Abstract
India’s federal framework, as envisioned in the Constitution, seeks to harmonize the pow- ers of the Union and the States, promoting cooperative federalism in a diverse nation. This paper critically examines the historical evolution, constitutional underpinnings, and contemporary challenges of Centre-State relations in India. It explores how political, economic, and institutional dynamics have shaped this relationship, focusing on fiscal federalism, legislative overreach, and the evolving roles of institutions like the Finance Commission and NITI Aayog. Employing a doctrinal research methodology, the study analyzes constitutional provisions, judicial pronouncements, and policy developments. It argues that while India’s federal structure has demonstrated resilience, challenges such as centralization, regional disparities, and political tensions undermine cooperative federal- ism. The paper proposes reforms to strengthen Centre-State collaboration, emphasizing equitable resource distribution and institutional autonomy.
Keywords: Federalism, Centre-State Relations, Cooperative Federalism, Fiscal Federalism, Indian Constitution, Finance Commission, NITI Aayog, Judicial Review.
Introduction
India’s federal structure, often termed “quasi-federal,” is a unique amalgamation of uni- tary and federal principles, designed to accommodate the country’s vast socio-cultural, linguistic, and political diversity. Enacted in 1950, the Constitution of India delineates powers between the Union and the States through legislative, administrative, and finan- cial frameworks.
However, the evolution of Centre-State relations has been fraught with tensions, driven by centralizing tendencies, regional aspirations, and economic dispari- ties.
This paper critically examines the historical trajectory, constitutional provisions, and modern challenges shaping Centre-State dynamics. It addresses the central question: How has the balance of power between the Union and States evolved, and what obsta- cles hinder the realization of cooperative federalism? The study also explores the role of judicial interventions and institutional mechanisms in maintaining federal equilibrium.
Research Methodology
Objective
This paper aims to analyze the evolution of Centre-State relations in India, identify key challenges to cooperative federalism, and propose actionable reforms to enhance federal harmony.
Research Questions
- How has the constitutional framework shaped Centre-State relations in India?
- What are the major challenges to cooperative federalism in contemporary India?
- How have judicial interventions and institutional mechanisms influenced Centre- State dynamics?
- What reforms can strengthen the federal structure in India?
Methodology
The study adopts a doctrinal research methodology, relying on primary sources such as the Constitution of India, landmark judicial decisions, and government reports, comple- mented by secondary sources like scholarly books, journal articles, and policy analyses. A qualitative approach is used to critically evaluate legal provisions, case laws, and historical developments, providing a comprehensive understanding of Centre-State relations.
Review of Literature
The discourse on Indian federalism is rich and multifaceted. Granville Austin describes India’s federal model as “cooperative federalism,” emphasizing collaboration between the
Union and States to achieve national goals.1 Amal Ray critiques the Constitution’s uni- tary bias, particularly provisions like Article 356, which allow central intervention in State governance.2 M. Govinda Rao highlights fiscal federalism as a critical challenge, noting that unequal resource distribution fuels regional disparities.3 The shift from the Planning Commission to NITI Aayog has sparked debates, with scholars like Nirvikar Singh arguing that it centralizes policymaking, limiting State autonomy.4 Recent studies also explore the impact of the Goods and Services Tax (GST) on fiscal federalism, un- derscoring tensions in tax-sharing arrangements.5 This paper builds on these works by offering a holistic analysis of historical, constitutional, and contemporary dimensions.
Historical Evolution of Centre-State Relations
Pre-Independence Context
The roots of India’s federal structure trace back to the colonial era. The Government of India Act, 1935, introduced a federal framework, though it vested significant control with the British Crown.6 This model influenced the Constituent Assembly’s debates, which sought to balance national unity with regional diversity in a newly independent India.
Constitutional Framework
The Indian Constitution divides powers between the Union and States through the Sev- enth Schedule, comprising Union, State, and Concurrent Lists.7 Articles 245–255 govern legislative relations, while Articles 268–293 address financial relations.8 Residuary powers
1Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation (Oxford University Press, 1966), 186.
