ABSTRACT
The All India Judicial Services (AIJS) has been a contentious proposal long on discussion that seeks to meet the pervasive challenges hindering India’s lower judiciary, such as staggering vacancies, increased pendency of cases, judicial disparities in regional standards, and homogeneity. The study analyses critically the constitutional, institutional, and administrative rationales for creating a centralized judicial recruitment process in the form of AIJS. Rooted in Article 312 of the Indian Constitution and endorsed by different Law Commission Reports and Supreme Court decisions, AIJS is set to introduce transparency, meritocracy, and uniformity to judicial appointments nationwide. While doing so, the paper examines valid misgivings expressed by state governments and jurists on issues of federalism, language issues, loss of local jurisprudential acumen, and possible centralization of power. Using doctrinal and empirical approaches, this research delves into historical suggestions, case laws, judicial tendencies, and quantitative facts to evaluate the feasibility and desirability of AIJS. Based on a balanced analysis, the article suggests a phased, zonal, and judiciary-driven model of implementation that is consistent with constitutional limits yet responds to the imperative for systemic change. Finally, it contends that a properly designed AIJS can be a path-breaking move towards reclaiming the credibility, accessibility, and efficiency of the Indian judiciary.
KEY WORDS
All India Judicial Services (AIJS), Judicial Appointments in India, Subordinate Judiciary Reform, Judicial Independence and Accountability, Merit-based Judicial Recruitment
INTRODUCTION
Justice is the bedrock of a constitutional democracy, with the judiciary serving as the vigilant protector. In the Indian federal framework, which operates under the rule of law, the judiciary is described by our Supreme Court as the “Sentinel on the Qui Vive.” But, although the judiciary is constitutionally exalted, India’s lower judiciary has significant internal structural challenges; growing pendency, concerning vacancies, inconsistent recruitment policies, and no public confidence. While the upper judiciary gets the attention, justice is first encountered at the district and subordinate level by the common man. A robust, independent, and professional lower judiciary is necessary to support the integrity of justice and justice’s reach.
Judicial appointments to the subordinate courts are currently made by individual states, usually through Public Service Commissions, resulting in varying standards and vulnerability to local pressures. Allegations of nepotism, arbitrariness, and politicization have marred the appointment process. Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer has earlier pointed out that some of the judicial appointments are made at the “fancy of the collegium,” with some of them being incompetent or even delinquent. Scholars such as Vishnu Parshad have also contended that judicial independence should be complemented by institutional safeguards that insulate judges from political interference and merit-based selection. In this regard, the recommendation for an All India Judicial Service (AIJS), similar to the IAS and IPS, has emerged as a structural change with the potential to give India’s judiciary a new lease of life.
The legal basis for AIJS is valid. Article 312 of the Indian Constitution allows for the establishment of such a service by parliamentary law if it is considered necessary in the national interest by the Rajya Sabha. The Law Commission in its 14th and 116th Reports emphatically recommended the creation of AIJS to ensure transparency and efficiency in judicial appointments. All India Judges’ Association v. Union of India saw the Supreme Court uphold this suggestion as a “major and compelling necessity.” The suggestion, however, has not been adopted due to issues concerning federalism, linguistic diversity, and local autonomy. This article, utilizing a doctrinal approach, analyses the constitutional provisions, judicial decisions, and Law Commission reports to assess the need and feasibility of creating the AIJS as part of India’s federal democratic structure.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The primary research uses a descriptive and analytical methodology, allowing it to review secondary sources, including provisions of the Constitution of India, Law commission Reports, Supreme Court decisions, journals, government data and news articles. It uses both doctrinal and empirical methodology to look at the legal foundation, practical feasibility and desirability to action initiatives on AIJS and it also analyses the criticism and concern raised by states and jurists, on aspects relating to the constitutional federal frame, implications and aspirations of India’s linguistic diversity and the domain needs in relation to locality and local jurisprudence. The research uses comparative methodology and some content analysis to appropriately juxtaposition arguments for and against actions of AIJS. In the end, it delivers and makes the case for phased zonal response, where action is led through judiciary but is ultimately aligned through the constitutional framework needing reform.
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Constitutional Framework and Creation Mechanism
The All India Judicial Services (AIJS) is a proposed centralised service aimed to standardise, enhance transparency and meritocracy across all subordinate levels of judges in India. Its constitutional genesis is based in Article 312 which allows for Parliament to create an All India Service via a Rajya Sabha resolution agreed to by a two-thirds majority. Instead of the current model where appointments to the lower judiciary are made by State Public Service Commissions and High Courts under Articles 233 to 237, AIJS would set a national recruitment and training process (similar to IAS or IPS). As such, the purpose is to facilitate judicial appointments and to address the pressing issues of regional imbalance, increased vacancies, and different conditions of service.
