Abstract
Internet shutdowns, state-imposed disruptions of online connectivity, have become an increasingly common tool of political control. Governments around the world, from democracies to autocracies, invoke shutdowns during unrest or conflict to manage information. This paper examines shutdowns in India and Iran, two prominent cases, to assess their legality under international human rights law, particularly Article 19 of the ICCPR (freedom of expression). India, which leads the world in the number of recorded shutdowns, notably imposed a six-month blackout in Jammu & Kashmir after August 2019. Iran has likewise repeatedly shut down the internet during protests (e.g. fuel-price protests in November 2019 and anti-hijab demonstrations in 2022). We conduct a comparative case study using legal analysis of primary sources (court judgments, international law) and secondary sources (NGO reports, scholarly literature). Key findings are that blanket shutdowns lack the necessary legality, necessity, and proportionality required by Article 19(3) ICCPR; even India’s Supreme Court has warned that indefinite bans violate domestic law. Human rights organizations uniformly condemn such shutdowns as disproportionate and harmful. The paper concludes that India’s and Iran’s shutdowns fail to meet Article 19 standards and urges adherence to international norms, legal reforms, and increased oversight.
Keywords: Internet shutdowns; Freedom of expression; India; Iran; ICCPR Article 19; Human rights.
Introduction
In recent years, governments have increasingly resorted to internet shutdowns – intentionally cutting off or throttling internet access as a response to political unrest, protests, or armed conflict. Such shutdowns range from localized cell-network blocks to nationwide “kill switches” that disconnect entire populations. They are often justified by states on grounds of national security or public order, but human rights experts warn they severely restrict core rights. By their nature, shutdowns undermine freedom of speech and access to information, threatening the bedrock of democratic societies. As the UN Secretary-General has noted, “blanket internet shutdowns and generic blocking… are considered by UN human rights mechanisms to be in violation of international human rights law”. Shutdowns can also facilitate other abuses: victims’ cries for help cannot reach the world, and perpetrators act with impunity in the dark. In the global picture, Access Now reports that at least 187 shutdowns occurred across 35 countries in 2022, often coinciding with elections, crises or protests.
This study zeroes in on two case studies: India and Iran. India has ranked first worldwide for several years in the number of shutdowns implemented. Notably, after revoking Jammu & Kashmir’s special status in August 2019, the Indian government imposed a communications blackout – including an extended internet shutdown – that lasted months. Iran, likewise, has repeatedly shut down connectivity during unrest. During Iran’s November 2019 protests over fuel prices, authorities imposed a near-total internet blackout, a move which Amnesty International later linked to the killing of hundreds of protesters. More recently, in the wake of the Mahsa Amini protests (2022–2023), Iran implemented dozens of localized blackouts to suppress dissent.
Against this backdrop, the paper asks: How do these shutdowns align with international human rights law, especially Article 19 of the ICCPR? Article 19 guarantees “the right to seek, receive and impart information of all kinds” and permits restrictions only when prescribed by law and necessary for a legitimate aim. We evaluate India’s and Iran’s shutdowns under this framework and domestic law. We incorporate judicial precedents – for India, the landmark Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (2020) decision – and reports from rights watchdogs (e.g. Access Now, Human Rights Watch, ARTICLE 19). The analysis shows that both countries’ shutdowns fall short of Article 19’s strict tests and constitutional protections. The paper concludes with recommendations: states must limit shutdowns to strictly necessary cases, ensure transparency and review, and align domestic regulations with international standards.
Research Methodology
This research employs a comparative qualitative method. We examine two national contexts (India and Iran) as case studies, analyzing how shutdowns have been implemented during specific periods of political turmoil and what legal justifications have been offered. The methodology involves legal analysis of relevant texts – international treaties (especially the ICCPR), UN human rights resolutions and reports, and national legal decisions – alongside documentary analysis of secondary sources (NGO reports, academic studies, media accounts). In India’s case, we review the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India and related litigation. For Iran, where domestic judicial recourse is minimal, we rely on reports by human rights NGOs and independent monitors (e.g. Article 19, Freedom House, NetBlocks, Reuters).
