Citation: Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma, (2020) 9 SCC 1 (India).
Court: Supreme Court of India (Three-Judge Bench)
Judges: Arun Mishra, S. Abdul Nazeer, and M.R. Shah, JJ.
Date of Judgment: August 11, 2020
1. FACTS
The case of Vineeta Sharma v Rakesh Sharma & Ors was an analysis of the right of Hindu daughters to the ancestral property in Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) under the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 that amended the original Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Specifically, a Hindu daughter was given equal rights of inheritance of ancestral property held as a HUF in Section 6 of the amendment.
The case came into the court when Vineeta Sharma brought a partition lawsuit to get her part in the property of her deceased father as a coparcener. She had lost her father, Dev Dutt Sharma, back in 2001 before the amendment came into force on 9 September 2005. The respondents who are the brothers to Vineeta argued that Vineeta could not have a claim since the amendment could only be adopted in the case the father and daughter were both dead on the date of its reply. Delhi High Court based their ruling on precedence as determined by the Supreme Court and supported the argument of the brothers and struck off the claim. The appeal was made.
In Prakash v Phulavati (2016), it was observed by the Supreme Court that the amendment was prospective only. The point was further developed in the subsequent case in Danamma @ Suman Surpur v Amar (2018) where the decision claimed that the amendment was to be applied retrospectively and thus made daughters a coparcener by birth whether their father had died pre- 2005 or not. As such, it was decided to call a three-judge bench to harmonize these contradicting dicta and find out the resolution to the coparcenary rights of Hindu daughters in respect of ancestral property in cases where the father was deceased prior to the replacement of the coparcenary concept by the amendment.
In passing the order, the Supreme Court not only considered the spirit of the laws making the 2005 amendment, but also the history of discrimination against women in Hindu successions and the Mitakshara coparcenary system that ostensibly disallowed women to be an equal member. It reviewed the input of similar cases and intercessions by the womenrights organisations so as to establish the law universal occurrence of Section 6.
2. ISSUES RAISED
The Supreme Court framed the following key issues for adjudication:
- Whether the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, which substituted Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, applies retrospectively or prospectively with respect to daughters’ coparcenary rights?
- Whether a daughter’s right to be a coparcener in an HUF depends on her father (the coparcener) being alive on September 9, 2005, the date of the amendment’s enforcement?
- How should conflicting judgments, particularly Prakash v. Phulavati and Danamma @ Suman Surpur, be reconciled to establish a uniform interpretation of Section 6?
- Whether the amended Section 6 aligns with constitutional guarantees of equality under Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India?
3. CONTENTION
Appellant’s (Vineeta Sharma) Contentions:
The Hindu Succession Act has an amendment under the year 2005 which is retrospective that is the coparcenary rights can be enjoyed by daughters by the birth right and hence they have the same right by the birth right regardless of the subsequent enactment. Section 6(1) of the amended Act stipulates that daughters “shall have the same rights and liabilities” as sons, without temporal limitation contingent upon the father’s survival. To achieve the goal of eliminating the gender discrimination that is inherent in the Mitakshara coparcenary system, this change is in line with the Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution, which both ensures equality and denies any form of discrimination. In addition, a case of Prakash v. The Phulavati judgment is criticized because it is inconsistent with legislative intent and those cases only look at the amendment in a narrow way, the Danamma case is more accurate as the rights of daughters are acquired by birth in relation to circumstances regardless of the death of the father. The further exclusion of daughters based on the death of the father before the year 2005 further affects gender inequality and neutralizes the aim of treatment equality brought about by the amendment.
Respondents’ (Rakesh Sharma & Ors.) Contentions:
The Amendment of the Hindu Succession Act of 2005 is prospective and only gives rights to the daughters whose father had survived in the fraternal coparceners up to 9 September 2005, as stated in Prakash v. Phulavati. In the Mitakshara system, the right of coparticipatory in the coparcenary only occurs on partition or the demise of the coparcener, thus the daughters born prior to 2005 could not access the past benefits of the earlier legal regime.The proviso to Section 6(1) and Section 6(5) of the Act further restrict the amendments to properties that remain unpartitioned or that are subject to pending litigation, thereby excluding any situation in which a father had died before 2005. Any retrospective effect would have undone years of property settlement, created a sense of uncertainty in property, and created injustices to those male coparceners that had expected the pre-2005 law to apply. In addition, the amendments attempted to balance the issue of gender inequality without interference with existing succession patterns.
Intervenors (Women’s Rights Groups):
In the proceedings, the parties making the appeal raised an argument that the considered constitutional amendment was a form of a targeted social-reform effort aimed at abolishing discrimination on the basis of gender. They, therefore, advanced a liberal and retrospective interpretative posture. It was claimed that the amendment did in fact serve to grant coparcenary rights to daughters by birth, at which interpretation means rights gained upon the birth itself, as they are gained on the day of the birth and not upon the day of the amendment itself. This was defended on basis of constitutional imperative of equality.