The proposal was originally endorsed in the 14th Law Commission Report (1958) which emphasized the need to increase access to talented lawyers and implement intense, uniform training for newly appointed judicial officers to improve standards and performance of judiciaries. The Commission viewed the AIJS as “a very potent unifying force” and a way to harness intellectual capital of promising law graduates that might otherwise pursue executive jobs with better monetary prospects. Later, in All India Judges Association v. Union of India (1992), the Supreme Court even acknowledged this recommendation and requested that the Union government to seriously explore the possibility of implementing the AIJS for the benefit and “health of the Judiciary”. The Court stated that the 42nd Constitutional Amendment transferred judicial administration from the State List to the Concurrent List, therefore allowing the Centre to initiate the process, amongst other things. However, some important legal issue surrounding the implementation of the AIJS still exists around Article 312 and Article 235, where Article 235 gives High Courts administrative power over the subordinate judiciary.
Existing System and the Need for Reform
Articles 233 and 234 of the Constitution govern appointments to the subordinate judiciary in India. The Governor, in consultation with the High Court, appoints District Judges while Civil Judges are appointed by State Public Service Commissions. Each state operates a model that aims to be decentralised. However, in practice, this has meant different selection systems, service conditions and training. The reality was that we have a judiciary filled with significant vacancies, an accumulation of over 1.9 crore cases and claims of nepotism and arbitrariness in judicial appointments. Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer pointed out that several appointments were made at the “fancy of the collegium” and that some appointed judges were incompetent.
Long before the Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer stated this, a noted critic, Vishnu Parshad, has advocated for a balance of judicial independence with institutional constraints to appointments. The 14th Law Commission Report (1958) argued for the creation of a unified judicial service to improve efficiency, meritocracy and standardisation; it recommended recruitment based on a national-level competitive examination. The Supreme Court expressed this view in All India Judges’ Association v. Union of India when it stated that establishing all India judicial service AIJS was a “major and compelling necessity” for preserving the health of the judiciary. In this context, the inefficiencies in the existing systems requires urgent structural reform in the form of an AIJS to ensure transparency, competence, and uniformity in judicial appointments
Benefits and Support for AIJS
The All India Judicial Services (AIJS) is seen as a necessary reform to remediate persistent problems within India’s lower judiciary. One promise of the AIJS is to implement uniformity, transparency, and merit-based recruitment and training of judges through a centralised, competitive process. The Supreme Court contrasted the AIJS as a “major and compelling necessity,” because of the highly disparate selection and service standards of judges across states. A uniform recruitment system would ensure judges are selected solely on merit, regardless of caste, region of origin, and political connections.
At this moment, India’s judiciary is also battling a spectacular vacancy and case-pendency crisis. As of 2021, there were more than 5,146 (21%) vacancies in the subordinate judiciary, while some states (like Bihar and Haryana) had vacancy rates exceeding 35%. At the same time, there are 3.46 crore cases pending in subordinate courts, and 5.16 lakh pending cases in High Courts, with 23% of subordinate court cases pending for over five years, and nearly 4.5 million (which is almost 40% of subordinate court cases) pending cases for over a decade. This is largely a consequence of irregular and/or delayed recruitment and appointment of judges by the State Public Service Commission
In addition to greater efficiency, AIJS can help improve the social diversity and inclusion within the judiciary. The exam for a national level appointment would create the possibility for representation from women, SC/STs, OBCs, and minorities to reflect India’s social structure in a turn for the better. AIJS would act as a talent pipeline to the higher judiciary and would help create increased career mobility and institutional capacity. It is also worth noting that AIJS would shield the appointments from the various executive or collegial forms of bias and uphold the independence of the judicial system, ultimately restoring public trust in the judiciary.
Challenges, Criticisms, and Federal Concerns
The proposal for an All-India Judicial Services (AIJS), while well-meaning in its focus on addressing anti-structural inefficiencies in the lower judiciary, has sparked significant opposition on constitutional and administrative grounds. Critics argue that a centralised service would lead to too much concentration of power in a single centralised authority which makes important decisions around appointments and postings and local information is not always made available to a centralised authority that is already overburdened, inflexible and secretive. A central service would replace anti-decentralised inefficiencies with anti-local impediments and other bureaucratic forms of inflexibility, and hinder the responsiveness of the judiciary at the grassroots level. Furthermore, it has been argued that these reforms usually do not have an empirically founded grasp of how the communities function, and they will also create pathways to greater dependency or arbitrariness for the subordinate judiciary.
A fundamental constitutional issue is that the AIJS would encroach upon the federal character of the Indian Constitution. That is, Articles 233 to 237 confer on the state governments and the High Courts the powers of recruitment, promotion, and control of those who make up the subordinate judiciary. Centralized recruitment would press pause on state autonomy and upset the delicate balance of cooperative federalism put in place to displace states from recent meddling in judicial administration. The Supreme Court, while agreeing that judicial reform is important in All India Judges’ Assn. v. Union of India, laid down that efficiency should come with due regard to constitutional possibilities. Further, central appointments of state judges subject to state oversight will have dual accountability risks, where the blurring of accountability would render reporting, disciplinary, and promotion lines distinct.