Sources include NGO publications by Human Rights Watch and Access Now, which document shutdown instances and impacts, and scholarly literature on “digital authoritarianism” and freedom of expression. We also consult UN declarations and resolutions: for example, the UN Human Rights Council’s 2021 resolution explicitly condemns shutdowns as violations of expression rights. The comparative lens highlights similarities and differences: both democratically-elected (India) and theocratic-authoritarian (Iran) regimes use shutdowns, but political and legal contexts differ. Throughout, we test government actions against the Article 19(3) ICCPR criteria (lawfulness, legitimate aim, necessity, proportionality, and least intrusive means).
This paper’s approach is largely doctrinal and normative: it does not entail fieldwork or statistical analysis, but draws on documented case law and expert commentary. Data from NGOs (e.g. number and duration of shutdowns) supplement the legal review, illustrating patterns. The goal is to assess compliance with international human rights standards and to identify legal and policy reform recommendations.
Review of Literature
Extant literature – legal, scholarly, and advocacy reports – uniformly underscores that internet shutdowns inflict broad harm. International bodies and rights experts warn that such draconian measures curtail more than speech. A UN High Commissioner’s report observed that shutdowns “are powerful markers of deteriorating human rights situations,” generating “a wide variety of harms to human rights… that outweigh the purported benefits.” Indeed, Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 34 affirms that internet access is integral to free expression and assembly, and that any shutdown must meet strict necessity and proportionality tests. Academic observers note that while the internet is a crucial forum for political assembly and information, authoritarian states “rely on the hierarchical physical infrastructure of the Internet… to block access and shut down the digital environment”. The internet is recognized as not only economically vital, but also as enabling “democratic values such as assembly and freedom of expression”. Shutdowns thus represent a blunt tool of control.
International legal perspective: Many authors stress that under the ICCPR, any restriction on expression (including via internet) must be narrowly defined by law and truly necessary. HRW notes that Article 19(2) protects the right to seek, receive, and impart information “of all kinds,” and that under Article 19(3) any limitation must be “provided by law” and be a “necessary and proportionate response to a specified national security or other threat”. Shutdowns almost never satisfy this. For example, a Human Rights Watch report on India observes that because of their “indiscriminate and widespread impacts, internet shutdowns rarely meet the proportionality test”. UN special rapporteurs have likewise urged states to refrain from connectivity cuts during peaceful protests, deeming them inconsistent with ICCPR obligations. In 2021 the UN Human Rights Council explicitly condemned shutdowns as violations of online freedom and called for immediate cessation. Similarly, ARTICLE 19’s reports on Iran conclude that blanket shutdowns (like Iran’s Nov 2019 blackout) are “illegal under international human rights law”.
Empirical and NGO reports: Rights organizations have documented the real-world fallout. HRW’s 2023 report on India details how shutdowns “deny access to basic rights” – disrupting banking, education, healthcare, and livelihoods. The Kashmir blackout (2019–2020) alone caused “more than $2.4 billion” in economic losses and up to 500,000 job losses. UN experts sent a rare joint statement in Aug 2019 decrying Kashmir’s communications clampdown as “inconsistent with… necessity and proportionality,” calling it collective punishment. Access Now’s #KeepItOn coalition tracks global shutdowns; its 2022 report shows India at 84 incidents and notes Iran’s 18 shutdowns during the Mahsa Amini protests. It further observes that all shutdowns violate human rights and often accompany violence. In Iran, Reporters Without Borders and Centre for Human Rights have documented that the 2019 blackout concealed mass violence: “much valuable footage” of security forces’ abuses was lost, aiding impunity.
Country-specific analyses – India: Scholars and practitioners have examined India’s pattern. The Supreme Court’s Bhasin judgment has been analysed in law reviews and blogs (e.g. Global Freedom of Expression project). Commentators note the court’s recognition that online speech is constitutionally protected and that indefinite bans violate Article 19 of India’s Constitution.
