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Mohit Subhash Chavan vs The State of Maharashtra (2021)

Case Comment, Publications

Introduction

The case of Mohit Subhash Chavan v. State of Maharashtra (2021) represents a critical judicial examination of the annuity of expectant bail in cases involving sexual offences against minors under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012. This case gained significant attention due to the Bombay High Court’s strong deprecation of the Sessions Court’s sense while granting expectant bail to the criminated, Mohit Subhash Chavan, who faced serious allegations of repeated rape, intimidation, and sexual exploitation of a minor girl. The High Court’s decision to cancel the bail order underscores the bar’s responsibility to handle cases of sexual violence with utmost perceptivity, particularly when the victims are children.

The judgment also raises broader enterprises about judicial stations towards sexual assault cases, especially those involving minors. The Sessions Court’s compliances similar as suggesting the survivor had” sufficient maturity” and that the relationship could have been” consensual” reflect deep- seated patriarchal impulses that continue to impact legal logic in India. The Bombay High Court’s stern reversal of this order serves as a necessary corrective, buttressing the principle that courts must rigorously cleave to statutory protections under POCSO and avoid victim- condemning narratives.

This case comment critically analyzes the data, legal issues, judicial logic, and broader counter accusations of the judgment, while also examining blights in the current legal frame and suggesting necessary reforms.

Background of the Case 

The case originates from an FIR (No. 462/2019) registered at Dharangaon Police Station, Jalgaon, Maharashtra, on December 17, 2019. The plaintiff, Rinku Nana Pardhi (also 18 times old), indicted Mohit Subhash Chavan, a technician at the Maharashtra State Electricity Production Company Ltd., of sexually assaulting her constantly since she was a minor.

Facts of the Case 

  1. On December 17, 2019, an FIR (No. 462/2019) was registered at Dharangaon Police Station, Jalgaon, Maharashtra, grounded on a complaint by Rinku Nana Pardhi, also 18 times old. She indicted Mohit Subhash Chavan, a technician at the Maharashtra State Electricity Production Company Ltd., of sexual assault that allegedly passed over several times, commencing when she was a minor. The FIR included charges under IPC Sections 376(rape), 417(infidelity), and 506(felonious intimidation), as well as Sections 3, 4, and 12 of the POCSO Act, given that the contended assaults began when the plaintiff was under 18 times of age.
  2. The plaintiff contended that the accused, a distant relative, started visiting her home constantly in 2014- 2015 when she was roughly 16 years old and in Class 9. She stated that the original sexual assault passed when she was alone at home, with the indicted reportedly entering through the backdoor, restraining her, and violating her. She further claimed that the accused hovered her with violence and acid attacks if she bared the incidents. She contended that these assaults passed multiple times (10- 12 times) over the posterior times, with the indicated occasionally using contraceptives. In 2018, she tried self-murder, which led her mama to take her to the police station to file a complaint.
  3. Prior to the enrollment of the FIR, in June 2018, the indicator’s mama reportedly interposed and admitted to the allegations. A inked undertaking was inked on June 2, 2018, stipulating that the accused would marry the plaintiff once she attained the age of 18. Still, after the plaintiff turned 18, the accuser’s family allegedly refused to deal with the marriage, which latterly led to the form of the FIR in December 2019.
  4. Following the enrollment of the FIR, on January 6, 2020, the accused filed for anticipatory bail, which was granted by the fresh Sessions Judge, Jalgaon. The conditions for bail included a security deposit of ₹ 20,000, regular attendance at the police station, and restrictions on entering the survivor’s will still, on February 5, 2021, the Bombay High Court canceled this anticipatory bail, stating that the compliances made by the Sessions Court were indecorous. In March 2021, the accused also approached the Supreme Court, which granted him a four- week interim protection from arrest, but did not overturn the Bombay High Court’s order.

Issue Raised 

  1. Whether the Sessions Court erred in granting anticipatory bail to the indicted despite serious allegations under the POCSO Act (where the victim was a minor) and IPC, considering the nature of the contended offenses and the substantiation presented ?
  2. Whether the Sessions Court’s logic for granting bail, particularly its compliances regarding the” sufficient maturity” of the minor victim and the notion of” consensual relations,” demonstrated a severe lack of perceptivity and proper operation of law in cases involving sexual offenses against minors ?
  3. Whether the anticipatory bail order was perverse, arbitrary, and capricious, thereby hindering a fair disquisition and taking cancellation to allow for necessary custodial interrogation of the indicted ?

Contentions

Applicant (State’s Side):

  1. Inappropriate operation of Section 438 CrPC: The applicant argued that the Sessions Court failed to judiciously exercise its discretion under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), 1973, for granting anticipatory bail. They asserted that the bail was granted” simply for asking” despite the extreme soberness of the contended offenses. 
  2. Gross misapprehension and Violation of POCSO Act, 2012: A crucial contention was that the Sessions Court’s logic violated the abecedarian principles of the POCSO Act, particularly Sections 3, 4, and 12. The aspirant argued that the Sessions Judge’s complaints about the minor victim’s” sufficient maturity” and the notion of” consensual relations” were fairly unhappy and directly contradicted the Act’s premise that a minor’s concurrence is inapplicable. 
  3. Inhibition of disquisition (Chapter XII CrPC): The aspirant contended that the entitlement of anticipate bail precariously hindered the police disquisition, specifically by depriving the probing Officer of the pivotal occasion for custodial interrogation, which is frequently necessary in serious cases as per Chapter XII of the CrPC.
  4. Serious Allegations of IPC Violations: The aspirant stressed the serious nature of the charges under the Indian Penal Code (IPC), including Section 376(rape), Section 417 (infidelity) for the broken marriage pledge, and Section 506 (felonious intimidation) through pitfalls.

