transform the Indian model from one marked by opacity and overreach into a framework that earns public trust, protects individual dignity, and sustains democratic legitimacy in cyberspace. Ultimately, the future of India’s internet governance will depend not on how often the state asserts control, but on how consistently it upholds constitutional commitments in the exercise of that control.
Bhoomi shroff
Siddharth law college, Gandhinagar