However, literature also stresses the gap between law and practice. One commentary noted that despite Bhasin, shutdowns continued apace: “the year following the SC’s decision witnessed a surge in Internet shutdowns… surpassing the preceding year,” with fresh bans during Kashmir protests and farmers’ marches. Legal scholars critique India’s archaic telecom laws as overly broad, lacking safeguards for necessity or review. A 2021 Parliamentary committee reported the Suspension Rules “grossly misused” and recommended avoiding shutdowns on flimsy grounds.
Country-specific analyses – Iran: In Iran-focused literature, shutdowns are part of a pattern of tightening internet control. Article 19’s briefing Tightening the Net (2020) details how state monopoly over infrastructure enables blanket blackouts and lack of transparency in decision-making. Freedom House’s Freedom on the Net 2024 report observes that internet disruptions in Iran “continued throughout 2023,” especially during anti government protests. Activist accounts (e.g. in the Center for Human Rights in Iran) emphasize that shutdowns are used to “cover their tracks” after lethal crackdowns. Policy analysts note that Iran justifies shutdowns on national security, but highlight the absence of any clear legal or judicial oversight; decisions to cut connectivity are typically ad hoc directives by the Supreme National Security Council. Overall, the literature portrays Iran’s shutdowns as tools for information monopoly and repression, with grave human costs.
In sum, the literature underscores that internet shutdowns are broadly viewed as excessive, rights-infringing measures. They often fail international law’s tests. In both India and Iran, shutoffs have been denounced by courts, experts, and witnesses as tools of control that silence dissent rather than achieve genuine security aims. This review sets the stage for a focused legal analysis of those two countries’ specific instances.
Method
This paper employs a comparative legal-analytical method. First, it identifies key instances of shutdowns in India and Iran and characterizes their context. For India, the primary incident is the August 2019 communication blackout in Jammu & Kashmir, and for Iran the November 2019 and subsequent shutdowns (e.g. during the Mahsa Amini protests in 2022). We gather official orders, court petitions, and government justifications for those shutdowns from published sources.
Second, we analyse these measures under the framework of international law. We apply the test of ICCPR Article 19(3) — legality (must have a clear legal basis), a legitimate aim (national security/public order), necessity and proportionality (least restrictive means) — to each case. We also consider domestic law: in India, the constitution and telecom statutes; in Iran, any relevant national security provisions. Where domestic or international quasi-legal bodies have opined (e.g. the UNHRC or the Indian Supreme Court), we integrate those pronouncements as interpretive guidance.
Third, the comparative aspect highlights differences in procedures and oversight. India, as a constitutional democracy, has judicial review and recent Supreme Court guidelines on shutdowns, whereas Iran’s judiciary operates under an authoritarian system with no independent checks on state censorship. By juxtaposing these, we discern whether international human rights obligations operate differently under different regimes, and to what extent domestic decisions satisfy them.
Finally, we incorporate empirical data from NGOs as supporting evidence. For example, Access Now’s tracker provides the number and timing of shutdowns; HRW interviews illustrate impacts. This triangulation of legal analysis with civil society reports enriches our understanding of consequences. The method is qualitative and interpretive, aimed at normative assessment rather than statistical inference.
Review of Literature
The literature on internet shutdowns spans international law, political science, and human rights advocacy. We synthesize key findings below.
Impact and rights analysis (global perspective): A broad consensus is that shutdowns severely impair human rights. For instance, the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression found that shutdowns “generate a wide variety of harms to human rights” (including impeding emergency services and economic activity) and are never the “least intrusive” means. The UN Office of the High Commissioner’s report (2022) similarly warns that shutdowns mark deteriorating rights situations. ARTICLE 19 (the free expression NGO) has compiled case law and notes that international bodies treat shutdowns as presumptively incompatible with rights. Academic studies echo this: Pollino (2020) argues that while governments cite disinformation threats, “blanket shutdowns and generic blocking” are disproportionate. Others contextualize shutdowns within “digital authoritarianism”: states today can weaponize internet infrastructure to control protest, rather than relying on old blunt tools. On the flip side, some scholarship acknowledges states’ public-order concerns, noting debates over whether emergency measures (like the Christchurch Call to eliminate extremist content) might justify restrictive actions. But this viewpoint increasingly faces criticism, since technology offers more targeted options than total blackout.