2Amal Ray, “Federalism and Centre-State Relations in India,” Political Science Review 22, no. 3 (1983): 45–60.
3M. Govinda Rao, “Fiscal Federalism in India: Trends and Issues,” Economic and Political Weekly 50, no. 23 (2015): 34–41.
4Nirvikar Singh, “NITI Aayog and Indian Federalism,” Journal of Indian Governance 12, no. 1 (2018): 22–30.
5Arun Kumar, “GST and Federalism in India,” Economic and Political Weekly 53, no. 12 (2018): 25–32.
6Government of India Act, 1935, s. 5.
7Constitution of India, 1950, Seventh Schedule.
8Constitution of India, 1950, arts. 245–255, 268–293.
rest with the Union, reflecting a unitary tilt.9 Emergency provisions, notably Article 356, allow the Centre to impose President’s Rule in States, often leading to federal tensions.10
Post-Independence Developments
The early post-independence period saw a dominant Centre due to single-party rule un- der the Congress Party. The 1970s marked a shift with the emergence of regional parties, challenging central authority.11 The economic liberalization of the 1990s and coalition governments further decentralized power, fostering cooperative federalism. However, cen- tralizing policies in recent years have reignited debates over federal balance.
Constitutional Provisions and Federal Dynamics
Legislative Relations
The division of legislative powers under the Seventh Schedule is a cornerstone of Centre- State relations. The Union List includes subjects like defense and foreign affairs, while the State List covers areas like public health and agriculture.12 The Concurrent List allows shared jurisdiction, but Union law prevails in case of conflict.13 This structure often leads to disputes, particularly when the Centre legislates on State subjects under the guise of national interest.
Financial Relations
Financial relations are governed by Articles 268–293, with the Finance Commission play- ing a pivotal role in recommending tax devolution.14 The Union’s control over major revenue sources, such as income tax, limits State fiscal autonomy, creating dependency on central grants.15
9Constitution of India, 1950, art. 248.
10Constitution of India, 1950, art. 356.
11Balveer Arora, “Federalism and Political Change in India,” Indian Journal of Political Science 45, no. 2 (1984): 78–90.
12Constitution of India, 1950, Seventh Schedule, Lists I and II.
13Constitution of India, 1950, art. 254.
14Constitution of India, 1950, arts. 268–293.
15Y.V. Reddy, “Fiscal Federalism in India: Emerging Challenges,” Indian Economic Review 47, no. 1 (2012): 12–25.
Administrative Relations
Administrative relations are shaped by provisions like Article 256, which mandates States to comply with Union directives.16 The deployment of central forces and the role of All- India Services further illustrate the Centre’s administrative dominance, often causing friction with States.
Contemporary Challenges
Fiscal Federalism
Fiscal federalism remains a critical challenge. The Finance Commission’s recommenda- tions, while binding, often fail to address regional disparities adequately.17 The intro- duction of GST in 2017 centralized tax administration, reducing States’ fiscal autonomy and sparking protests from resource-poor States.18
Legislative Overreach
The Union’s dominance in the Concurrent List and frequent use of ordinances have strained Centre-State relations. For instance, central laws on agriculture, a State subject, have faced opposition from States, highlighting legislative overreach.19
Institutional Shifts
The replacement of the Planning Commission with NITI Aayog in 2015 aimed to foster cooperative federalism. However, NITI Aayog’s advisory role limits its ability to address State-specific concerns effectively.20 Critics argue that it prioritizes central agendas, un- dermining State autonomy.
16Constitution of India, 1950, art. 256.
17Fourteenth Finance Commission Report, 2015, para. 8.2.
18Arun Kumar, “GST and Federalism in India,” Economic and Political Weekly 53, no. 12 (2018): 25–32.