Administrative feasibility is another difficult challenge. AIJS without substantial investment in judicial infrastructure and capacity will be a top-down phenomenon and not a functional solution. In the 2017 Union Budget, the judiciary was allocated only ₹1,744.13 crore; an amount broadly considered inadequate for meaningful reform. Many lower courts in the country do not have basic courtroom infrastructure, as evidenced by the public criticism of constitutional authorities. Additionally, a singular national examination could neglect regional legal traditions, local languages, and customary practices that are depended upon to provide functional justice. There are similarly fears that already existing judicial officers may be demoralised, as the career potential of existing judicial officers may be impeded by new entrants being directly recruited. The work of judicially minded officers may be devalued without formal acknowledgement of their prior judicial experience. There are important support concerns that together point to an appropriate phased and culturally sensitive implementation of any AIJS.
Comparative Perspectives and Contemporary Relevance
Many countries have established centralised judicial recruitment systems that provide valuable illustrations of centralized judicial recruitment systems that provide valuable lessons for India’s planned AIJS. In France, the École nationale de la magistrature (ENM) offers a competitive judicial entry exam followed by full-time vocational training. The independent CSM, created by Article 64 of the Constitution, oversees the ENM and controls career probation, appointments, and disciplinary matters. Appointments and appointments are managed in a manner that is transparent and, via the CSM, free from executive control. A study on judicial administration in Europe notes that, “the major distinction of the French system is the degree of autonomy provided to the judges by the State, clearly a balance that is necessary to maintain judicial independence.
In Japan, candidates for judges must pass a national bar examination before attending the Legal Training and Research Institute, which is overseen by the Supreme Court’s administration (which also administers judicial assignments). The Japanese model stresses the need for uniform professional standards, as well as the gradual acculturation of national norms. Regional adaptation occurs when judges learn about local practice as judges when they join the bench.
Also, the global developments show that centralised recruitment can regress to independent, merit-based and diverse judiciary – provided there are strong institutional safeguards in place to uphold independence, and the positions are decentralised. In India, the AIJS also aims at achieving some meritocracy with standards akin to centralised recruitment to decrease the disparities observed in the quality of debit judges in previous years, delays caused by pendency, and folly of 5,000 vacancies in inferior courts and delays in resolving 3.46 crore cases, Cases pending in subordinate courts are a result of infrastructural issues, which these models also highlight in the need for adaptation methodology in leu of departing respectfully in optimism of regional indices understanding, significance of local context in the use of knowledge transfer and infrastructure readiness in adaptation processes.
SUGGESTION
Constitution, it is suggested that the launch of AIJS be staged. Initially, a pilot project could be initiated in a few consenting states or judicial regions to assess administrative feasibility, logistical readiness and acceptance of the model. This would allow policymakers to assess what can happen on the ground before widespread implementation. The pilot could be led by a judicially-chaired national committee, which includes nominees from various High Courts, the state governments and academicians to maintain a balanced representation.
Additionally, to alleviate concerns of language, diversity and local jurisprudence, the AIJS model should also include local training elements in training modules, multilingual examination options and postings that are prioritised for local legal experience. Similar to France’s École nationale de la magistrature and Japan’s Legal Training Institute, the AIJS might consider a training model that allows for both centralised training with national standards while at the same time utilising localised immersion. Lastly, complementary investments would be required for judicial infrastructure and e-governance tools to assist with the reform in order for long term effect. With this type of calibrated approach rooted in co-operative federalism, meritocracy and institutional reform, AIJS would be an initiative that could help transform the reclamation of credibility, affordability and independence of the judiciary in India.
CONCLUSION
The All India Judicial Services (AIJS) represents an opportunity and challenge in India’s effort for judicial reform. While the proposal promises to advance recruitment in a streamlined manner, provide merit-based mechanisms for recruitment, and address long unresolved issues concerning vacancy and pendency of judges in the lower judiciary, legitimate criticisms can be made with respect to factors relating to federal structure, administration, and cultural responsiveness. Opposition and support for AIJS raises hard choices of weighing efficiency against constitutionally framed federalism and uniformity against diversity.
International examples, specifically France, Japan and several Eastern European countries, demonstrate that centralised recruitment can xvi work fairly well when complemented by locally established institutional mechanisms, training situated in regions, and investment in infrastructure. In the case of India, moving forward does not mean a unique imposition but a staged, consultative and inclusive installation. Pilot initiatives, zonal programs, and awareness of language in recruiting and training, can mediate the relationship between national goals with regional contingencies.
The future of AIJS will depend on a lot more than legal design and administrative features; if AIJS is going to build public trust, respect the diversity of the Indian judiciary, and secure judicial independence, it will need to be instituted as it is intended. If instituted thoughtfully, AIJS can be the cornerstone for India and its ability to create a more accountable, efficient, and accessible justice system.
ANSH NAMDEO
INSTITUTE OF LAW NIRMA UNIVERSITY