International legal standards: Doctrinal writers emphasize that under Article 19 ICCPR, every person has the right to freedom of expression including “to seek, receive and impart information of all kinds, regardless of frontiers”. Crucially, limitations on this right are only allowed if “provided by law” and necessary for a specified purpose like national security or public order. The restrictions “must also be the least intrusive option available”. Commentators observe that shutdowns are typically neither well-defined nor time-limited by law, and thus fail these criteria. Human Rights Watch notes India’s own obligations: since India ratified the ICCPR in 1993, it is bound to respect Article 19 standards; any suspension of internet must then comply with the ICCPR’s necessity and proportionality. UN Human Rights Committee General Comment 34 has explicitly linked Internet access to Article 19. Moreover, shutdowns implicate other rights too: Article 19(2) covers “information of all kinds,” so cutting off connectivity curtails the right to receive information. UN special procedures have asserted that interrupting communications during peaceful assembly violates freedom of expression. The HRC’s 2021 resolution on the internet underscores that “the same rights people have offline must also be protected online,” and strongly condemns shutdowns. These global legal pronouncements form the baseline: any restriction must be narrowly tailored, transparent, and subject to oversight.
Consequences of shutdowns: Numerous studies document the concrete fallout. For example, the HRW report on India (2023) details that shutdowns prevented Kashmiris from accessing medical care, online education, banking, or digital payments. In Kashmir’s 2019 blackout, a journalist said it “felt like the silence of the graveyard.” Economic studies concur: six months of communications shutdown cost Kashmir’s economy over $2.4 billion. Shutdowns also provide cover for other abuses. During Iran’s 2019 protests, Amnesty International reported at least 304 deaths (Reuters citing up to 1,500) of protesters, noting that the internet blackout “made it easier for the state to carry out gross human rights violations”. Without live streams or reports coming out, “the scale of the killings” was concealed. Access Now emphasizes that 133 out of 187 shutdowns worldwide in 2022 coincided with violence. Thus, the literature portrays shutdowns as disproportionately harmful, often worse than the problems they purportedly address.
India-specific literature: In India, discussions have centered on constitutional rights and telecom regulations. Following Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (2020), legal scholars hailed the judgment’s recognition of Internet-based expression as constitutionally protected. The ruling held that an indefinite shutdown is illegal under Indian law and imposed requirements of necessity, proportionality, public notice, and review. Commentators have since debated implementation. Despite Bhasin, reports note that state authorities continued frequent shutdowns. One analysis observed that in 2020 alone, India experienced more shutdowns (surpassing 2019 levels) as authorities repeatedly resorted to bans during protests and exams. Evaluations of Indian law criticize the Indian Telegraph Act and 2017 Suspension Rules for allowing overly broad emergency restrictions without effective review. Empirical work by the Internet Freedom Foundation and HRW quantifies this: in 2020–2022, at least 127 shutdowns were recorded across 18 states, often for flimsy reasons like exam security. The literature underscores a disconnect between Bhasin’s safeguards and on-the-ground practice, pointing to the need for reforms to bring Indian rules in line with international law.
Iran-specific literature: Scholarship on Iran’s internet freedom highlights its systematic censorship. Article 19’s Tightening the Net report (2020) details how Iran’s state-controlled infrastructure and opaque decision-making allow rapid blackouts. Freedom House’s “Freedom on the Net” reports for Iran (2024) describe periodic shutdowns correlated with protests: for instance, “widespread internet shutdowns and mobile disruptions” were used to “quell massive anti government protests” after Mahsa Amini’s death. Activists emphasize that authorities have no legal mechanism or transparent criteria; cuts are made by decree of security elites. Journalistic accounts (e.g. the Center for Human Rights in Iran) provide chilling narratives: Iranian photojournalists say that during the 2019 blackout their footage had to be smuggled out, and that no “iconic images” of Bloody November survive because “they managed to cover their tracks well.”. Analysts thus conclude that Iran’s shutdowns are largely arbitrary and intended to suppress dissent, lacking the legality needed under international norms.