Respondent (Mohit Subhash Chavan’s Side):

  1. Proper Exercise of Discretion under Section 438 CrPC: The indicted argued that the Sessions Court had, in fact, exercised its discretion meetly under Section 438 CrPC, citing presumptive reasons for granting bail.
  2. Advanced Threshold for Bail Cancellation (Section 439(2) CrPC): The indicted contended that the parameters for canceling a formerly granted bail (under Section 439(2) CrPC) are stricter than for granting it, suggesting the High Court should not fluently capsize the original order unless there was abuse of liberty or hindrance with the disquisition.

Rationale

  1. Seriousness of POCSO Act Offenses: The Court emphasized the essential graveness of crimes under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012. It stressed that the very purpose of the Act is to address similar serious matters, inferring that a lenient approach to bail is generally unwarranted.
  2. Impertinence of Minor’s Consent under POCSO: The most critical aspect of the High Court’s explanation was its severe review of the Sessions Court’s observation that the minor victim had” sufficient maturity” and that the alleged relationship was” consensual.” The High Court unequivocally stated that under the POCSO Act, the concurrence of a minor is entirely immaterial, and any observation to the contrary demonstrates a” maximum lack of perceptivity” and” capability.”
  3. Irritability and Arbitrariness of Sessions Court’s Order: The High Court set up the Sessions Court’s logic to be” atrocious,”  perverse, arbitrary and capricious.” It concluded that the Sessions Judge did not exercise his discretion judiciously in granting anticipatory bail under Section 438 CrPC.
  4. Need for Custodial Interrogation: The Court determined that the Sessions Court’s entitlement of anticipatory bail had” easily deprived the probing Officer of an occasion to custodial interrogate” the indicted. This stressed the necessity of custodial interrogation for a proper and thorough disquisition, especially given the serious and long- standing nature of the allegations. 
  5. Corroboration of Allegations: The High Court noted that the original allegations by the survivor, including the history of stalking, forced sexual intercourse, pitfalls, and the posterior inked undertaking for marriage, were prima facie believable. It also gave significant weight to the “stamp paper jotting” (allegedly indicating consensual coitus), interpreting its very actuality and prosecution by the indicted and his family as corroborating the survivor’s interpretation of sexual exploitation, indeed when she was a minor. The Court viewed the indicter’s and his family’s capability to land such a document from the illiterate mother as reflective of their influence and the indicter’s guilt.
  6. Unfulfilled Marriage Promise as substantiation of Exploitation: The fact that the indicter’s family originally interposed and promised marriage, only to renege once the plaintiff turned 18, was seen as further substantiation of manipulation and a breach of trust, strengthening the allegations against the indicted.

Defects in Law

  1. Misinterpretation: The Sessions Court unnaturally erred by failing to fete that under the POCSO Act, 2012 (Sections 3, 4, and 12), the concurrence of a minor is fairly inapplicable for sexual offenses, leading to unhappy compliances about the victim’s” maturity” and” consensual relations.”
  2. Misapplication: The Sessions Court’s decision to grant anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), 1973, was supposed perverse, arbitrary, and not a judicious exercise of judicial discretion, especially given the soberness of the charges.
  3. Obstruction: The entitlement of anticipant bail precociously elided the police’s power to probe under Chapter XII of the CrPC, specifically depriving the probing officer of the necessary occasion for custodial interrogation of the accused in a serious case.

Interference

In the case of Mohit Subhash Chavan vs. The State of Maharashtra, the Supreme Court’s involvement created significant contestation due to its direct hindrance, especially when the Chief Justice of India S.A. Bobde, during a bail hail for the indicted, asked him if he’d be willing to marry the woman who had indicted him of repeated rape, starting when she was a minor. This direct question by the Court, made on March 04, 2021, and its posterior commentary about the indicted losing his government job and going to jail if he refused to marry her, were extensively blamed for suggesting marriage as a implicit result to a grave felonious offense, thereby trivializing rape and raising enterprises about women’s rights and justice.

This specific intervention by the Supreme Court was distinct from the earlier undertaking linked by the indicter’s mothers promising marriage, which had passed intimately before the FIR was filed and was latterly traduced, leading to the legal proceedings. The Supreme Court’s direct query in 2021 brought the largely problematic idea of marriage as a resolution to a rape case into the loftiest judicial forum, sparking wide commination for its counteraccusations on victim’s rights and the integrity of the felonious justice system.

Commentary and Analysis

The Mohit Subhash Chavan case highlights critical excesses in judicial logic when dealing with sexual offenses against minors. The Sessions Court’s complaints regarding the victim’s” sufficient maturity” and implicit for” consensual relations” demonstrate a misreading of the POCSO Act’s defensive frame. As established in Nipun Saxena v. Union of India,  the concurrence of a minor is fairly inapplicable in cases of sexual offenses, making the Sessions Court’s logic both fairly incorrect and dangerous.

The Bombay High Court’s intervention was necessary to correct this judicial overreach. The principle established in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, regarding anticipatory bail must be balanced against the serious nature of offenses under the POCSO Act. Courts have consistently held in cases like Libnus v. State that a restrictive approach to bail is warranted in cases involving sexual offenses against children, given the inflexibility of similar crimes and the need to cover vulnerable victims.

The Supreme Court’s controversial intervention, suggesting marriage as a implicit resolution, reflects a broader systemic issue in the Indian bar’s approach to sexual violence cases. This approach contradicts the principles established in corner judgments and undermines the defensive intent of technical legislation like the POCSO Act.

Shruti Dyodia

O.P. Jindal Global University