19Rekha Saxena, “Centre-State Relations in India: Contemporary Issues,” Indian Journal of Federal Studies 19, no. 1 (2019): 55–70.
20NITI Aayog, Annual Report 2015–16, 10.
Political Tensions
Political differences between the Centre and States, particularly under coalition or opposition- ruled governments, exacerbate federal tensions. The misuse of Article 356 in the past, though curtailed by judicial intervention, remains a contentious issue.21
Role of Institutions in Federalism
Finance Commission
The Finance Commission is tasked with ensuring equitable resource distribution. Its recommendations, such as increasing States’ share in tax devolution, have strengthened federalism, but implementation gaps persist.22
NITI Aayog
NITI Aayog was envisioned as a collaborative platform, but its lack of statutory pow- ers limits its effectiveness. States often view it as an extension of central authority, undermining its role in fostering cooperative federalism.23
Inter-State Council
The Inter-State Council, established under Article 263, aims to resolve Centre-State disputes. However, its infrequent meetings and advisory nature reduce its impact.24
Judicial Interventions
The judiciary has been instrumental in shaping Centre-State relations. In State of West Bengal v. Union of India (1963), the Supreme Court upheld the Union’s supremacy in federal matters.25 However, in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973), federalism
21S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 1918.
22Fifteenth Finance Commission Report, 2020, para. 7.3.
23Nirvikar Singh, “NITI Aayog and Indian Federalism,” Journal of Indian Governance 12, no. 1 (2018): 22–30.
24Constitution of India, 1950, art. 263.
25State of West Bengal v. Union of India, AIR 1963 SC 1241.
was declared part of the basic structure, safeguarding State autonomy.26 The landmark
S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) case restricted the misuse of Article 356, reinforcing federal principles.27 Recent judgments, such as those on GST disputes, continue to shape federal dynamics.
Emerging Trends and Future Prospects
Cooperative Federalism Initiatives
Recent initiatives, such as the GST Council and collaborative schemes like Ayushman Bharat, reflect efforts toward cooperative federalism. However, their success depends on mutual trust and equitable resource sharing.28
Regional Aspirations
The rise of regional parties and demands for greater autonomy highlight the need for a balanced federal structure. States like Tamil Nadu and West Bengal have consistently advocated for greater fiscal and legislative powers.29
Technological Interventions
Digital governance and e-governance platforms have facilitated Centre-State coordination, but disparities in technological infrastructure across States pose challenges.30
Conclusion
India’s federal structure has evolved significantly, adapting to political, economic, and social changes. However, challenges like fiscal imbalances, legislative overreach, and in- stitutional inefficiencies persist. The judiciary’s role in upholding federal principles and
26Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461.
27S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 1918.
28Rekha Saxena, “Cooperative Federalism in India,” Journal of Constitutional Studies 15, no. 2 (2020): 88–102.
29Louise Tillin, “Regional Aspirations and Federalism in India,” Political Studies Review 16, no. 3 (2018): 200–215.
30NITI Aayog, Digital India Report 2023, 45.
institutions like the Finance Commission and NITI Aayog have been pivotal, yet their effectiveness remains limited by structural constraints. Strengthening cooperative fed- eralism requires greater fiscal devolution, transparent policymaking, and robust institu- tional mechanisms. A balanced approach that respects State autonomy while preserving national unity is essential for India’s federal future.
Recommendations
- Enhance fiscal autonomy through equitable tax devolution and increased State shares in central taxes.
- Strengthen NITI Aayog’s role as a statutory body with binding powers for State- specific planning.
- Limit the use of emergency provisions like Article 356 through stricter judicial oversight.
- Revitalize the Inter-State Council as a regular forum for Centre-State dialogue.
- Promote digital governance to bridge coordination gaps, with targeted support for technologically lagging States.
Author-ABHI KUSHWAH
Mail-kushwahabhi890@gmail.com No- 7987535288
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BALLB(H)
Amity University Madhya Pradesh, Gwalior