Overall, the literature paints shutdowns in India and Iran as instruments of authoritarian control that violate standard rights safeguards. Both countries have been singled out by experts and courts for practices that violate Article 19’s requirements. With this background, we now turn to the concrete analysis of these countries’ shutdowns in law and practice.
Analysis
India: Internet Shutdowns and Constitutional Constraints
India’s recent record is unparalleled: for five years it has topped global shutdown rankings. Shutdowns occur under two main laws: the colonial Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 (specifically sections 5(2)) and the 2017 Suspension Rules framed under it, and also under Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In practice, state and central authorities issue orders citing “public safety” or exam security, often with minimal transparency. For example, in August 2019, following a government order revoking Jammu & Kashmir’s autonomy, telecommunication services in the region were suspended by issuing District Magistrate orders and invoking the Telegraph Act. Over subsequent months, mobile data and internet access remained largely cut off, even as Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code (supposedly limited to physical gatherings) was used to justify continuing restrictions.
Legally, these shutdowns triggered the writ petition Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India in the Supreme Court. In Bhasin, the Court made several landmark rulings. It unequivocally stated that the freedom of speech and expression through the internet is protected under Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution. The Court held that an “indefinite” blackout is illegal, and that any order suspending internet must satisfy tests of necessity and proportionality under Article 19(2). Crucially, Bhasin required authorities to publish their orders, limit the scope and duration of suspensions, and subject them to judicial review. As a factsheet summary notes: “even in cases where national security is used to justify restrictions…this would not per se justify not providing access to information regarding the specific decisions”. In effect, Bhasin aligned Indian law with international norms: it implicitly drew on ICCPR principles (which are reflected in India’s Constitution) to demand that shutdowns be lawful, necessary, and the least restrictive option.
Despite this, authorities have persisted. HRW reports that in the year following Bhasin, shutdowns surged beyond previous levels. Instances include restrictions during the 2020 farmers’ protests and during separatist leader Geelani’s death in 2021. Often, orders are not published even as Bhasin mandates, undermining accountability. Judicial interventions since Bhasin have echoed its guidance. For example, in 2023 the Supreme Court (in a case involving Telangana) struck down a statewide WhatsApp ban on free speech grounds, reiterating that communications cannot be blocked wholesale without rigorous examination.
Under international law, India is bound by Article 19 ICCPR (ratified 1979). The harsh reality of India’s shutdowns contrasts with Article 19’s restrictions criteria. Shutdown orders rarely cite a precise statute or clearly articulated threat, and often extend far beyond what is “necessary.” HRW notes, “[I]ndiscriminate and widespread” shutdowns “rarely meet the proportionality test”. For example, blocking mobile internet statewide to prevent exam cheating was a common justification, even when other measures (invigilators, anti-cheating masks, CCTV) could have sufficed. These measures appear arbitrary and overbroad. By both constitutional and international standards, then, many of India’s shutdowns seem ultra vires. Indeed, Bhasin itself required rules (and executive action) to “ensure that the orders are lawful, necessary, proportionate, and limited in scope”– a prescription that, by most accounts, is not being met.
To illustrate, consider the year 2021. The parliamentary committee observed that shutdown rules were “grossly misused”. Rights groups documented dozens of orders across multiple states. In Rajasthan, for example, analysis showed most shutdown orders followed a “copy-paste template” and lacked any real emergency justification. These findings echo scholarly warnings that blanket cut-offs violate core freedoms. The Supreme Court of India recognized this threat: it held that internet access is an essential condition of freedom of press and trade, requiring any shutdown to be “tested… on the basis of reasonableness and proportionality”. Where courts have access to evidence, shutdowns have often been criticized. Yet the political trend is to use shutdowns as a default tool for law-and-order.
In sum, India’s approach to shutdowns falls short of Article 19 norms. Although domestic law (post-Bhasin) theoretically demands necessity and limits, the practice has been sweeping. Many shutdown orders have unclear legal basis, secretive issuance, and extended duration – raising serious Article 19 concerns. The domestic Supreme Court has established high hurdles for justification, but enforcement gaps remain. From the human rights perspective, one concludes that most of these shutdowns in India likely violate India’s ICCPR obligations.