4. RATIONALE
In a unanimous opinion rendered by Justice Arun Mishra, the Supreme Court has held that the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, is retrospective in its operation and, consequently, confers upon daughters equal coparcenary rights by birth irrespective of their father’s status on 9 September 2005, the Act’s date of commencement. To reach this conclusion, the Court undertakes a thorough exegesis of legislative intent and the textual provisions of Section 6(1) of the amended statute, which declares that “a daughter shall by birth be a coparcener in the same manner as a son,” and it proceeds to apply those provisions to living as well as deceased daughters. The Court understands the term by birth to mean that coparcenary rights are bestowed upon birth and not by the time of the enactment of the amendment and makes it clear that the term on and from 9 September 2005 refers only to the effective date of exercise of rights not to their creation.
The judgement also points to the fact that the phrase by birth works as a clear remedy to historical gender discrimination enshrined in Mitakshara coparcenary system. This kind of discrimination is an act of denying equality against Article 14 and 15 of the Constitution. Therefore, giving rights to vest only in case the father survives would be the continuation of the inequality that should have been addressed with the amendment. Accordingly, the Court sets aside the Prakash v Phulavati verdict, in which they wrongly declared the Act prospective and dependent upon the survival of the father. This decision disregarded the fact that the drafters clearly used the words, by birth thus defeating the intent of the amendment which is to provide a remedy. On the contrary, the Court upholds its ruling in Danamma @ Suman Surpur which understood the amendment to be retrospective.
With respect to partitions, the Court clarifies that only those partitions initiated through registered instruments or judicial orders completed prior to 20 December 2004 are exempt from the amendment’s reach under Section 6(5). In line with this, oral or un registered partitions effected subsequent to that date can no longer protect daughters to their coparcenary interests. By so doing the Court resolves clashing judicial precedents, thus enhancing judicial uniformity, as well as rejecting arguments that retrospective application would undermine hitherto acquiesced rights. Rather, the Court observes that coparcenary interests lie fluid until an effective partition.
5. DEFECTS OF LAW
The conclusion of the Supreme Court contained in Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma step by step explores a number of failures of the current legal order, and judicial interpretation of some. To begin with, it examines gender discrimination that is instilled in Mitakshara law. With the pre-amendment 1956 Act, daughters were not included to be in coparcenary, causing preservation of the patriarchal values which goes against the constitutional reasons of equality, hence women were marginalized in terms of property succession.
Second, the case mediates a lot of judicial inconsistency largely observed through the contradicting decisions in Prakash v Phulavati and Danamma @ Suman Surpur. The differing rulings have created uneven standards on the lower courts hence limiting access to justice as well as the faith the citizens has on the justice system.
Third, the ruling is critical of Section 6 in the amended Act, in which the phrases, on and from and by birth, have an interpretative ambiguity as this has been illustrated in Prakash. Moreover, the proviso and Section 6(5) on partitions give rise to ambiguity with respect to the retrospective application of the statute.
Fourth, Section 6(6) of Prakash sets a cut-off date (2005) by which daughters could claim coparcenary rights only if their fathers were alive at that time. This arbitrary limit undercuts the gender justice aims of the 2005 amendment and burdens women, who must often establish partition status that is seldom documented within Hindu Undivided Families (HUFs).
In combination, these issues made the Court take the sufficiency step of passing a remedial, clarifying judgment: that it holds the retrospective effect of the 2005 amendment is true; it overrules incorrect precedents and that the text is implemented in a way that is reasonable and in consistency with constitutional dictates.
6. INFERENCE
The ruling of the Supreme Court of India in Vineeta Sharma v Rakesh Sharma is a landmark case on inheritance law in India as it promotes gender equality and backs the constitutional promise of the country. The Court, by treating the 2005 amendment to the MitaksharaSystem as retroactive, destroyed a centuries-old patriarchal system of inheritance where daughters were entitled to rights in their father alive and inherit equal value of all the fathers property. The result will be in accordance with similar obligations of India in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and facilitate social development through women economic empowerment.
The context in which the judgment is very strong is that the judgment based its reasoning soundly on the Constitution, rational perception of the statutory provisions, and relieved the previous anomalies, presenting a faithful instruction on the Mitakshara rules of inheritance. In striking down Prakash v Phulavati and clarifying that the inheritance rights of daughters begin upon birth as opposed to the amendment date, the Court eliminated past confusion and made the legislation easier to understand.
However, it has attracted criticism because it does not specifically deal with the practical problem of henceforth disagreements over the partition or sale of property which occurred before 2005 and were not sufficiently substantiated and because retroactivity most likely will disrupt the family structure. The Court might have suggested any transitional actions to alleviate such problems.
The consequences of the judgment are broader than that of the Hindu inheritance law to imply the influence of the judiciary in striking down institutional discrimination and protecting constitutive rights. It is an indication of definite statutory changes and reinstates the fact that even the legal assurances would prove to be fruitful only in the event of social awakening. Vineeta Sharma, therefore, is a bright example of how the Supreme Court rejects the norms of gender discrimination and is capable of forging the course of India in the era of progressive cultural and legal developments.
YASH SEHRAWAT
OP JINDAL GLOBAL UNIVERSITY