Iran: Shutdowns as Repression during Unrest
In Iran, internet shutdowns are an established tool of the authoritarian state. Unlike India, Iran does not provide open judicial review of shutdown orders; the decisions are made by security councils or senior officials, often behind closed doors. Nevertheless, the pattern is clear: on any occasion of widespread protest or conflict, connectivity is cut. Notable examples include the nationwide shutdowns during the November 2019 fuel-price riots and the recurrent shutdowns amid 2022’s “Woman, Life, Freedom” protests sparked by Mahsa Amini’s killing. During these events, Iran’s authorities severed international internet gateways, blocked social media and messaging apps, and even slowed mobile data to near-zero in protest regions.
Reports from Iran and NGOs document these shutdowns’ scale and intent. ARTICLE 19’s investigation of November 2019 found that Iran’s state monopoly over Internet infrastructure made a total blackout possible, and concluded the blackout “remain[s] illegal under international human rights law”. By shutting off Iranians from global news and communications, officials effectively hid evidence of a brutal crackdown – Amnesty noted that hundreds, possibly over a thousand, were killed while Iran was offline. Likewise, during the Mahsa Amini protests, Freedom House observes “widespread internet shutdowns and mobile disruptions… to quell massive antigovernment protests”. These shutdowns often coincide with sharp violence: HRW and others report that forces responded with live ammunition, torture, and public executions while communications were cut. In effect, shutdowns in Iran are not just precautionary; they appear to facilitate and cloak repression.
Legally, Iran’s shutdowns have no clear domestic justification. Iranian officials sometimes cite the International Telecommunication Union (as noted by Article 19) to claim a right to control networks, but this ignores domestic human rights commitments. Iran is a party to the ICCPR (ratified 1975) and its constitution nominally provides for freedom of expression (though with vague security exceptions). International law applies equally: the ICCPR’s Article 19 protections bind Iran, and its derogation clauses are never legitimately invoked for mass communication blockades. Indeed, UN experts have criticized Iran’s shutdowns. After Bloody November 2019, UN human rights experts jointly stated that the internet blackout was “inconsistent with the fundamental norms of necessity and proportionality” and labeled it a form of collective punishment.
Iranian authorities often justify shutdowns on vague grounds like “national security” or rumor control, but these claims do not satisfy Article 19(3). The restrictions are neither transparent nor narrowly tailored. For example, the 2019 blackout lacked any announced legal order; Iranian media and commentators struggled to identify who had issued it. The internet was cut for days on end – far beyond any immediate threat. During 2022, shutdowns would recur weekly in protest hotspots, with no judicial oversight. In short, Iran’s actions fail the ICCPR test: they are not limited by clear law or time, and they lack proportionality. One notable contemporary commentary aptly describes Iran’s blackout during the recent Israel–Iran skirmish as “psychological warfare,” serving no public safety need other than to control information.
In the absence of local remedies, we rely on international analysis. Human rights advocates warn that Iran’s connectivity cuts are an unmistakable violation of expression rights. Shutdowns in Iran have never been found to meet the necessity standard: no evidence is offered that violence was averted by cutting Instagram or messaging apps. Instead, the societal damage is evident. Beyond silencing dissent, shutdowns worsen humanitarian crises: during 2022, students could not apply online, sick people couldn’t access telemedicine, families lost contact.
A comparative note: India’s shutdowns occur under a constitutional rule-of-law framework (with appeals to courts like Bhasin), whereas Iran’s happen under security-state fiat. Yet in both cases, international norms require justification that is lacking. As one legal scholar observes, even if a state of emergency existed, certain aspects of Article 19 do not permit arbitrary disconnects – and neither country has formally proclaimed such an emergency to trigger ICCPR derogation provisions. Thus both India and Iran struggle to meet the Article 19 criteria. In practice, Iran’s shutdowns appear as stark disconnections with no checks, so from a human rights perspective they are especially indefensible.
Legality under International Law (Article 19 ICCPR)
Both India and Iran have ratified the ICCPR, making Article 19 applicable. Under Article 19(2), freedom of expression encompasses all media – explicitly including electronic communication. Article 19(3) provides that restrictions must be “provided by law” and necessary for limited aims (e.g. national security, public order). The Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 34 clarifies that an internet blackout would generally not meet the “necessary” or “proportionate” requirements, since it cuts off virtually all speech. The Committee has warned states that disconnecting people from online expression about peaceful assemblies violates Article 19.
Applying these principles, we find both shutdown regimes problematic:
- Legality (“provided by law”): India has statutory provisions (Telegraph Act and Rules), but these empower shutdowns on vague grounds (like “public safety”) without clear safeguards. In many cases, the orders did not even cite the enabling provision, as Bhasin noted. Iran has no transparent statutory procedure; decisions are ad hoc security orders with no public legal basis. Thus in both countries, the legal basis is questionable, undermining legitimacy under Article 19.
- Legitimate aim: Both governments invoke national security or public order. We do not dispute that states may have legitimate concerns during unrest. But Article 19 requires a genuine threat and a direct link between the measure and the threat. Scholars point out that oftentimes a looming threat was already mitigated by arrests or curfews, rendering a network shutdown overbroad. The Bhasin petitioners argued that Jammu & Kashmir’s situation did not justify a full telecom ban. In Iran, authorities similarly label all protests as security crises. However, there is little evidence that information flow itself creates violence; more often it empowers peaceful reporting. The UN SR on assembly/association has emphasized that blaming protests on “influence of social media” is not enough to warrant cutting off communication.
- Necessity and proportionality: This is where most shutdowns fail. International norms require that, even for a valid aim, the restriction be narrowly tailored and the least intrusive means. A complete blackout is the broadest possible cut-off, affecting all citizens indiscriminately. UN experts and NGOs alike state that shutdowns are inherently disproportionate except under the gravest circumstances. In India, courts and experts expect gradual and local measures rather than blanket bans. In Bhasin, the Court stressed that even during security threats, the executive must not withhold the reasons for a shutdown from the public. In Iran, pro-democracy analysts note that connectivity could have been limited just in protest areas, but authorities opted for nationwide cuts. Reports from both countries make clear that the total shutdowns were never the “least intrusive” option – e.g. jamming only social apps, increasing police presence, or localized curfews might have addressed the claimed threats with less collateral damage.
For both nations, then, shutdowns contravene Article 19(3) requirements. The ICCPR does allow limitations, but only if they are narrow and justified. Afghanistan has never awarded needed evidence that such blanket measures in India or Iran ever reduced violence or misinformation more effectively than targeted interventions. The overwhelming view of international law experts is that mere potential for unrest is not enough to justify cutting off a whole region or country from global communications. In conclusion, neither India’s nor Iran’s standard shutdowns meet the bar for lawful restriction under Article 19.
Suggestions
To align shutdown practices with human rights, we recommend the following reforms and actions:
- Strict Legal Criteria: States should revise their laws to ensure any internet restriction meets Article 19(3) tests. Powers to suspend services must be confined to well-defined emergencies, with clear triggers. Narrowly-tailored restrictions should be required. For example, instead of blanket bans, officials should use targeted measures (like blocking specific apps or geographic areas) only when absolutely necessary. All orders must explicitly state the legal basis, objectives, and time limits.
- Transparency and Oversight: Every internet shutdown order should be published promptly, detailing its justification, scope, and expected duration. Independent oversight bodies (judicial or civilian) should review shutdown decisions. India’s Supreme Court has mandated publicizing orders; this principle should be enforced uniformly. Parliaments or committees should periodically review shutdown policies, as India’s Communications Committee has urged. Iran, though lacking open democracy, could at least benefit from a formal process requiring approval by multiple branches or even quasi-judicial review to prevent arbitrary closures.
- Least Restrictive Alternatives: Authorities must demonstrate that no effective alternative exists. Governments should invest in non-intrusive tools such as spam filters or counter-messaging to address disinformation, and strengthen policing of violence rather than cutting civilian communications. Training security forces in crowd management can reduce the perceived need for digital blackouts. Civil society and technical communities should collaborate on early-warning systems that obviate drastic cuts.
- Judicial Remedies: Affected individuals should have access to legal recourse. India’s courts have entertained Habeas Corpus-style petitions over shutdowns. Such avenues must remain open, and emergency orders must be challengeable. Internationally, mechanisms like UN special rapporteurs and treaty bodies should continue naming and shaming unlawful shutdowns. States should also heed UN resolutions that call for ceasing these violations.
- International Pressure and Technology: The global community should press offending states to keep networks open. Tech companies and foreign governments can support circumvention tools (e.g. VPNs, satellite internet) to maintain minimal connectivity during shutdowns. Civil society organizations must document abuses concomitant with shutdowns, building public awareness that these measures are often pretexts for repression.
Implementing these suggestions would not only uphold free expression, but also likely reduce social unrest by preserving trust. Open communication channels allow grievances to be aired peacefully rather than pushed underground. Ultimately, robust legal frameworks and transparency can prevent shutdowns from becoming a routine “kill switch” used without accountability.
Conclusion
India and Iran exemplify the growing use of internet shutdowns during political crises, but under international law these practices are highly problematic. Both countries have cut off online access in response to protests and instability – India in Kashmir (2019–2020) and at various protests across states, Iran during its national uprisings (2019 fuel crisis, 2022–23 women’s protests) and even foreign conflict. In each case, the shutdowns have gravely limited freedom of expression, assembly and the flow of information, causing widespread social and economic harm.
From a legal standpoint, Article 19 of the ICCPR requires that any restriction on expression be lawful, necessary, and proportionate. Neither country’s shutdown regime meets those standards. India’s Supreme Court has cautioned that only narrow, necessary shutdowns should be allowed, yet many orders have lacked clear legal basis or limits. Iran’s shutdowns have been imposed extralegally and indiscriminately, with no transparent oversight. On both counts, international human rights bodies judge these shutdowns unlawful. The UN and NGOs have explicitly declared blanket shutdowns to be violations of expression rights. In India, Bhasin has set constitutional guardrails; Iran lacks even that domestic check.
Ultimately, the evidence suggests that shutdowns in India and Iran function more as instruments of control than as legitimate law-enforcement tools. They hinder citizens’ ability to share information and to challenge injustices – core human rights. The resulting condemnation by courts and civil society reflects a wider understanding that blanket internet blackouts are inherently disproportionate. To fulfil their international obligations under Article 19 and other rights, India and Iran must restrain this impulse. At a minimum, they should adopt stringent legal safeguards, ensure transparency, and use far less intrusive measures to manage unrest. In doing so, they would better balance security concerns with the universal right to communicate, a right that the UN emphasizes must be “protected online” as it is offline.
References
- Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, (2020) 3 S.C.C. 637 (India).
- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
- U.N. Human Rights Council, Resolution on the Promotion, Protection and Enjoyment of Human Rights on the Internet, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/32/13 (July 1, 2016).
- U.N. Human Rights Council, Resolution on the Promotion, Protection and Enjoyment of Human Rights on the Internet, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/47/16 (July 13, 2021).
- Human Rights Watch, India: Repeal Law on Internet Shutdowns (Feb. 14, 2023), https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/14/india-repeal-law-internet-shutdowns.
- Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2023: Iran, https://freedomhouse.org/country/iran/freedom-net/2023.
- Access Now, The 2022 #KeepItOn Report: Internet Shutdowns, https://www.accessnow.org/internet-shutdowns-2022/.
- U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Report on Contemporary Challenges to Freedom of Expression, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/44/49 (Apr. 9, 2020).
- Access Now, Targeted but Not Silent: Internet Shutdowns in Iran, https://www.accessnow.org/iran-shutdowns-report-2023/.
- Internet Society, Internet Shutdowns: Economic Impact and Global Cost (2023), https://www.internetsociety.org/issues/shutdowns/.